Order Number 9512480

Individualism-collectivism and relationships in distributive negotiation: An experimental analysis

McCusker, Christopher Robert, Ph.D.

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1994

U·M·I
300 N. Zeeb Rd.
Ann Arbor, MI 48106

INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM AND RELATIONSHIPS IN DISTRIBUTIVE NEGOTIATION: AN EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS

BY

CHRISTOPHER ROBERT McCUSKER

B.S., University of Illinois, 1987
A.M., University of Illinois, 1990

THESIS

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Psychology
in the Graduate College of the
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1994

Urbana, Illinois

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN

THE GRADUATE COLLEGE

May 1994

WE HEREBY RECOMMEND THAT THE THESIS BY

Christopher Robert McCusker

ENTITLED Individualism-collectivism and Relationships in Distributive Negotiation: An Experimental Analysis

BE ACCEPTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF Doctor of Philosophy

Director of Thesis Research

Head of Department

Committee on Final Examination†

Chairperson

† Required for doctor's degree but not for master's.

O-517

ABSTRACT

An experiment was conducted in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong to test predictions about the impact of individualism and collectivism on the process of distributive negotiation. Individualism and collectivism are cultural syndromes that generally refer to the relative emphasis people place on individuals or groups in thinking about and behaving in social interactions. Individualism is defined by an emphasis on a private self-identity and a desire for independence. Consequences of individualism include the tendency for behavior to be a function of individual cost-benefit calculations. Collectivism is defined by an emphasis on a collective self-identity and a desire for interdependence. Its main consequences are that social norms should be of primary importance in directing social behavior, and the ingroup or outgroup status of others should be important considerations for behavior in social interactions. Based on an analysis of the implications of individualism and collectivism for negotiation behavior, it was argued that the assumption of self-interest was more valid for individualists than collectivists. It was further argued that collectivistic dyads would follow communal relationships rules, while individualistic dyads would follow exchange relationship rules. Communal rules are characterized by concern for the needs of the other party. Exchange rules are characterized by immediate reciprocation of benefits received by another. In the current experiment, participants were classified as

individualists or collectivists based on responses to questionnaire measures. Consistent with expectations, undergraduate male participants from Seoul, Korea and Hong Kong tended to be collectivistic, while those from Champaign, Illinois, U.S.A. tended to be individualistic. Individualistic and collectivistic dyads participated in a 1 issue distributive negotiation. Consistent with predictions, the assumption of self-interest was more viable for individualists than collectivists. Also, consistent with predictions, collectivists and individualists appear to rely on communal and exchange relationship rules for giving and receiving benefits in distributive negotiation, respectively. Implications for the dominant paradigm of negotiation research and the theory of individualism and collectivism are discussed.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was funded in part by an American Psychological Association Dissertation Research Award and a Dissertation Research Grant from the Department of Psychology at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

Several people deserve mention for their helpful assistance with this project. In the United States, I appreciate the friendship, expertise and kindness of Joselito Cornelio Lualhati who skillfully coded the "I am" statements one saturday in New York City. I also thank Jill Conway, Paul Franz and Michael Sammonds for their assistance with collecting and entering data. In South Korea, I am grateful for the enthusiastic support of Dr. Kidok Nam in all aspects of this research including collection of the Korean data. He is a great friend. Finally, I sincerely appreciate the efforts of Dr. Andrew Chi-fai Chan in collecting the Chinese data and providing his insights concerning the project.

I would especially like to thank the members of my dissertation committee: Harry C. Triandis (Chair), Peter J. Carnevale (Director of Research), Fritz Drasgow, Lawrence J. Hubert, and Samuel S. Komorita. Special mention and extra thanks should be given to three of them. It is hard to calculate all that Fritz Drasgow has done for me over the years. In 1986, he agreed to supervise my undergraduate Honors Thesis and provided me with my first research experience. The expertise, patience, enthusiasm, humor and sound advice he shared with me during that

project continued through graduate school through his roles as teacher, research supervisor, and primary academic advisor. Peter Carnevale sparked my interest in negotiation research and was the advisor of my A.M. thesis. It has been a delight to work with him. His enthusiasm, generosity, curiosity and creativity are contagious. I especially want to thank him for the countless hours he has spent sharing ideas, teaching, and listening to and providing feedback about my latest "great" idea. Finally, I want to thank Harry Triandis. It has been a pleasure to be his student. He was a magnificent Chair--reading and commenting on drafts of my thesis within a day, sharing this thoughts and ideas, and so on. His dedication to students is remarkable. In 1986, as an undergraduate, I stopped in his office to ask for a "social distance" questionnaire he had developed. He stopped typing what was probably a very important paper and looked for the social distance scale for 10 minutes. Unsuccessful in his search, he decided to retype it from memory. Twenty minutes later, I left. Now, as an assistant professor, I often face interruptions from students when I am trying to write a paper or do something "important." Sometimes it is hard to give them all of the attention they deserve. For Harry, students, from not-so-famous, newly met undergraduates to graduate collaborators, have always been top priority. His dedication, patience, enthusiasm and generosity are greatly appreciated.

I would also like to thank my parents, Dennis and Gail, and my siblings, Jeff, Dawn, Shawn, and Rachael. They have been a

constant support group for me throughout my graduate and undergraduate years. My parents have taught me how to live and appreciate a passionate, uncomplicated, focused life. Also, my siblings have always reminded me how important it is to play and have fun. They were also the first people with whom I had to negotiate--most of the ideas contained in this dissertation have been played out one time or another in our childhood! I think these results prove once and for all that I was right in most of our disputes.

Finally, I would like to thank my wife and soul mate Wendy. She has been there every step of the way--from reading drafts of my proposal in White Plains, New York to enduring my late nights and weekends on the computer in Branford, Connecticut to lonely late night phone calls from Champaign, Illinois as I try to get this beast in the right format. I appreciate all of her help, patience, humor, and encouragement. She demonstrates, time and time again, the positive consequences of having someone you love follow communal relationship rules. I am very fortunate!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

The manner in which interdependent parties reconcile divergent interests is a fundamental issue for social science. When divergent interests exist among two parties, they have two basic options available: domination or discussion. Domination occurs when individuals attempt to use force to achieve desired ends. It entails actions such as yelling, fighting and often war. Discussion that occurs among interdependent parties to reconcile divergent interests is called negotiation (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992).

Because of enormous scientific and technological success, never in the history of human existence has the choice between domination and discussion been so important. While science and technology have made people across the globe increasingly interdependent, they have also given mankind the means to self-destruct. So far, over 180 million people have been killed in war during the 20th century (Deutsch, 1993). Perhaps one of the biggest challenges facing social scientists in the twenty-first century will be to develop and apply theories to improve on this alarming legacy.

Moreover, global interaction and interdependence will only increase in the coming years. This means that there is a potential for culture, through its effects on social behavior, to play an increasingly important role in human affairs. This dissertation explores the role of culture in negotiation. It is based on the presumption that culture is a necessary parameter in

understanding negotiation in an increasingly interdependent world.

From Greek historians to modern day international observers, people have long recognized cultural differences in customs, habits, attitudes and so on (Triandis, 1972). No special training is needed to observe them. The question for negotiation researchers is how much impact, if any, does culture have on how divergent interests are reconciled.

Despite its substantive importance, social psychological research on culture and negotiation is sparse. Research on negotiation is considerable, but knowledge gleaned from research on culture and social behavior remains unassimilated. Neglect is understandable since theoretical developments in cross-cultural psychology have been relatively recent. But as Triandis (1990) notes, the time is ripe to incorporate culture in our theories of social behavior.

This thesis is an initial step in a program of research to address the role of culture in negotiation. Specifically, the current research analyzes negotiation behavior in 3 places: Champaign, Illinois, USA; Seoul, Korea; and Hong Kong. It is assumed that observed differences in negotiation behavior stem from the influence of the different cultures evident in the 3 places. This dissertation also provides a test of the capability of certain aspects of the cultural theory of individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1989; 1990) to interpret observed cultural differences in negotiation behavior.

Negotiation

Negotiation occurs when two or more interdependent parties attempt to reach agreement about conflicting interests through discussion (Lewicki & Litterer, 1985; Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). The parties in a negotiation can include individuals, groups, departments, units or even political bodies such as the United Nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and although the parties and contexts can vary substantially, many researchers believe there are more similarities than differences across the diverse arenas in which negotiation occurs (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

It is worth noting the above definition has three essential ingredients. The first is interdependence. Interdependence occurs when one's outcomes are the confluence of one's actions and the actions of at least one other person. If parties are not interdependent, they can pursue their interests unencumbered by the interests of others, and it makes no sense to concern ourselves with the second key ingredient: conflict. Conflict arises when people compete for scarce resources or when people possess different opinions, interests, or goals. Finally, the third ingredient is discussion. Because negotiation entails discussion, rather than domination, force or aggression, it is a peaceful way to resolve conflict.

Negotiation is not easy, and sometimes domination can be less costly to the party that employs it. Moreover, domination can be effective in meeting one's objectives. But, when one

considers the combined costs **to both parties** of resolving conflicts through domination, negotiation is clearly preferred. For example, complete elimination of entire cities is technologically feasible. That option might be perceived as a quick, efficient way to achieve objectives within the narrow reasoning of an amoralistic despot, but it hardly maximizes joint outcomes. In sum, negotiation involves peace and with peace comes prosperity. Thus, the effectiveness of negotiation in resolving disputes can be directly linked to the well-being of society (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

The importance of negotiation research will increase in the future because people of the world are simultaneously growing more interdependent and aggressive. One need not look far to see increasing international economic interdependence. For example, foreign direct investment in the United States is increasing exponentially (Adler, 1986). One need not look much further to see increasing aggression. From urban violence in U.S. cities to renewed war in Europe, the tendency to resolve conflict through domination seems to be on the rise.

Gaining competitive advantage in business contexts represents another reason negotiation research has been and will continue to be important. Among managers, leaders, and organizational scholars, an emerging consensus contends collaborative commercial transactions can be superior to competitive ones (cf. Dixit & Nalebuff, 1991).

Another important application of negotiation research

concerns labor-management relations. Unions and collective bargaining continue to command attention from organizational scholars (cf. Freeman & Medoff, 1984). Moreover, dramatic changes are taking place in the nature of the employment relation. For example, temporary workers are becoming commonplace especially in the service sector. Negotiation is a crucial mechanism in managing the tension between staffing for flexibility and gaining commitment from temporary help. On the other side of the coin, organizations must negotiate employment contracts with highly skilled employees who are increasingly in demand and less committed to a particular organization than they are to a career path (Northcraft & Neale, 1990).

For these reasons, research on negotiation theory continues to attract the attention of scholars in several disciplines. According to Carnevale and Pruitt (1992), there are 3 main research traditions in negotiation: advice (for example, Cohen, 1980; de Callieres, 1716), mathematical (for example, Luce & Raiffa, 1957), and behavioral (for example, Pruitt, 1981; Walton & McKersie, 1965).

This dissertation is grounded in the behavioral tradition that has been emphasized by social and organizational psychologists. Its aim is to develop theories to understand and predict relations between external conditions, psychological states, and negotiation behavior. Its strengths lie in the conceptual cause-effect relations that have been articulated and tested, and its weaknesses stem from the overly simplistic causal

sequence that has become the dominant paradigm (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

CHAPTER 2. DISTRIBUTIVE NEGOTIATION

This dissertation is based on the behavioral tradition, which is described in the remainder of this chapter. The description begins with a presentation of two fundamental negotiation processes: distribution and integration. This is followed by a literature review of distributive processes, the focus of this dissertation.

Distribution and Integration in Negotiation

A fundamental distinction occurs between distributive and integrative negotiation processes (Follett, 1940; Walton & McKersie, 1965). In her now well known example, Follett (1940) describes two sisters bickering over possession of an orange. One wants to make juice, the other jam. One solution is to cut the orange in half, thus allowing both sisters to enjoy a portion of it. Another solution is to give all of the peels to one sister for jam and the rest to the other for juice. By doing so, each ends up with better outcomes, more juice or more jam, than if the orange were simply divided. From this example, it is possible to identify the two processes. Distributive negotiating entails "pure" conflict - one person's loss is the other person's gain. Negotiators desire to obtain as much as possible of the same resources, hence the gist of distributive bargaining is deciding how to "divide the pie." Integrative negotiation involves several issues on which parties have different preference orderings. Thus, important issues for one party and may be unimportant for the other. Integrative

agreements are possible if negotiators make trade-offs to maximize yield on important issues in exchange for concessions on unimportant ones (Pruitt, 1981; Raiffa, 1982; Walton & McKersie, 1965). In sum, distribution concerns claiming value, or "dividing the orange," while integration concerns creating value, or "expanding the amount of the orange available" (Lax & Sebenius, 1987).

The simplest form of distributive negotiation occurs when parties negotiate over a single issue. Unlike integrative negotiation, where parties can create value, or "expand the pie," to achieve "win-win" agreements that satisfy both parties, distributive negotiation requires compromise or giving-in (Follett, 1940). One or both parties must make concessions to reach an agreement. Even when multiple issues exist and negotiators successfully "expand the pie," the resources, or pie, still must be divided and concessions are required. So, all negotiations contain both distributive and integrative aspects (Bottom & Studt, 1990).

The early part of the behavioral tradition focused primarily on distributive negotiation, while the latter half has focused primarily on integrative negotiation (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992). Why is this? Perhaps the initial emphasis on distributive negotiation in behavioral research was due to the heavy influence of the mathematical tradition (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Economists and game theorists focused on distributive negotiation because it tendered a smaller set of situational parameters to

mathematically represent. However, as the behavioral tradition unfolded and defined itself, integrative negotiation received more attention, probably because the social aspects of negotiation were clearly very important. For instance, to find and make trade-offs, one must communicate and be willing to collaborate with the other party (Pruitt, 1981).

The relative abandonment of research on distributive negotiation in the behavioral tradition may have been premature. Distribution and integration represent two qualitatively different processes (Follett, 1940; Lax & Sebenius, 1987; Walton & McKersie, 1965), and as Bottom and Studt (1990) note, both processes occur during most negotiations. Therefore, a complete theory of negotiation should account for both.

The Dominant Paradigm of Negotiation Research

Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) argue that a dominant paradigm exists in negotiation research. The paradigm they depict specifies the consistent causal links that have been made in behavioral negotiation theories. The first is between external conditions and psychological states. External conditions exist at the start of negotiations and concern features of the situation. Examples of such conditions include time pressure (Carnevale & Lawler, 1986), the number of parties (Kramer, 1992), and the frame of the task (Huber, Northcraft & Neale, 1987). External conditions are assumed to lead to psychological states such as goals, motives, perceptions and cognitions (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Psychological states then affect outcomes such

as concession rate or demand level. The link between psychological states and outcomes can be direct, or it can be mediated by strategy and tactics.

Most of the research on distributive negotiation is consistent with what has become the dominant paradigm. Below a literature review of research on distributive negotiation is presented and criticized. First, some important features of distributive negotiation are described.

Features of Distributive Negotiation

Distributive negotiation occurs when interdependent parties must reach agreement about how to divide a resource (Pruitt, 1981). Before empirical analyses of distributive negotiation are reviewed, a brief discussion of its key elements is presented.

This analysis considers a simple distributive negotiation in which there is a single resource to be divided between two parties. Features of distributive negotiation include the issue, goals, demands, limits, agreement and agreement zone. The issue can be any resource desired by interdependent parties. Interdependence arises since neither party can decide independently how much of the resource to take--both parties must agree on its final distribution. Goals are the levels of demand negotiators want to achieve. Demands are the amount of the resource requested by parties at various times during the negotiation. Limits are the most unfavorable levels of demand that are acceptable to the parties, respectively. An agreement is reached when parties' make mutually acceptable demands.

Finally, the agreement zone is defined by the parties' limits and consists of the set of possible agreements, or demands, that are mutually acceptable to both parties.

Presented below is an example of a distributive negotiation between two professors: Snodgrass and Resnikoff. In this example, a secretary, Mr. Luke Warm, has been assigned to work 19 hours per week. The professors must divide Mr. Warm's time between them. The issue is the number of hours Mr. Warm will work for each professor per week. The total amount of Mr. Warm's available time is 19 hours per week. The demands of each party can range from 0 to 19 hours. Prior to their meeting, Professors Snodgrass and Resnikoff determine their goals and limits. Snodgrass determines that she needs Mr. Warm at least 9 hours per week. She is an Associate Editor of a prestigious journal. However, she would not mind a few additional hours to ensure efficiency, so she sets a goal of 12 hours. Professor Resnikoff determines that he needs Mr. Warm 3 hours per week. Being very disorganized he needs Mr. Warm to help him find things. However, he does not want to appear less important than Snodgrass by having no real use for a secretary, so he decides to accept no less than 8 hours of Mr. Warm's time. Resnikoff also sets a goal of 13 hours, because, after all, his files are a mess and Mr. Warm could spend some time alphabetizing them. So Snodgrass's has a goal and limit of 12 and 9, respectively, while Resnikoff's goal and limit are 13 and 8. This creates a positive agreement zone that consists of those demands that are greater than or

equal to both parties limits, but sum to 19 hours or less. It can also be noted that the limits define the amount of resource that is negotiable, or "on the table." If the sum of the professor's limits was greater than 19 then a negative agreement zone would exist. In such a case, no agreement would be possible unless the limits were changed.

Research on Distributive Negotiation

Most research has been wholly consistent with the dominant paradigm described by Pruitt and Carnevale (1993). Researchers have attempted to identify the conditions leading to different concession making strategies, and, then, how concession making strategies affect negotiation outcomes.

Strategy in Distributive Negotiation

Two types of concession strategies have been explored in distributive negotiation: proactive[1] and reactive. Proactive strategy refers to the posture, or stance, a negotiator takes. Two distinct approaches exist. The first is toughness, which consists of making high initial demands followed by slow concessions. The second is softness, which entails making low initial demands and then rapid concessions.

Reactive strategies develop in response to the behavior of the other party. Two distinct reactive strategies are matching and mismatching (Pruitt, 1981). Matching is an imitation strategy whereby negotiators mimic the behavior of the other party. Toughness is met with toughness, softness with softness. Matching is closely related to the norm of reciprocity (Komorita

& Esser, 1975). Mismatching entails responding to the other's softness with toughness and vice versa. Mismatching seems to be a function of tracking (Pruitt, 1981; Yukl, 1974b). Tracking occurs when negotiators base demands on their estimation of what the other party's limit might be. For example, if a negotiator is faced with a soft opponent, it may indicate that the opponent has a low limit, or has more room to concede. Thus, based on this information, mismatching the opponent's softness is feasible.

In summary, we make the distinction between proactive and reactive strategies in distributive negotiation. Proactive strategies concern negotiation postures and can be either tough or soft. Reactive strategies concern responses to the other party's behavior and can include either matching or mismatching. Much research has attempted to link these concession strategies to negotiation outcomes.

Outcomes in Distributive Negotiation

Economic, rather than psychological, outcomes have dominated research on distributive negotiation. Most research has analyzed the levels of demand, the value of agreements and the likelihood of agreement. There are psychological outcomes as well, including satisfaction with outcomes and perceived procedural fairness.

Relation between Proactive Strategy and Outcomes

Pruitt (1981) and Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) conclude that there exists an inverted U-shaped relation between proactive

strategy and economic outcomes. If negotiators are too tough, in other words, make initial demands that are extremely high and concede slowly, outcomes tend to be poor because agreement is unlikely. If negotiators are too soft, in other words, make initial demands that are extremely low and concede rapidly, then they receive poor outcomes--outcomes inferior to those of the other party. Behavior between the extremes should result in better outcomes.

Direct support for this conclusion has been found. Benton, Kelley, and Liebling (1972) used programmed concession schedules that were either tough, moderate, or soft. The tough concession schedule yielded significantly fewer agreements than the moderate or soft schedules did. Moreover, the average earnings were greatest in the moderate condition.

Further support can be found for different parts of the relation in several other studies. For example, the idea that too much toughness leads to poor outcomes has been supported in a study by Hamner (1974). He found subjects who faced a tough programmed strategy produced fewer agreements and took longer to reach an agreement than subjects who faced softer strategies.

Other research indicates that too much softness leads to poor outcomes. For example, if subjects made low initial demands and fast concessions, agreements were less likely than if moderate demands and concessions were made (Bartos, 1974; Hamner, 1974). Also, Chertkoff & Conley (1967) found that parties who made more extreme offers received higher outcomes than their

opponent.

Determinants of Proactive Strategy

Given the fundamental relation between proactive concession strategy and outcomes, much research has been done to uncover its determinants. Proactive strategy can stem from internal psychological states such as a cooperative or competition interpersonal orientation (Rubin & Brown, 1975) or negotiator aspirations or goals. Proactive strategy can also stem from external conditions. Consistent with the dominant paradigm, most research has attempted to identify how external conditions affect proactive strategy. An important external condition of proactive strategy has been limits. In general, the most important determinants of proactive strategy have been limits and aspirations, and both have shown similar effects (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992).

Determinants of Limits. Limits can arise from economic considerations, such as determining one's Best Alternative To Negotiated Agreement, or BATNA (Fisher & Ury, 1981). For example, if one were selling a car and received a firm offer from Party A, when dealing with subsequent parties, Party A's offer becomes the BATNA. Similarly, one can base one's limit on a reservation price (Raiffa, 1982), which is the BATNA plus or minus any transaction costs associated with finding a new party to deal with (White & Neale, 1992).

Limits can also be determined subjectively. For example, they may be a function of how much a negotiator likes the other

party (White & Neale, 1992). Pruitt (1981) argues that low limits may appear if negotiators anticipate costs of breaking off the negotiation, such as deterioration of the relationship. He argues further that limits may be high when negotiators are concerned with the need to look strong. In such cases, negotiators may set high limits and reject otherwise reasonable offers.

It should be noted that although the ideas concerning the determinants of limits are compelling, no research has specifically addressed them.

Limits and The Resistance Model. The mechanisms underlying the effects of limits on proactive strategy are best summarized by the resistance model of Kelley, Beckman and Fischer (1967); modified by Smith, Pruitt, and Carnevale (1982). According to this model, negotiators experience two competing psychological states: resistance to making concessions and pressure to make concessions. Higher concessions are hypothesized to produce more resistance. Resistance is hypothesized to be directly related to limits. Higher limits produce greater resistance. Also, the closer a demand is to one's limit, the greater resistance to making concessions becomes. Pressure to make concessions can stem from external conditions such as time pressure (Smith, Pruitt, & Carnevale, 1982). While there is little concession pressure, for example, low time pressure, demands should be greater. Under large concession pressure, such has high time pressure, demands should be reduced. This model predicts that

one's level of demand will occur based on competing pressures toward resistance and concessions. This model also predicts that concession rates should decrease during the course of negotiation because resistance should be greater, the closer one is to one's limit. Directly at the value of one's limit, resistance is infinite and no further concessions should occur.

The main predictions of the model, namely that higher limits produce higher initial demands and slower concessions, have received support (Holmes et al., 1971; Kelley et al., 1967; Smith et al., 1982; Yukl, 1974a,b). Support for the notion the relation between limits and demands is greater near the limit has also been found (Holmes et al., 1971; Kelley et al., 1967; Yukl, 1974b).

Aspirations and Proactive Strategy

Aspirations have been shown to produce similar effects to those of limits (Pruitt, 1981; Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). For example, Siegal and Fouraker (1960) found that if agreement was reached, negotiators with higher aspirations received better outcomes. Further research has found that higher aspirations are related to higher demands and smaller concessions (Hamner & Harnett, 1975). The work of Yukl (1974a,b) suggests that aspirations should be related to demands in the early stages of negotiation, but limits should be increasingly related to demands as the negotiation progresses, in other words, as tracking takes effect.

Limits, Aspirations and Overbidding

In most negotiation research, a model of the flow of the negotiation process is assumed (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). This model assumes that people make initial demands that are above their aspirations, or goals, which in turn are above their limits. The model then assumes that as the negotiation proceeds both parties make concessions until they reach a level that is mutually acceptable, in other words, a level that falls within the agreement zone. So, over the course of negotiation, demands, goals and limits converge. Support for this model has been observed by Yukl (1974a).

This dynamic has been called overbidding, or sham bargaining (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Overbidding is presumed to result from concerns about creating an image of firmness (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Another possibility is that negotiators follow social prescriptions, or norms, about the way negotiation should be conducted (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Some norms imply that concession making is an expected part of negotiation (Zartman et al., 1990), and, thus, by overbidding, negotiators allow themselves room to concede, yet still obtain their goals.

Determinants of Reactive Concession Strategies

Research on the determinants of reactive concession strategies has focused on one party's reactions to the other's demands. Two distinct possibilities have been examined: matching or mismatching. Matching entails responding to the other's toughness with toughness and softness with softness.

Mismatching entails responding to the other's toughness with softness and vice versa.

Matching other's toughness has been found many studies (Bartos, 1974; Benton et al., 1972; Chertkoff & Conley, 1968; Esser & Komorita, 1975; Komorita & Esser, 1975; Smith et al., 1982; Yukl, 1974b). Matching seems most likely, when parties have information about the other party's payoffs or limits (Chertkoff & Conley, 1968; Smith et al., 1982).

Mismatching has also been found in several studies (Chertkoff & Conley, 1967; Liebert et al., 1968; Pruitt & Syna, 1985; Yukl, 1974b). Mismatching seems to be most likely when parties have little information about the other's payoffs or limits (Chertkoff & Conley, 1968; Smith et al., 1982).

This effect is best explained by assuming that an attributional process takes place when an opponent makes a demand (Esser & Komorita, 1975). In the absence of other information, the other party's demand provides clues about how much one can expect to receive in the negotiation. When the other party is tough, negotiators adjust their aspirations and decide that less is available in the negotiation. When the other party is soft, negotiators adjust their aspirations and decide that more is available. Thus, mismatching occurs with little information.

When additional information is available, negotiators can judge whether an opponent's demand is fair, and, matching is likely due to the reciprocity norm (Esser & Komorita, 1975; Komorita & Esser, 1975).

Another explanation for matching is not strategic, but concerns operant conditioning (Wall, 1974). In 4 experiments, Wall found support for the idea that the probability of future concessions will increase if a negotiator rewards an opponent's concession by making one himself.

The Quality of Agreements

Another important topic in distributive negotiation concerns the quality of agreements reached by negotiation dyads. This research has generally assessed agreement quality by comparing obtained agreements to those expected based on normative economic criteria. Such prescriptive standards arise from economic considerations of efficiency (cf. Nash, 1950; Raiffa, 1982). In distributive negotiation, this entails considering how much of the available resource was allocated between the parties and how much was unallocated, or "left on the table."

Returning to our example, an efficient, high quality, agreement would occur if all 19 of Mr. Warm's weekly hours were divided. For example, Snodgrass gets 10 and Resnikoff gets 9. An agreement of poor quality would be one in which Snodgrass gets 9 and Resnikoff gets 9. This would be inefficient because it leaves 1 hour for Mr. Warm to daydream, talk on the phone overseas, or gossip with coworkers about how terrible it is to work for Snodgrass and Resnikoff.

Unfortunately, little research has directly attempted to examine the quality of agreements in distributive negotiation. Perhaps this is due to the recent emphasis of negotiation

researchers with the quality of agreements in integrative negotiation. This integrative emphasis has been especially important among those who analyze negotiation outcomes from a cognitive or decision making perspective (cf. Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985). These researchers have identified how judgment errors can lead to agreements of poor quality (cf. Thompson, 1990).

Another way to assess agreement quality is to consider how satisfied parties' are with the agreement. Satisfaction is important for agreements to be upheld (Pruitt, 1981). Little work has been done concerning satisfaction, although some research has found that outcome-differences account for a larger portion of overall utility than the utility associated with own outcomes (e.g., De Dreu, Lualhati, & McCusker, 1994).

Fairness principles. The quality of agreements in distributive negotiation can be affected by fairness principles related to social comparison. Fairness in social comparison usually takes the form of a norms of distributive justice (Deutsch, 1975). Such norms include equality, which states that benefits should be distributed equally (for example, human rights should apply to all regardless of race, sex, etc.), equity, which states the benefits should be proportional to contributions (for example, higher pay raises should go to the hardest workers), or need, which states that benefits should be distributed according to needs (for example, entitlement should go to the poor).

Such norms can sometimes lead negotiators to agreements that

are incompatible with efficiency. For example, according to the equality principle, negotiators should prefer agreements that yield equal outcomes to both parties. Or, according to the equity principle, negotiators should prefer agreements that produce equivalent proportions of inputs to outcomes to those that do not. Both of these principles can yield inefficient outcomes when the most efficient outcomes are not consistent with them. This is precisely what was reported by Messe (1971).

In his study, subjects performed a prebargaining task and were given feedback about how much they contributed. Then, they negotiated over which of a series of 9 possible payments they each would receive. Consistent with both the equality and equity principles, dyads with equal inputs on the prebargaining task tended to prefer the one agreement that provided equal outcomes ($2 for each), even though the 8 other possible agreements were more efficient, or yielded larger combined profits (for example, $5 for one and .50 for the other). Moreover, consistent with the equity principle, subjects preferred agreements that produced equivalent proportionalities between inputs and outcomes, to those that did not, but were of higher combined value. These findings support the idea that fairness norms, and more fundamentally social comparison, can lead negotiators to leave some of the resource unallocated.

Equal concessions. Another perspective has been given about the nature of agreements. Raiffa (1982) argues that the most likely point of agreement among negotiators of equal power and

status will be the midpoint of the agreement zone. In Raiffa's conception this is based on the idea that negotiators tend to follow the norm of equal concessions. This is closely related to the reciprocity norm (Esser & Komorita, 1975; Komorita & Esser, 1975) and the use a matching strategy (Pruitt, 1981). There is no reason to assume that the most efficient outcome lies in the midpoint of the agreement zone.

Focal Solutions. Another perspective is provided by Schelling's (1960) ideas about "focal solutions," or mutually prominent alternatives. According to Schelling (1960), perceptual salience sometimes makes particular agreements, such as the middle level of an issue, more likely. Again, if the focal solution predicts outcomes, then the efficiency of outcomes will simply be a matter of chance.

Judgment in Distributive Negotiation

Both distributive and integrative negotiation require decision making. In the decision making framework, negotiators, as cognitive misers suffering from information overload (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), are conceptualized to be information processors and decision makers (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Negotiators choose among alternative courses of action based on judgments. Judgments are made regarding the other party, the self, interpersonal utilities, offers and counter-offers, outcomes and the negotiation process (Thompson & Hastie, 1990).

Because incomplete information is typical during negotiations, judgment occurs under uncertainty. Psychologists

have extensively studied judgment under uncertainty and have described many situations when decision makers deviate from normative criteria of economic rationality (Arkes & Hammond, 1986; Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; Markus & Zajonc, 1985).

Many findings from the "judgment under uncertainty" literature have received attention in negotiation research (e.g., Bazerman, Magliozzi & Neale, 1985). Erroneous judgments can impede successful negotiations (Pruitt, 1981; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Little research on judgment and integrative negotiation points to different conclusions (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993).

Many efforts have sought to incorporate Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) value framing effects into negotiation (cf. Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985). Recent research has examined judgments of interpersonal utilities, in other words, judgments of the other party's preferences and limit (Bottom & Paese, 1994; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; Thompson, 1990). These inquiries demonstrate that judgments of interpersonal utilities are an important determinant of negotiation outcomes.

One judgment error in particular, the fixed-pie perception, has been shown to be problematic (Pruitt & Lewis, 1975; Thompson & Hastie, 1990). According to this error, people often assume other parties have preferences identical to theirs. This leads to a failure to identify trade-offs and, subsequently, inefficient <u>individual</u> and <u>joint</u> outcomes. For example, if the sisters in the Follett story mistakenly perceived the other to want the orange for identical reasons, they would never identify

the possible trade-off and would inefficiently split the orange in half.

This effect can be attributed to an instance of the false-consensus effect (Dawes, 1989) in that people are assuming that others hold similar views as themselves. However, as Dawes (1989) argued, the false-consensus effect is not a judgment error if one uses Baysian logic. If one only has information about one's self, why not use it? It could be that subjects in these experiments are just good Baysians, rather than error makers.

The effects of the fixed-pie perception are probably specific to integrative negotiation involving multiple issues. Therefore, conclusions about the relation between judgment and individual and joint outcomes based on this effect are probably limited to the integrative aspects of negotiation.

For example, as Bottom and Paese (1994) demonstrated, judgment in distributive negotiation is quite different, and can lead to a different conclusion about the relation between judgment errors and outcomes. They contrasted two hypotheses concerning judgments of opponents' limits. One was the rational expectations hypothesis. In its strong form, it stated that negotiators should accurately estimate the opponent's limit. In its weak form, it stated that negotiator's should on the average provide inaccurate estimates, but the errors should be random about an accurate mean. The second hypothesis was the optimism hypothesis, which stated that negotiators should estimate the opponents' limits to be favorable to themselves.

Bottom and Paese used a one-issue distributive negotiation, where subjects negotiated over the purchase price of a used car. During the negotiation, buyers made judgments about the sellers' limits, or how far sellers would ultimately lower their prices. They found support for the optimism hypothesis. But, they found that negotiators who exhibited an optimistic judgment bias outperformed those who were accurate. Apparently, believing they could get more from the other party resulted in a tougher strategy and superior outcomes. Although their study does not address this, it can be argued that this judgment error--estimating the opponent's limit to be favorable to oneself, can reduce the quality of joint outcomes by lessening the likelihood of agreement.

In summary, similar to research on integrative negotiation, judgment errors were found to be important in predicting outcomes in distributive negotiation. Contrary to conclusions from research on integrative negotiation, however, Bottom and Paese found that judgment error correlated positively with the quality of individual outcomes. Buyers who overestimated the extent to which sellers would lower their prices, actually outperformed those who accurately judged the size of sellers' lowest offers. Thus, judgment error was shown to produce better results.

One possible criticism of research on the effects of judgment error in negotiation concerns realism. That is, subjects have not been asked to make judgments of interpersonal utilities per se, but rather of experimenter utilities. For

example, research on the fixed-pie perception has required subjects to construct their opponents' issue charts, but those issue charts were given to opponents by the experimenter. So, essentially subjects are asked to construct the issue chart that was given to their opponent by the experimenter. Similarly, in research on estimates of opponents' limits, opponents were given limits by the experimenter. So, subjects task was one of estimating what limit the experimenter gave their opponent.

To the extent to which limits stem from subjective factors such as interpersonal attraction (White & Neale, 1992) or the need to create an image or preserve a relationship (Pruitt, 1981), their methodology is a limitation.

Relationships in Distributive Negotiation

Another potentially important influence on negotiation is the relationship between the negotiators (Gruder, 1971). Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) argue that the positivity or negativity of the negotiators' relationship can affect negotiation. Relationship positivity or negativity stems from the amount of concern the parties have for each other's outcomes. High concern for the other party's outcomes indicates positivity, and vice versa. Defined this way, relationships, and their effects, are easily comported to the Dual Concern Model (Pruitt & Rubin, 1986), which has been shown to be a powerful tool in predicting outcomes in integrative negotiation (cf. Ben-Yoav & Pruitt, 1984a,b).

However, in research on distributive negotiation, only one

study has examined relationships (Schoeninger & Wood, 1969). Shoeninger & Wood compared the negotiation behavior of married and ad-hoc mixed sex dyads. They found married couples exhibited less toughness than ad-hoc dyads. That is, married couples tended to make smaller initial demands and concede more rapidly. A similar finding was found in a study by Fry et al. (1983) using an integrative task. Further research is needed to determine the many other ways in which relationships are bound to affect negotiation.

Research on Distributive Negotiation: Conclusions

In this section, three main conclusions about behavior in distributive negotiation are described. Each of the conclusions can be thought of as assumptions, underlying theory, that have received solid empirical support from behavioral research on distributive negotiation.

Conclusion 1: *Parties in distributive negotiation attempt to maximize their own interests.* Most research described above is consistent with the notion that people approach distributive negotiation situations with a "how much can I get from this exchange" mentality. For example, support for this can be observed in findings concerning mismatching--when there is no information to conclude otherwise, people will respond to another's softness with toughness. Assuming self-interest, the thinking behind mismatching might be as follows: "The other person is conceding, thus, they are probably in a weak position and I can get more from them." Similarly, support for the self-

interest conclusion can be seen in evidence that people engage in tracking, or considerations of the value of the opponent's limit, when making demands in the negotiation. When one seeks the value of the opponent's limit, one seeks the answer to the question: "how much can I get from this exchange?"

Conclusion 2: *Behavior in distributive negotiation can be understood through analyses individual cost-benefit calculations.* Much empirical evidence is consistent with the assumption that negotiators need to make cost-benefit calculations during distributive negotiation. For example, that there exists a curvilinear relation between proactive strategy and outcomes, suggests that negotiators must weigh the costs of being too tough against the likelihood of agreement. In being tough, one must calculate the odds that the other party will fail to agree. If a demand level is too high such that agreement is not possible, negotiators are better off lowering levels of demand. Thus, calculations (of demands and agreement likelihoods) are an essential aspect of maximizing what one can get from the negotiation.

Also, much research has uncovered the importance of limits, aspirations, and other features of the negotiation situation. The emphasis and importance of such parameters in understanding distributive negotiation is wholly consistent with an individual cost-benefit characterization of distributive negotiation. That is, individuals define the negotiation situation using situational parameters that are independent from others (for

example, "What is my limit?", or, "How much do I want to get?"), and, as the evidence has shown, those individual parameters predict outcomes.

Conclusion 3: *Judgment errors predict behavior in distributive negotiation.* In recent years, mounting evidence suggests that human judgment under conditions of uncertainty is subject to heuristics and biases. Thus, it is hardly surprising that in the context of negotiation, judgmental heuristics can play an important role. Research on judgment in negotiation has generally made predictions about judgment error that stem from the basic hypothesis that people are cognitive misers suffering from information overload. Most negotiations requires judgment because people are rarely informed fully about every feature of the negotiation situation. Thus, judgment errors, stemming from human information processing limitations, can have important effects in negotiation. However, the verdict is still out as to what conditions determine whether judgment errors are positively or negatively related to desired negotiation outcomes.

Research on Distributive Negotiation: A Perspective

Research on distributive negotiation has generally been consistent with the dominant paradigm (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Although it has been a good starting point, Pruitt and Carnevale (1993, p. 8) criticize the dominant paradigm as being too simplistic.

> "It relies too much on the assumption that negotiators are always trying to maximize self-interest. It ignores the

> social context of negotiation, overlooking such important phenomena as social norms, relationships between negotiators, group decision processes, and the behavior of third parties. It lacks a time dimension, failing to come to grips with the stages of negotiation and the events that occur before negotiation starts and after it is over. It also provides no information about why people choose negotiation rather than arbitration, struggle, or some other approach to conflict."

The perspective offered by Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) is likely to remove the blinders of many negotiation researchers. Another criticism of the dominant paradigm, not levied by Pruitt and Carnevale (1993), is that it suffers from a cultural bias. This concern is quite plausible considering that all of the research cited above was conducted in North America (north of the Rio Grande) and Western Europe. As Triandis (1983; p. 183) notes,

> "Its [culture's] influence for organizational behavior is that it operates at such a deep level that people are not aware of its influences. It results in unexamined patterns of thought that seem so natural that most theorists of social behavior fail to take them into account. As a result, many aspects of organizational theories produced in one culture may be inadequate in other cultures."

Thus, culture's influence has probably affected both the behavior of subjects that have participated in experiments and the theoretical assumptions and processes that have been made and

examined by researchers. Although faulty assumptions are a potentially devastating limitation of current knowledge, that they have been made by negotiation researchers is hardly surprising. As Schwartz (1986) has argued, individualistic assumptions do not describe human nature, yet such assumptions completely dominate the behavioral sciences.

The monopoly on negotiation research held by the Western world is a serious concern. Not because something is wrong with the Western world, but rather any monopoly in psychological research may underestimate the role of culture and incorrectly assume findings are "human nature". Thus, cross-cultural research can have an unconfounding function by exposing unexamined patterns of thought (Triandis & Brislin, 1984).

For example, Freud's Oedipus Complex does not apply to adolescent boys in the avuncular culture of the Trobriand Islands of Papau New Guinea (Malinowski, 1927; but see Spiro, 1982). There, adolescent boys are disciplined by uncles, and, uncles are the targets of adolescent hostility. Thus, through cross-cultural research, it is possible to conclude that the disciplinarian of adolescent boys (fathers in Vienna; uncles in the Trobriands), rather than the mother's lover, is the target of hostility.

Also, culture is a potentially important topic for negotiation research due to the substantive reasons mentioned. Worldwide, a myriad of issues necessitates negotiation among people from diverse cultural backgrounds. Examples of such

issues include disarmament (for example, North Korea), border disputes (for example, Cyprus), trade policy (for example, GATT), environmental standards (for example, pollution of the Rhine), monetary policy (for example, the European Community) and human rights (for example, Myannmar).

A Skeptical Perspective on the Role of Culture

The above arguments compel cross-cultural research on negotiation. Time and data will ultimately determine the usefulness of the undertaking. But, it should be noted that some feel the endeavor is not worthwhile. Most notable of the skeptics, Zartman (1993) feels arguments for examining culture in negotiation are tautological, and he feels culture's measurement is vague and its role in the process epiphenomonal.

First, he argues that if culture is an obstacle to negotiation, the impact of culture is tautological because failure (in negotiation) means conflict. In other words, since culture is conflict, it makes no logical sense to study the effects of culture on conflict.

Zartman also criticized how cultural differences are conceived and measured in negotiation research. He states (p. 18),

> ...culture is a social phenomenon and so is related to a particular society. But it is never clearly established why the given traits inhere in that society...The approach perpetuates stereotypes and self-proving hypotheses, usually advanced by the opponent who thus forces the other party to

behave as the assigned stereotype."

Finally, Zartman argues that culture is epiphenomenal, it is a "...ghost--a shadow without form or substance (p. 20)." Instead of noting "national idiosyncracies," Zartman feels we should first focus on getting an understanding of the process of negotiation. Then we can address this issue of culture, which, in his view, "...is to negotiation what birds flying into engines are to flying airplanes, what weather is to aerodynamics--practical impediments that need to be taken into account (and avoided) once the basic process is fully understood and implemented (p. 19)."

A careful assessment of Zartman's critique reveals that, given the nature of much of the previous research on culture and negotiation (described below), his first two criticisms are reasonably valid. They concern the epistemological and methodological difficulties of empirically examining cultural differences, not the logic of conducting the research in the first place. In other words, Zartman's first two criticisms would be dispelled if culture's role in negotiation were to be defined more theoretically and its measurement more systematic.

However, his third criticism is unpalatable. Implicit in his argument is the notion that theoretical assumptions developed and tested in the West are universal. Such universality claims are logically untenable for theories of <u>social</u> behavior, unless assumptions underlying theories are grounded in human genetics, or a common, or universal, ecology or social structure (Pepitone

& Triandis, 1987). In sum, negotiation is a social activity, the nature of which not readily bound to a common human heredity, ecology or social structure. Thus, we have no a priori reason to assume that negotiation theory developed in one part of the world is equally valid in other parts of the world.

This dissertation is not the first attempt to analyze the effects on culture on negotiation. The following Chapter reviews previous research on this topic. Research on cultural differences in social behavior suggest that the cultural syndrome of individualism and collectivism is of fundamental importance (Triandis, 1990). This syndrome and its implications for negotiation are discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. Described in Chapters 7, 8 and 9 is an experiment designed to provide a cross-cultural analysis of distributive negotiation based on individualism and collectivism.

CHAPTER 3. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON CULTURE AND NEGOTIATION

This chapter reviews previous research on culture and negotiation. Despite its importance for substantive and theoretical reasons, little research has been conducted on it from the behavioral tradition. Most contributions would fall into the advice tradition. Nonetheless, there are some empirical analyses and this chapter provides a review of what has been done so far.

Empirical Research on Cross-cultural Negotiations

Empirical research on cross-cultural negotiations can be divided into two categories based on the aims of the researchers. The first is research that has attempted solely to compare cultural groups and determine if differences exist. The second compares negotiations within or between cultures and relates cultural differences to aspects of the negotiation processes.

Do cultural differences exist?

Several studies have attempted to determine whether cultural differences in negotiation can be found--period. Druckman, Benton, Ali and Bagur (1976) assessed whether differences between American, Indian and Argentinean negotiators stemmed from culture or other factors. After controlling for possible confounds such as age and sex, they concluded that culture did have an effect. Indians were found to be tougher than U.S. or Argentineans.

Tung (1982) conducted a survey of Chinese (PRC) and American business executives. The majority of respondents in both places agreed that Chinese and Americans had different negotiating

styles. In another analysis of business executives in several cultures, Graham and Sano (1984) found some executives have similar characteristics (U.S. and Brazilian), while others showed differences. For example, the U.S. executives tended to emphasize "rational" abilities (for example, planning, intelligence) while the Japanese emphasized interpersonal skills (for example, respect, listening).

The most sophisticated analysis was provided by Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991). In their study, Roth et al. (1991) were not interested in the source of cultural differences, but rather whether cultural differences existed. They created experimental ultimatum negotiation markets in the U.S., Israel, Yugoslavia and Japan. The ultimatum task requires one party to propose a division of a resource. Another party either accepts or rejects the proposal. If the division is accepted, then both parties receive the allocation as proposed. If the division is rejected, both parties receive nothing.

They observed no differences in market behavior across cultures. In other words, there were no differences in acceptance rates. But, they found substantial differences in the average amount accepted. For example, the Japanese and Israeli subjects accepted much lower amounts. Because there were no differences in how the markets worked, they conclude that observed national differences in amounts offered were not due to languages, currencies or experimental confounds, but from cultural differences in what is regarded as fair.

In sum, studies that have specifically addressed the question support the notion that culture can impact negotiation behavior. However, it should be noted that there are published studies that have found the contrary (Harnett & Cummings, 1980). For example, Harnett and Cummings (1980) found that age and sex predicted negotiation behavior much better than nationality did.

Culture and Negotiation Processes

There are several empirical studies that found cultural differences and linked them to aspects of the negotiation process.

Shapira and Bass (1975) compared and contrasted industrial conflict patterns in North America, North Europe and Mediterranean Asia. They found that European Managers tended to show the strongest commitment to their groups, which led to greater inflexibility and longer labor-management negotiations. In their discussion, Shapira and Bass did little speculation as to the reasons for the observed cultural differences.

Alcock (1974) examined the effects of time pressure on Canadian and Indian subjects. For Canadian male subjects, he found that time pressure imposed by the other party produced toughness, but time pressure imposed by the experimenter produced softness. Canadian females and Indians of both sexes were soft, or cooperative, regardless of the amount or source of time pressure. He argues that the results arise because Canadian males are high in the personality trait of dominance.

Alcock (1975) analyzed an asymmetric experimental

negotiation in Canada and India. Subjects were instructed to agree to one of five possible payoffs in three conditions. In each condition, one option provided equal payoffs while the other options produced inequitable options--options where one party gains more than the other. He also varied the extent to which the inequity was advantageous or unadvantageous to the subjects.

Alcock's findings suggested the payoff structure impacted Canadian subjects more than it did Indian subjects. For example, Canadians took longer than Indians to reach agreement in conditions of disadvantageous inequity. Alcock explains the differences between cultural groups by noting the high degree of authoritarianism in Indian society. He argued, due to the historical caste system in India, Indian subjects tended to accept the inequity of the payoff structure more readily than the Canadians.

Graham and associates (reviewed below) have done a considerable amount of exploratory work on differences in negotiation behavior among various cultural groups. Generally speaking this work has attempted to link culture to negotiation processes. Many findings have been reported by Graham and associates and it is difficult to identify a major theme in them. One conclusion from this work is that situational factors (such as the role) tend to affect negotiation behavior more for Japanese than other cultural groups.

For example, Graham (1984a) found that the role (either buyer or seller) impacted negotiation behavior more for Japanese

than Americans, and information exchange had greater impact for Americans than Japanese.

Allerheiligen, Graham, and Lin (1985) examined the effects of deception in experimental negotiations in the U.S., Brazil, Taiwan, and Japan. They found that the Americans were the most trusting and achieve poor results because of it. They conclude (p. 13) that "Americans are relatively naive." Chinese and Brazilians were found to use deception and achieve better results. The Japanese were found to be unaffected by deception, but the role (buyer or seller) had an effect.

Graham (1984b; 1985) has done several studies to show that culture's effects on negotiation are mediated by other process variables (for example, strategy). For example, Graham (1984b) analyzed both intracultural and intercultural negotiations with American and Japanese subjects. He found that culture (location) affected interpersonal attraction which in turn led to cooperativeness or competitiveness.

Graham, Kim, Lin and Robinson (1988) did a study involving U.S., Japanese, Chinese (Taiwan), and Korean negotiations. They found that problem solving strategies had the greatest impact among U.S. negotiators and competitive strategies affected the Chinese the most. For the Koreans and Japanese, they found that the role (buyer or seller) had the greatest impact on negotiation outcomes.

Graham and associates have also examined differences in negotiator style. For example, Graham (1985) examined the

negotiation behavior of Brazilian, Japanese, and American businessmen. He reported several cultural differences in negotiator style. For example, Brazilians tended to physically touch each other and use the word "no" significantly more than did their Japanese or American counterparts. A severe limitation of this study was the sample sizes involved (6 subjects, or 3 dyads, participated from each culture)! In another study on styles, Adler, Brahm, and Graham (1992) found that Chinese (PRC) negotiators asked more questions and interrupted each other more than Americans did.

Francis (1991) examined the effects of cultural adaptation on intercultural negotiation. Cultural adaptation refers to the ability of one party to adjust and act similar to another party from a different culture. Using scenarios, she looked at American subjects' attractiveness responses to adaptive behaviors of Korean and Japanese "business people." Each scenario presented a sales negotiation dialogue and differed in the amount of adaptation to American culture exhibited by the other party. In the "no adaptation" condition, the Japanese and Korean business people were depicted in ways consistent with stereotypes (for example, bowing, formality). In the "substantial adaptation" condition the Koreans and Japanese were portrayed stereotypical American behavior (for example, directness, informality of speech). There was also a "moderate adaptation" condition, which was only a partial shift toward the stereotypical American. Her findings suggest that a moderate

level of adaptation was judged most attractive. For example, when the Japanese adapted too little, they were clearly part of an outgroup and were judged unattractive. When they adapted too much, they were judged unattractive as well. Francis argues, consistent with Social Identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1982), that this occurred because when an outgroup acts too similar to an ingroup, the ingroup's distinctiveness is threatened, and the outgroup is judged to be unattractive.

The best analysis of culture and negotiation was provided by Chan (1991). He used individualism and collectivism theory to make predictions of negotiator behavior in an integrative negotiation. This study is the only previous work on culture and negotiation that is directly relevant to this dissertation and receives more attention in Chapter 5.

Perspective on Empirical Research on Cross-cultural Negotiations

Two conclusions can be drawn from the research described above. First, it appears that negotiation behavior does differ across many cultural groups. Many findings have emerged about how the Japanese differ from Americans and so on. In sum, although the results of many of the experiments are detailed an difficult to summarize, it appears that culture affects negotiation behavior.

Second, generally speaking, little theoretical progress has been made in understanding why cultural groups differ. This limitation makes it difficult to build on most of this body of work. As Zartman has criticized, little attention has been paid

to examining the theoretical underpinnings of cultural differences.

The latter conclusion is a consequence of two factors. First, theoretical progress in cross-cultural psychology has been relatively recent (Triandis, 1990). This means for many years there was a lack of a framework from which researchers could have made predictions and organized findings. For example, Alcock (1974; p. 175) states,

> "Thus, it is difficult to make any predictions about Indian behavior since there are grounds for expecting them to be more cooperative than their North American counterparts, but there are also grounds for expecting them to be more competitive."

The second reason for the lack of theoretical progress is that much of the research has been driven by substantive, rather than conceptual, considerations. For example, Graham (1984; p. 51) states,

> "Business negotiations in two cultures, Japan and the United States, were chosen for the study because they are the two largest economies in the free world and merchandise trade between them amounted to more than $60 billion during 1982."

But as Triandis (1990) has argued, recently significant progress has been made in cross-cultural psychology, and the time is ripe to include culture as a parameter in our theories of social behavior.

CHAPTER 4. RESEARCH ON INDIVIDUALISM AND COLLECTIVISM: AN ANALYSIS OF SUBJECTIVE CULTURE

This Chapter reviews theoretical and empirical research on individualism and collectivism. Included in this analysis are descriptions of the key defining attributes of the theory. The analysis begins with a discussion of some concepts and definitions that are critical to an analysis of cultural differences.

What is Culture?

Many cross-cultural researchers have attempted to define culture. For example, culture is a schedule of reinforcement (Skinner, 1971), the man-made part of the environment (Herskovitz, 1955), a pattern of symbolic discourse and shared meaning (D'Andrade, 1984), or collective mental programming (Hofstede, 1980). Little agreement has been achieved about the definition, but the definition provided by Triandis (1972; 1994) seems most applicable to cross-cultural analyses of social behavior.

To define culture, one must first identify what constitutes a cultural group. According to Triandis (1994), "a cultural group consists of people who have in the past, and who are now, communicating among themselves, and thus have arrived at shared understandings of how to perceive their social environment, and how to solve the key problems of existence." Whether membership in a cultural group is likely to impact social behavior depends on an analysis of its subjective culture.

According to Herskovitz (1955) culture is the human-made part of the environment. This definition is too broad to be scientifically useful, and thus needs to be "unpackaged" (Triandis, 1972). Triandis (1972) distinguished between objective and subjective culture. Objective culture includes physical human-made aspects of the environment such as tools, roads, dwellings, clothing and so on. Subjective culture is "a cultural group's characteristic way of perceiving its social environment (Triandis, 1972; p. 3)." Elements of subjective culture include thoughts, emotions, values, beliefs, attitudes, norms, self-cognitions, rules, associations, and so on. The aim of cross-cultural psychology should be to identify similarities and differences in the subjective cultures of various cultural groups.

Differences in subjective cultures of cultural groups probably arise because they are ecologically adaptive, or at one time they were adaptive and have been transmitted over time (Triandis, 1972; 1994). That is, shared understandings about patterns of thought and behavior develop because they are or were functional for survival in a particular ecology (Berry, 1979).

Methodological Considerations

While the arguments made earlier clearly compel cultural research on negotiation, the methodological difficulties of doing such studies are arduous. A complete volume of the Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology (Triandis & Berry, 1980) was devoted to analyzing methodological difficulties in cross-cultural studies.

Many methods are available for cross-cultural research (for example, questionnaires, field studies, ethnographies, laboratory experiments), and each method comes with inherent limitations (cf. Cook & Campbell, 1979; Runkel & McGrath, 1972) that are exacerbated by applying them across cultures. The discussion will highlight several threats to valid inference that remain difficult to eliminate and, thus, must be kept in mind when empirically identifying cultural differences.

Conceiving Cultural Differences

What does it mean to "find a cultural difference?" In answering this question, research aims must be addressed. Hofstede (1980) points out that research can be conducted at the individual level, where individuals are the units of analysis, or the ecological level, where nations or cultural groups are the units of analysis. Findings at one level of analysis do not necessarily generalize to the other (Shweder, 1973). Ecological analyses are useful for identifying cultural dimensions (for example, Hofstede, 1980). Individual analyses are done to identify individual dimensions in multi-cultural studies (Leung & Bond, 1989). So, the first consideration in attempting to identify cultural differences concerns the level of analysis.

Hofstede (1980) also distinguished two fundamental research questions: 1) does a cultural difference exist for some variable, X?, and 2) is there a general relation between two variables across cultures (for example, as X increases, Y increases)?

The former question involves research attempting to identify how cultural groups differ in their emphasis of an element of subjective culture. Cultural groups arrive at shared understandings because they share the same place and time, and they communicate. So, cultural groups are typically identified for research purposes according to demographic characteristics. Then measurements are made of elements of subjective culture for each group and mean differences are reported. When subjective cultures are analyzed in this way it is possible to organize differences along psychological dimensions, such as individualism. This approach is useful because it provides a framework to understand the psychological mechanisms underlying group differences.

There are several difficulties in accurately identifying cultural differences of this sort. The most important criterion to be met is measurement equivalence. Measurement equivalence is obtained when individuals with identical standings on an element of subjective culture respond to an experimental stimulus in the same way, regardless of their cultural group membership (Drasgow, 1984). If measurement equivalence is not met for cultural groups under study, then observed group differences on elements of subjective culture may arise from reasons other than true differences.

When a difference on an element of subjective culture has been validly identified for cultural groups, it is possible to examine relations between the element of subjective culture and

other variables. This is the purpose of research based on the second question. The issue of importance is relational equivalence (Drasgow, 1984). Relational equivalence is obtained when equivalent relations are obtained between elements of subjective culture and other variables, across cultures. Thus, according to this framework, a cultural difference exists when the null hypothesis of measurement equivalence is not rejected, but the null hypothesis of relational equivalence is rejected. It is important to note that measurement equivalence can never be assured--in other words, one cannot accept a null hypothesis--but, if the null hypothesis of measurement equivalence is not rejected, we can be more confident that the observed difference in relations is not spurious.

Threats to Measurement Equivalence

Measurement equivalence is critical for valid cross-cultural comparisons. Reporting observed differences without assessing measurement equivalence leaves open the possibility that differences stem from factors other than true differences on the underlying dimension. Three important threats to measurement equivalence are: etic versus emic meanings of constructs, translation fidelity, and response sets.

Etics versus emics. When measuring dimensions underlying cultural differences, concepts found in one culture may have a different meaning in another. That is, when analyzing subjective cultures, it is important to distinguish elements that are etic from those that are emic. The terminology is borrowed from

linguistics where a phonemic system concern sounds that have meaning for a specific language, and phonetic systems concerns sounds that have meaning in any language (Pike, 1966; Triandis, 1972). Similarly, emic meanings of concepts are specific to a particular culture, and etic meanings are universal.

Triandis (1972) has argued that etic versus emic aspects of meaning depend on the level of abstraction used in describing a concept. For example, self-reliance is valued by both individualists and collectivists (Triandis et al., 1990). But, for individualists, the concept means "do my own thing," and for collectivists, it means "not be a burden on my ingroup." So, in both cases there is a etic aspect, or common core ("it is important to be self-reliant"), that is colored by emic meanings (Triandis & Brislin, 1984).

The crux of measurement equivalence is whether the experimental stimulus means the same thing in all cultures of the study. A typical experimental stimulus is an item on a questionnaire. If an item measures an aspect of a concept that has emic meanings in two groups, then the item is not measuring the same underlying dimension in both groups, and comparisons are problematic. In short, valid cross-cultural comparisons should be made for items that have equivalent meanings, in other words, etic items. Therefore, before making cross-cultural comparisons of questionnaire items, the etics must be separated from the emics.

Another experimental stimulus can be a treatment in a

laboratory experiment. It is important to use treatments that have etic meanings. For example, if one wished to examine the effects of relationship positivity on interpersonal relations in two cultures, a sensible thing to do would be to ask subjects to bring a friend to the experiment with them. Analogous to whether a questionnaire item has the same meaning, one must assess whether "friend" has the same meaning in both cultures. It could be that in one place a "friend" means someone on the same floor of the dormitory (moderate relationship positivity), but in the other place "friend" means a lifelong soul mate (extreme relationship positivity). Thus, experimental treatments may have emic meanings, and experimental researchers must carefully include manipulation checks.

Translation Fidelity. Another threat to measurement equivalence when questionnaires are used is the fidelity of language translations. Much like the problem of different meanings arising from emic aspects of concepts, some concepts do not translate perfectly and different meanings might emerge. Casagrande (1954) distinguished four types of translations: pragmatic, aesthetic-poetic, ethnographic, and linguistic (see Brislin, 1980, for a review). Brislin (1980) has argued that translation fidelity can be achieved through back-translation with de-centering. However, when one examines the criterion of measurement equivalence, the problem of scale translation represents a unique category (Hulin, 1987) and, thus, needs Item Response Theory methods to assess translation quality (Hulin,

Drasgow, & Parsons, 1983; Lord, 1980). Item Response theory analyses have proven to be useful tools in assessing translation fidelity (Bontempo, 1993; Hulin & Mayer, 1985). However, their limited use may stem from the necessity for relatively large sample sizes and homogeneous item pools, both of which have been rarely evident in cross-cultural research.

Response Sets. A final threat to measurement equivalence is response sets. Cronbach (1951) defines a response set as "any tendency causing a person consistently to make different responses to test items than he would, had the same content been presented in a different form." Numerous types of response sets have been identified, including acquiescence, social desirability, and faking (Jackson & Messick, 1962).

Typically, response sets have been examined at the individual level. Hofstede (1980) argues that if different cultural groups respond to items in different ways, observed group differences may reflect a group-scale interaction rather than true group differences. That is, some cultural groups may have a tendency to use a particular response pattern independent of item content.

It is well-documented that there are cultural differences in responding to questionnaires (Leung & Bond, 1989). Ignoring response sets can often lead to suspect conclusions. For example, Luthans, et al., (1985) reported that Asian workers have lower levels of organizational commitment than U.S. workers. Triandis (1995) has argued that there is a strong tendency for

Asians to use the middle of the scale. Thus, it seems that a group response set is a plausible rival interpretation for the results.

In summary, there are numerous threats to valid inference to cross-cultural research (Triandis & Berry, 1980). An important criterion to be met is measurement equivalence (Drasgow, 1984). Three important threats to measurement equivalence of experimental stimuli are whether stimuli represent etic versus emic constructs, language translation fidelity and response sets. The three threats described above are those which pose threats to valid inference in most cross-cultural research done to date, including the research described in this dissertation. Refinements in cross-cultural theory (e.g., Triandis, 1995) and developments in psychometrics (e.g., Thissen & Steinberg, 1986) may ultimately provide techniques to address them. Until then, conclusions drawn from empirical research conducted across cultures must be tempered by the admission that threats to valid inference are a source of rival explanation.

Individualism and Collectivism

The most developed and important analysis of subjective culture has concerned the relative emphasis cultural groups place on themes of individualism or collectivism. Generally referring to how individuals in society relate to the groups in which they are embedded, this distinction has received much attention in cross-cultural psychology during the 1980s (Triandis, 1990).

The individualism-collectivism distinction is similar to

other conceptions of individual-to-group relations (for example, Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Parsons & Shils, 1951). The focus here is primarily on the theory of individualism and collectivism based on the social psychological work of Triandis and associates (Hui & Triandis, 1986; Triandis, 1989; Triandis, 1990; Triandis, Bontempo, Betancourt, Bond, Leung, Brenes, Georgas, Hui, Marin, Setiadi, Sinha, Verma, Spangenberg, Touzard, & Montmollin, 1986; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988; Triandis, Leung, Villareal, & Clack, 1985; Triandis, McCusker, Betancourt, Iwao, Leung, Salazar, Setiadi, Sinha, Touzard, Wang, & Zaleski, 1991; Triandis, McCusker, & Hui, 1990).

The work of Hofstede (1980) provided an important start to research on individualism and collectivism in social psychology. Hofstede analyzed the protocols of over 100,000 IBM employees in over 60 countries. The questions referred to perceptions of the workplace, satisfaction, goals, beliefs and demographics. After summing responses in each place and factor analyzing them, the factor explaining the most variance between cultures was called "individualism." Hofstede (1980; p. 148) defined individualism as "the relationship between the individual and the collectivity which prevails in a given society." In other words, individualism reflects the importance people place on individuals and collectives. Individualism was found to be highest in North America (north of the Rio Grande), North and Western Europe and Australia. Collectivism was found to be highest in Asia and Latin America.

To further conceptualize the constructs, Hui and Triandis (1986) surveyed a sample of social scientists to obtain their opinions about the meaning of the concepts. There was considerable agreement among the researchers that collectivism entails having concern for how one's actions or decisions affect others, sharing of material and nonmaterial resources, accepting the views of others, having concern about one's image in the eyes of others, believing a correspondence exists between own and other's outcomes, feeling involved in the lives of others.

Since then, much research has been done to measure and define the key aspects of the constructs both within and between cultural groups using a variety of techniques (for example, Triandis, et al., 1990). This work has been summarized by Triandis (1990). Triandis, et al., (1985) proposed that at the psychological level concepts of allocentrism and idiocentrism are analogous to concepts of collectivism and individualism at the cultural level. Thus, in any random sample of people from any cultural group (individualist or collectivist) there will be variation in the extent to which people are allocentric or idiocentric. This terminology is useful when intercultural and intracultural processes are compared. The current paper concerns intercultural comparisons, and the terms individualism and collectivism are used to refer to cultural differences measured at the individual level.

Contrasting Individualism and Collectivism

In analyzing subjective cultures, the general unifying theme

underlying differences between individualism and collectivism is the relative degree that personal or ingroup considerations regulate behavior (cf. Triandis, et al., 1988). According to Triandis (Triandis et al., 1988; 1990), an ingroup is a group from whom one receives a positive social identity and whose norms, goals, and values shape the behavior of its members. An outgroup as a "group with attributes dissimilar from those of the ingroup, whose goals are unrelated or inconsistent with those of the ingroup, or a group that opposes the realization of ingroup goals (Triandis, et al., 1990; p. 53)."

Below specific elements of subjective culture are reviewed for individualists and collectivists. Elements include identity, goals, values, beliefs and attitudes. Following this review, the most important defining attributes of individualism and collectivism are described.

Identity. Self-concepts are central cognitive structures (Higgins, 1987). For example, subjects can recall information more readily when it had been related to themselves in some way beforehand (Higgins & Bargh, 1987; Klein & Loftus, 1988). Also, self-concepts originate through social input (Cooley, 1964; James, 1890). Their centrality and origin suggest that important cultural differences should be evident in self-concepts (Markus & Kitiyama, 1991). In other words, if individualism and collectivism are differentiated by personal versus group considerations, then examinations of the social content of self-identities should reveal marked differences across cultures

(Triandis, 1989).

Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984) suggested a typology of self-cognitions. Cognitions which concern personal attributes (for example, "I am somnolent") are aspects of the private self, those which concern membership to social entities (for example, "I am a son") are aspects of the collective self, and those which concern beliefs about generalized others (for example, "others think I'm peripatetic") are aspects of the public self. Triandis (1989) proposed that individualism and collectivism should predict the likelihood that self-cognitions stem from various aspects of the self. Namely, he argued that the tendency among individualists should be to sample the private self, and the tendency among collectivists should be to sample the collective self. This is precisely what was reported by Triandis, et al. (1990), who administered the "twenty-statements" test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1955) in the PRC, Greece, Hong Kong, Hawaii and Illinois. For example, they found that, on the average, subjects from the PRC and Illinois sampled the collective self 52% and 19%, respectively. Trafimow, Triandis, & Goto (1991) replicated this effect among allocentrics and idiocentrics in Illinois, and found evidence that the different aspects of self (private, collective) occupy different locations in memory.

Goals. Goals are also important elements of subjective culture. In collectivistic cultures, there is a tendency for ingroup goals take primacy over personal goals, and in individualistic cultures, personal goals tend to take primacy

over ingroup goals (Hui & Triandis, 1986; Triandis et al., 1988).

Similarly, Triandis, et al., (1985) examined beliefs and attitudes among a sample of Illinois undergraduates. They factor analyzed 132 items designed to tap various aspects of allocentrism and idiocentrism. The most important Factor they identified was called, "subordination of personal goals to group goals." It was defined by items that asked subjects how much weight they would give to conflicting personal and group goals when they were faced with a decision to take a trip, help others with work, or lend money.

Values. Cultural differences in values, or guiding principles in one's life, have long been observed (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). Many cultural differences in values are consistent with differences individualists and collectivists attach to ingroup considerations.

For example, research has shown that collectivistic values include ingroup harmony, ingroup achievement, obedience to ingroup members, ingroup conformity, ingroup equality, ingroup honesty, ingroup cooperation, social order, national security, and "accepting my position in life," whereas, individualistic values include interpersonal competition, individual achievement, social recognition, individual pleasure, freedom, an exciting life, a varied life, enjoying life and independence (Triandis, et al. 1985; 1988; 1990).

Beliefs and Attitudes. Beliefs and attitudes of

individualists and collectivists have been examined in several studies. Typically, this research has administered questionnaires to cultures previously identified as individualistic or collectivistic. Then, response to items were factor analyzed and the underlying structure of attitudes and beliefs was uncovered.

Triandis, et al., (1986) conducted Factor Analyses of questionnaire data collected in the U.S. (Illinois and California), France, The Netherlands, India, Greece, Hong Kong, Chile, Costa Rica, Indonesia. Their analysis produced 4 etic factors defining individualistic and collectivistic beliefs and attitudes. The first factor distinguished individualistic tendencies and was called "Self Reliance with Hedonism." It contained items such as, "The most important thing in my life is to make myself happy." The second factor "Separation from Ingroups" was also related to individualism. It consisted of items like, "If the child won the Nobel Prize, the parents should not feel honored in any way." The third factor was called, "Family Integrity," and was characterized by items such as, "Aging parents should live at home with their children." It was the only factor which correlated with Hofstede's (1980) individualism factor. Finally, the fourth factor "Interdependence and Sociability" also concerned collectivisitic tendencies. It contained items such as, "I like to live close to my good friends." Most of this factor structure was replicated by Triandis, et al., (1990) using samples from Illinois, Hong

Kong and the People's Republic of China. Consistent with previous research (Triandis, et al., 1986; 1988), they found that "family integrity" discriminated very well across cultures, whereas "self-reliance" discriminated well within cultures.

Additionally, Triandis, et al., (1993) examined attitude and beliefs among samples from France, Venezuela, Poland, PRC, Chile, Illinois, Japan, Hong Kong, and Indonesia, and India. Through Factor Analysis, they identified 6 etic factors of individualism and collectivism. The factors were: 1) separation from ingroups (e.g., "Children should not feel honored even if the father were highly praised and given an award by a government official for his contributions and service to the community."), 2) Independence-Dependence (e.g., "I would rather struggle through a personal problem by myself than discuss it with my friends."), 3) Personal Competence (e.g., "Individuals should be judged on their own merits, not on the company they keep."), 4) Task versus Social Emphasis (e.g., "If the group is slowing me down, it is better to leave it and work alone."), 5) Independence and Self-sufficiency (e.g., "One should live one's life independently of others as much as possible."), and 6) Sociability (e.g., "I enjoy meeting and talking to my neighbors everyday.").

Triandis, et al., (1985) found a corresponding set of beliefs and attitudes in samples of Illinois allocentrics and idiocentrics. The most important factors they found to distinguish among allocentrism and idiocentrism were: 1) subordination of personal goals to group goals (described above),

2) ingroup as extension of self (e.g., allocentrics greater willingness to lend money to ingroup members in need), and 3) ingroup as a source of identity (e.g., allocentrics greater concern for ingroup members).

Further work on Illinois allocentrics and idiocentrics was done by Triandis, et al. (1988). They found the three most important factors discriminating allocentrics and idiocentrics were: 1) self-reliance with competition (idiocentric), 2) concern for ingroup (allocentric), and 3) distance from ingroups (idiocentric).

Summary. The empirical findings reported above have consistently supported the general notion that cultures differ in the extent to which personal (individualistic) versus group (collectivistic) considerations are given greater deference in directing social behavior. It is also evident that much research has been done identifying differences in individualistic and collectivistic subjective cultures. Although not yet definitive, at this point it is possible to underscore two key defining attributes of individualism-collectivism. In other words, they appear to have the greatest potential to classify and organize cultures as largely individualist or collectivist. They are: 1) personal versus collective self-identity, and 2) whether typical behavior promotes independence from others versus interdependence with others.

The first key defining attribute is personal versus collective self-identity. As mentioned above, self-identity has

been a fundamental concept in social psychology (Higgins, 1987; Markus & Kitiyama, 1991). Also, group identity is a construct of growing theoretical and practical significance (Bodenhausen, 1993; Kramer, 1993; Triandis, 1979). More important, the social content of self-identity has been quite successful in empirically distinguishing cultures (Triandis, et al., 1990).

The second key defining attribute of individualism-collectivism is the relative emphasis on independence versus interdependence. An examination of the evidence reveals a consistent tendency for individualists to strive toward independence (e.g., pursuit of personal goals, attitudes that emphasize separation from ingroups and self-reliance, values of achievement, pleasure and independence), while collectivists strive for interdependence (e.g., attitudes of "concern for ingroup members" such as "aging parents should live at home," values of social order, harmony and conformity). This distinction has been best indicated by differences in Family Integrity, a recurring etic factor that has emerged from pancultural factor analyses and has been repeatedly successful in distinguishing cultures (Triandis, et al., 1985; 1990; 1993). Also, in Triandis, et al. (1985), this was the only factor to correlate with Hofstede's (1980) individualism factor.

Family Integrity has been characterized by items such as, "Aging parents should live at home with children." Agreement with such items indicates a preference for interdependence, while disagreement indicates independence. Perhaps the reason that

Family Integrity has consistently been shown to discriminate well across cultures is that it pertains to a universal social structure. That is, all humans have parents, and, thus, parent-child relationships are universal. So, Family Integrity subscales distinguish cultures well because they tap into a common social structure, whereas items concerning coworkers, neighbors, etc., are more likely to suffer from personal experiences and culture-specific, or emic, influences.

Implications of Individualism-Collectivism for Social Behavior

The following section reviews two important implications of individualism and collectivism for social behavior. Empirical support is for them is also described. They are: 1) the extent to which behavior is predictable from personal cost-benefit calculations (likes and dislikes) versus social norms, and 2) the extent to which ingroup versus outgroup distinctions have potentially important effects for social behavior. These are not the only important potential implications of individualism-collectivism. However, they are those that seem to have a tight connection to the two key defining attributes described above, they have gathered some empirical support, and they have direct consequences for behavior in distributive negotiation.

Social Norms versus Cost-benefit Analysis. Theoretically, social behavior for individualists should be predicted from examining personal costs and benefits. Since one's self-identity is defined in private, individual terms, the self should be the unit of analysis. Coupled with a desire to gain independence,

individualists are less likely to be influenced by the desires of others, but strongly influenced by personal like-dislikes and personal cost-benefit calculations. In contrast, collectivists have a collective identity. Thus, even if collectivists went through cost-benefit analysis, the unit of analysis would be the group (Nakone, 1970). Information about the interests of one's ingroup can be found in social norms, and, thus, norms should be important determinants of social behavior for collectivists.

There is some empirical evidence to suggest that in individualistic cultures, behavior is generally influenced more by cost-benefit analysis than social norms, but the reverse is true in collectivistic cultures. For example, Hui (1988) found that collectivism related to a sense of obligations. A sense of obligation is a belief that others expect you to act in a certain way and the motivation to comply to such a belief. It has been incorporated as the social component in Triandis's (1980) attitude behavior model and the subjective norm component in Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action. Hui found that the obligation-intention relationship was lower for individualists than collectivists.

Bontempo and Rivero (1992) reviewed numerous empirical cross-cultural applications of the Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) theory of reasoned action. This model proposes that behavioral intentions are a function of two components: attitudes and subjective norms. Samples were classified as individualistic or collectivistic based on Hofstede's (1980) empirical analysis.

Consistent with expectations, in collectivistic cultures subjective norms were more important predictors of behavioral intentions, while attitudes were more important predictors in individualistic cultures. For example, in a study of birth control behavior, Davidson, Jaccard, Triandis, Morales, and Diaz-Guerrero (1976) provided support for the idea that for individualists behavioral intentions are mostly a function of attitudes, but for collectivists intentions are mostly a function of social norms.

Ingroup-Outgroup Differentiation. Triandis (1972) proposed that collectivists should make a sharper contrast between ingroups and outgroups than individualists, such that, for collectivists, behavior towards ingroup members should be substantially different than behavior towards outgroup members.

Theoretically, this is reasonable as collectivists, defined as having a greater collective self-identity, should be more apt to see the world in group terms. This should lead to ingroup-outgroup differentiation and ingroup cooperation and outgroup competition (Tajfel & Turner, 1982). Individualists, who define themselves in personal terms, are more likely to use the individual as a unit of analysis in social interactions, and, thus, there should be reduced salience of ingroup-outgroup differentiations. In summary, the effects of ingroup-outgroup differentiation should be greater for collectivists than individualists. In a general sense, this implies that across a wide variety of contexts, behavior should be more variable for

collectivists than individualists--where the source of the variation stems from the ingroup-outgroup status of the other people involved in the situation.

Some empirical research has corroborated this view. For example, Triandis et al., (1990) found that collectivists perceived associative and subordinate behaviors as likely when interacting with ingroup members and dissociative and superordinate behaviors as likely when interacting with outgroup members. Individualists, who also had ingroups and outgroups, did not make such sharp ingroup-outgroup distinctions. For individualists, likely behavior towards ingroup and outgroup members was similar.

Evidence can also be found in research on conformity (Frager, 1970; Triandis, et al., 1988). For example, Triandis et al. (1988) found that collectivists conformed more than individualists to desires of ingroup members (for example, one's family), but less than individualists to desires of outgroup members (for example, someone from another country).

Leung and Bond (1984) found that when deciding the division of a benefit between oneself and another, collectivists followed the equality principle when the other person was an ingroup member, but the equity principle when the other was an outgroup member. Individualists, on the other hand, stuck to the equity principle for both ingroups and outgroups. Similarly, Chan (1991) examined individualism and collectivism in integrative negotiation. He found that whether negotiation involved friends

(presumably part of the ingroup) or strangers (presumably part of the outgroup) had a greater impact for collectivists than individualists. This effect was obtained for the value of demands to one's self in an integrative negotiation.

In summary, the extent to which people receive positive social identity from groups should vary for individualists and collectivists. Thus, collectivists should show greater tendencies toward ingroup-outgroup differentiation, and, its concomitant effects on intergroup competition should affect social behavior.

Perspective on Individualism and Collectivism Theory

This work has produced many important findings about how the subjective cultures of individualists and collectivists differ. Triandis (1990) provides and extensive review of research in the behavioral sciences on individualism and collectivism. He reports on an extensive body of empirical findings consistent with the individualism and collectivism distinction. It seems increasingly clear that a fundamental distinction exists.

The collection of findings on which Triandis (1990) reports can be criticized in that it describes a broad syndrome that offers little guidance for making specific predictions about social behavior (Schwartz, 1990). Moreover, because of the broad sketch provided on individualism and collectivism to date, there is risk that they become "catch-all" constructs, used to explain any observed cultural differences consistent with individual versus group emphases. Triandis (1994) argues that over 60

elements of subjective culture have been found to contrast individualism and collectivism. It is methodologically impractical and theoretically tenuous to attempt to measure them all each time one wishes to study the effects of individualism and collectivism on social behavior.

One solution would be to prioritized certain elements of subjective culture that might be most important (such an undertaking was recently done by Triandis, 1995, forthcoming).

This dissertation also makes an attempt to simplify the picture. Table 1 displays the simplification that has been described. Here, the argument is that private versus collective self-identity and an emphasis on independence versus interdependence are the most important defining attributes of individualism and collectivism, respectively. The above review also suggests that there are two theoretically logical and empirically supported implications of individualism and collectivism that directly follow from the two defining attributes: emphasis on social norms and ingroup-outgroup distinctions for collectivists, and, emphasis on cost-benefit calculations and few ingroup-outgroup distinctions for individualists.

The above arguments are general, ignoring the context of social behavior. This is a potential limitation, as contexts may alter which aspects of subjective culture are most important for understanding cultural differences. For example, the finding that individualists are likely to value personal goals over group

goals, whereas collectivists are more likely value group goals over individual goals, is unimportant in situations where personal and group goals do not conflict. For example, if a team of workers were picking bushels of apples and each individual were paid according to the number of bushels she or he picked, no conflict between individual and group goals would exist, and goal considerations would be moot. But, if equal pay were given to all apple pickers no matter how many apples they picked, there would be a temptation to free-ride. In such a case, one would expect higher levels of free-riding to be associated with more individualistic apple pickers.

Presented in Chapters 5 and 6 is a discussion of individualism and collectivism in the context of distributive negotiation. The analysis attempts to predict the implications of individualism and collectivism in distributive negotiation (Chapter 5), and then apply this analysis to develop hypotheses about the universality of the previously described conclusions of distributive negotiation research (Chapter 6). Finally, Chapters 7, 8 and 9 describe an experiment designed to test the hypotheses.

CHAPTER 5. IMPLICATIONS OF INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM FOR DISTRIBUTIVE NEGOTIATION: COMMUNAL VERSUS EXCHANGE RELATIONSHIPS

In this Chapter, the implications of individualism-collectivism for distributive negotiation are explored. The analysis begins with a re-analysis of the basic process of distributive negotiation. This characterization identifies the giving and receiving of benefits as the fundamental aspect of distributive negotiation. This is followed by a discussion of the implications of individualism-collectivism for communal and exchange rules of giving and receiving benefits in relationships.

A Relationship View of Distributive Negotiation

Previously, distributive negotiation was described as entailing "pure" conflict -- in other words, one person's loss is the other person's gain. According to this view, negotiators desire to obtain as much as possible of the same resources, and the activity inherent in distributive bargaining is deciding how to "divide the pie." This view posits that reaching an agreement requires compromise, or a process of resource division. This view has resulted in the development of a distributive negotiation theory that might be dubbed "the psychology of compromise." Constructs such as the bargaining zone, limits, aspirations, and tracking all serve to understand how a negotiator goes about creating a psychological representation of how much of the resource is available--a key consideration for dividing it. Moreover, concepts such as matching and mismatching have been used to describe how one decides how much compromise,

or concession making, is likely based on the other person's behavior.

Suggested here is an alternate view. Distributive negotiation can also be analyzed from a relationship perspective. According to this view, distributive negotiation requires an allocation of something desirable, or a benefit of some kind, between two interdependent parties. How people respond in situations of interdependence is the focus. Thus, the activity inherent in distributive negotiation can be described as a mechanism by which people define the nature of their relationship through the giving and receiving of benefits. Thus, exchanges serve to effect an increase or decrease in interdependence, through a dynamic process of relationship definition. This view might be dubbed "the psychology of relationships."

When taking a relationship perspective on distributive negotiation, it is apparent that rules for giving and receiving benefits in relationships become important considerations for understanding distributive negotiation. In the following section, two fundamental types of relationship rules are described. This is followed by an argument that subjective culture, in the form of individualism-collectivism, should affect which type of rules are followed.

Communal versus Exchange Relationships

Margaret Clark, Judson Mills and associates have identified communal versus exchange relationships as two fundamentally different approaches individuals take in giving and receiving

benefits in relationships (Clark, 1981; Clark, 1984; Clark, 1987; Clark & Mills, 1979; Clark, Mills, & Corcoran, 1989; Clark, Mills, & Powell, 1986; Clark & Waddell, 1985). Exchange and communal relationships are characterized by the rules used in giving and receiving benefits. Exchange relationships are characterized by the belief that benefits should be given in accordance to benefits received. Thus, exchange relationship rules assert that benefits should be repaid immediately and in kind. In contrast, communal relationships are characterized by great concern for the other person's welfare, and benefits are given so the other person can meet his or her needs. There is less desire for benefits to be reciprocated immediately or in kind.

Empirical Research. Support for this categorization can be found in a series of studies done by Clark, Mills, and associates. Clark and Mills (1979) found that when an attractive female confederate immediately reciprocated a benefit given by male subjects, males reported increased attraction to her when they believed she was married and decreased attraction when they thought she was single (and available). Being married created a desire for an exchange relationship because no further interaction with her was expected. When male subjects believed she was single a communal relationship was desired because the romantic possibilities were limitless (until the male subjects were debriefed and found out she was a confederate). They replicated this finding in a second experiment with a different

manipulation of communal versus exchange, and, they found that for exchange relationships when a stooge requested aid on a task without having given the subjects prior aid, attraction to the confederate was decreased.

Clark, Mills, and Powell (1986) manipulated communal versus exchange relationships were created by having subjects fill out a questionnaire prior to the experiment. For communal relationship conditions, male subjects learned that the attractive female (confederate) in the room with them had just transferred to the university and was participating in the experiment because she thought it might be a good way to meet people. In the exchange conditions, male subjects learned that the attractive female (confederate) was married and was participating because it was convenient and her husband could pick her up afterwards. Clark et al., (1986) found that when no opportunity existed to reciprocate, people in communal relationships kept track of the person's needs to a greater extent than those in an exchange relationship. They also found that subjects kept track of the other person's needs when no opportunity to reciprocate existed, only if they desired a communal relationship. When an opportunity for the other to reciprocate existed, subjects kept track of the other's needs to a greater extent when an exchange relationship was desired. Clark, Mills, and Corcoran (1989) replicated these findings in an experiment that compared keeping track of needs of a friend's (someone subjects brought to the experiment with whom they had an ongoing relationship) versus a

stranger's (someone subjects met at the experiment).

Using scenarios describing exchanges of benefits between people, Clark (1981) found that subjects perceived friendship to be greater when the benefits that were exchanged were noncomparable. Also, she found that subjects perceived reciprocation of benefits was repayment to a greater extent when reciprocity entailed comparable rather than noncomparable benefits.

Clark (1984) had subjects work in pairs on a task that required searching a large matrix and circling numbers. The pairs were made of male subjects and an attractive female confederate. Communal versus exchange relationships were manipulated as in previous research (Clark & Mills, 1979). The dependent variable in this study was whether male subjects chose a pen of the same or different color as the female confederate's to do the task. The color of the pen that was chosen indicated how important keeping track of individual inputs was to the subjects. As expected, in three experiments, subjects in a communal relationship chose the same color pen significantly greater than 50% of the time, while those in exchange relationships chose a pen of different color greater than chance.

In another study, Clark and Waddell (1985) examined reactions to exploitation in communal versus exchange relationships. Half of the female subjects met a female confederate who was anxious because her husband was picking her up after the experiment, and who was to discuss differences of

interest with her during the experiment (exchange conditions). The other half met a female confederate who was anxious because she was looking forward to meeting people, and who was to discuss common interests with her later (communal conditions). During the experimental task, the confederates requested a favor from the subjects and either offered repayment or did not. Results indicated that only in exchange relationship conditions did failure to offer repayment result in subjects perceiving the confederate as less attractive and more exploitive.

In summary, strong empirical evidence has been found for the distinction between communal versus exchange relationships.

Subjective Culture and Communal versus Exchange Rules

Most of this work has concerned romantic versus nonromantic relationships, but as Clark and Mills (1982) note, most people, at one time or another, follow rules for communal or exchange relationships, either across people and situations, or even with the same person over time. However, the instance of following communal versus exchange rules seems related to individualism and collectivism. Although no theoretical attempts have specifically attempted to integrate individualism-collectivism and communal versus exchange rules, that there are some parallels between them has been observed previously (Triandis, 1990; Wheeler, Reis, & Bond, 1989). For example, Clark, Ouellette, Powell, and Milberg (1987) developed a scale to measure one's orientation toward communal or exchange relationships, and Triandis (1990, p. 63) has noted that the measurement of communal orientation closely

parallels the measurement of tendencies toward collectivism. Below arguments are presented to link the desire for communal versus exchange relationships to the key defining attributes of individualism-collectivism.

Private versus Collective Self-Concepts. The first key defining attribute concerned the self-concept. The extent to which people have concern for the needs of others can be directly linked to the nature of the self-concept. Individualists tend to sample the private self-concept, and the individual is the fundamental unit of analysis in social interaction (Triandis, 1989). This implies that it is possible for individuals, as a separable and distinct entities, to separate benefits accrued to self and other. More important, a private, or independent, construal of the self should lead to concern with enhancing personal goals, and the role of others in social situations should be to provide information for self-evaluation through the process of social comparison (Markus & Kitiyama, 1991). In other words, benefits received by others in social situations should be important for individualists for reasons concerning self-evaluation and social comparison, rather than as indications of how well others' needs have been fulfilled. In sum, individualists, or people who tend to sample the private aspects of the self, should prefer rules for exchange rather than communal relationships.

In contrast, collectivists tend to sample the collective self-concept, and, thus, the collective is the fundamental unit

of analysis in social interaction. For them, little distinction should be made between benefits accrued to self and other. Rather, they should have concern with the well-being of the collective. As Markus and Kitiyama (1991, p. 229) have suggested, those with an interdependent, or collective, construal of the self pursue relationships as an ends in themselves, and, "...maintaining a connection to others will mean being constantly aware of others and focusing on their needs, desire, and goals." Thus, we can expect that those who tend to sample the collective self should have a greater concern for the needs of others--in other words, collectivists should prefer rules for communal rather than exchange relationships.

The arguments above that link aspects of the self to communal versus exchange rules are related to some other work on culture and obligations. Most notable is the work of Joan Miller on moral obligations in America and India (Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990). She has found that offering to satisfy needs is a moral obligation in India (collectivistic culture) more than in the U.S. In India, adults perceive a moral obligation to meet others' needs, regardless of the acuteness of the need. In contrast, for the U.S. sample, a positive linear relation was found between the size, or acuteness, of the need and willingness to offer benefits to help the needy. Helping a needy other was only seen as a moral obligation in life-threatening situations. She argues that American values force one to make a trade-off between <u>personal</u>

liberty and responsiveness to others' needs, but Hindu values are characterized by service to a "social whole," or responding to the needs of its members. Similarly, as mentioned above, Hui (1988) found that collectivists had a greater sense of obligation than individualists.

The idea that collectivists have an enhanced concern for others can be found in numerous studies with samples around the world. For example, Triandis, Marin, Lisansky, and Betancourt (1984) have argued that *simpatico*, or extreme concern with being liked by others, is a cultural script among Hispanics. Similar concepts have been argued to exist among the Chinese (Hsu, 1981), Filipinos (Church, 1987), Japanese (Markus & Kitiyama, 1991), Koreans (Park, et al., 1986), Hindus (Kakar, 1978), and, as noted by Markus and Kitiyama (1991), even among some communitarian groups (e.g., Quakers) in the U.S.

Independence versus Interdependence. It was previously argued that the emphasis on independence versus interdependence was an important defining attribute of individualism-collectivism. The relative emphasis on independence can be tied to a preference for exchange relationships. One aspect of exchange relationships is that benefits received are reciprocated immediately and in kind. This promotes independence from others because the interaction is complete in that there are no loose ends: there is no debt and no obligation for repayment of any kind. In contrast, communal relationships are characterized by little immediate reciprocity and it is unnecessary to repay

benefits in kind. Thus, interdependence can be tied to a preference for communal relationships. Rules for communal relationships assume a continued interaction. Afterwards an obligation remains, or, in other words, repayment or elimination of a debt is neither expected, nor desired in communal relationships.

Empirical Support. Empirical support for the notion that collectivists are more likely than individualists to follow communal relationship rules can be found in Hui (1988). He compared questionnaire responses of samples from Hong Kong and the U.S. He found that collectivism was correlated with social interest (Crandall, 1975). Social interest concerns the extent to which one values cooperation more than success. He also found that in Hong Kong collectivism correlated with need for approval as measured by Crowne and Marlow's (1964) social desirability scale. This indicated that collectivism is valued in Chinese culture. Hui also examined responses in a scenario about breaking a window with a friend while playing frisbee. Also, he found that collectivism related to a greater preference for sharing responsibility (e.g., splitting the costs of repair, rather than pursuing other available options).

In summary, collectivists should be less concerned with personal outcomes and more concerned with the welfare and needs of others in social interactions--thus, they should desire that benefits in social interactions are governed by communal relationship rules. Individualists are focused primarily on

personal outcomes, and, in general, should be less sensitive to the needs of others--thus, they should give and receive benefits in social interactions through the use of exchange relationship rules.

CHAPTER 6. INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM IN DISTRIBUTIVE NEGOTIATION

This Chapter begins with a cross-cultural assessment of the three previously described conclusions about distributive negotiation. The aim of this assessment will be to make predictions about the universality of each conclusion vis-a-vis individualism-collectivism theory. The Chapter concludes with a presentation of several testable hypotheses about how culture, as defined by individualism-collectivism theory, should fundamentally affect process of distributive negotiation.

The Universality of Distributive Negotiation Theory

Three underlying assumptions have directed research on distributive negotiation: 1) people are self-interested, 2) people make cost-benefit analysis, and 3) judgments errors affect outcomes. Each of these will be evaluated in turn.

People are self-interested. Apparent in this notion is the idea that individuals are the unit of analysis in social interactions. Self-interest loses its meaning when one uses a group, or collective, as a unit of analysis. Thus, the implication of individualism and collectivism for this assumption is rather straightforward: Self-interested behavior in distributive negotiation should be more evident for individualists than collectivists when collectivists are negotiating with someone who is part of their ingroup.

When negotiation involves outgroup members, the situation is less clear for collectivists. On the one hand, one might expect

exploitation of and competition with outgroup members to occur (e.g., Chan, 1991; Leung & Bond, 1984). On the other hand, collectivism is characterized by a strong desire to adhere to social norms and promote interdependence through communal exchanges. Thus, it would seem that competition with outgroup members is not as likely if the context is governed by social norms (unless the norm is to exploit). Also, for norms to be enforced, monitoring of behavior by meaningful normative referents is important to ensure compliance. Thus, in public situations (such as a negotiation with full information), competition with outgroup members may be less apparent for collectivists (see Discussion section).

People make cost-benefit calculations. The cost-benefit calculations underlying prior theory and research are consistent with the assumption that rules for exchange relationships govern the giving and receiving of benefits in distributive negotiation. This perspective is probably less valid for collectivists, who should be more inclined to base giving and receiving of benefits in distributive negotiation on rules for communal relationships. In other words, collectivists should exhibit what Pruitt (1972) referred to as "mutual responsiveness," or concern for the other's needs. Thus, it seems reasonable that norms of equal concessions and immediate reciprocity of concessions should be more important for individualists than collectivists.

Judgment error affects outcomes. Prior research has found human judgment affects negotiation outcomes. Judgment errors

arise because human decision makers are cognitive misers suffering from information overload (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), and those errors have been linked to negotiation behavior. According to this "cognitive miser" model, errors stem from "inherent features of the cognitive system," rather than motivations (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, p. 13). The extent to which human limitations are rooted in a common biology, an assertion can be made that judgment errors due to human limitations are cultural universals (Pepitone & Triandis, 1987).

During the course of negotiation people make numerous judgments, some of which are without enormous information processing demands, but rather stem from motives and actions taken by the other negotiator. One such judgment concerns whether the other person is being tough or soft. Judgments of the other party's toughness or softness (proactive strategy) concern inferences about the causes of the other person's behavior, or attributions. For example, if the other party makes high demands, one might reasonably conclude he or she is following a tough strategy.

If attributional processes underlie perceptions of opponent's proactive strategy, then there is a potential for culture, through individualism-collectivism, to play a role in judgment. Individualists, who rely on rules for exchange relationships and cost-benefit analysis, will be more likely to infer that demands contain information about toughness or softness. Therefore, during the course of negotiation, because

demands are a source of information about strategy, individualists should change their estimates of the opponent's strategy over time. Moreover, if strategy is linked to a disposition, or internal state, rather than a situational factor, it is possible to apply the fundamental attribution error (Heider, 1958; Ross, 1977). Based on the greater tendency to overattribute others' actions to dispositional causes, individualists should overestimate the extent to which others' actions are due to dispositions.

Collectivists, on the other hand, rely on rules for communal relationships and social norms. Thus, the demands that the other party makes are a source of information about the needs of the other party, not about a tough or soft strategy. Therefore, there would be no reason to alter an estimate of the other party's toughness of softness over the course of a negotiation, and, errors of judgments of opponents' strategy should be less likely. This is consistent with recent research done by Newman (1992), who found the tendency to make the fundamental attribution error was greater among idiocentrics than allocentrics.

Ingroup-Outgroup Differentiation

As described above, there is some theoretical and empirical support for the notion that collectivists should make sharper ingroup-outgroup distinctions than individualists. A reasonable hypothesis is that while individualists are likely to follow exchange rules in giving and receiving benefits, collectivists

may be more inclined to follow communal rules for interactions with ingroup members and exchange rules for interactions with outgroup members. Thus, it may be that for interactions with outgroup members, collectivists approach distributive negotiation in a manner similar to that of individualists.

Hypotheses

Below several hypotheses are presented concerning individualists and collectivists in distributive negotiation. These hypothesis were tested in an experiment done in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong. The experiment concerned the division of a resource, and, involved negotiations with friends and strangers, and is described in subsequent Chapters.

Hypothesis 1 concerns whether individualism and collectivism is related to whether a communal versus exchange relationship is likely to govern behavior in distributive negotiation. In Chapter 4, collectivists were characterized as applying social norms to social decisions and preferring interdependence with ingroup members, while individualists were characterized as applying cost-benefit analyses to social decisions and striving for independence from others. In Chapter 5, it was argued that in social exchange situations, such as negotiation, collectivism and individualism are manifested through preferences for communal versus exchange relationships. Communal relationships are characterized by concern for others' needs. Thus, Hypothesis 1 states: *Collectivists should be more concerned than individualists about the outcomes received by other parties in*

negotiation. If communal relationships are a norm for collectivists, there should be a shared expectation that the other party has concern for one's own needs as well. Thus, Hypothesis 2 states: *Collectivists should believe that other parties have concern for their own needs to a greater extent than individualists.*

Hypothesis 3 concerns the self-interest assumption underlying much previous research on distributive negotiation. Based on the idea that individualists sample the private self and attempt to serve personal interests, while collectivists sample the collective self and serve collective interests, Hypothesis 3 states: *Demands should be higher for individualists than collectivists.*

Hypothesis 4 concerns the rules which govern the giving and receiving of benefits in distributive negotiation. Individualists rely on cost-benefit calculations and exchange relationship rules, while collectivists rely on social norms and communal relationship rules. Therefore, over rounds, demands of individualists should converge or move closer together because exchange relationships are characterized by immediate reciprocity, the principle of equal concessions and cost-benefit calculations. Cost-benefit calculations suggest concessions if one's demands are too large relative to the other's because one must weigh the costs of non-agreement against the value of demanding large amounts. On the other hand, over rounds demands of collectivists converge less. This stems from an emphasis on

communal relationships which are characterized by mutual responsiveness to the needs of the other party. High demands by one of the parties are interpreted as an indication of need. Thus, Hypothesis 4 states: *Demands should converge over time to a greater extent for individualists than collectivists.*

Hypothesis 5 concerns judgments about the other party's toughness or softness during negotiation. For individualists, demands should contain information about the other party's strategy, as determined from limits--provided that limits are set by the negotiators and not by the experimenter. Thus, estimates of the other party's limit should change over rounds as individualists make inferences based on demands. For collectivists, demands should contain information about the other parties needs, rather than strategy. Thus, there should be less change in estimates of limits over rounds for collectivists. Thus, Hypothesis 5 states: *Estimates of the other party's limit should increase over rounds to a greater extent for individualists than collectivists.*

Hypothesis 6 concerns judgment errors in estimates of the other party's limit in distributive negotiation. For individualists, demands are used as inferences about strategy. Thus, individualists should be more inclined than collectivists to infer that higher demands reflect a tough strategy. Also, the fundamental attribution error predicts that individualists should overestimate the extent to which high demands indicate a tough strategy, or highly set limits. Thus, judgment error, defined as

the difference between the estimate and the actual value of the other party's limit, should be greater over time for individualists. But for collectivists, who infer that high demands reflect the needs of the other party, this should not occur. Thus, Hypothesis 6 states: *Judgment errors should be greater for individualists than collectivists.*

The remaining hypotheses concern the effects of ingroup-outgroup differentiation. That is, it is possible to further predict that differences between friend-friend and stranger-stranger dyads should be apparent in much the same way observed between individualistic and collectivistic dyads. This stems from the argument that communal relationship rules are used among friends and exchange relationship rules are used among strangers. Thus, it is possible to state the following Hypotheses: 1) Hypothesis 1A: *Concern for other parties' outcomes should be higher in negotiations involving ingroup members than outgroup members,* 2) Hypothesis 2A: *Beliefs that the other party has concern for one's own outcomes should be greater for negotiations involving ingroup members than outgroup members,* 3) Hypothesis 3A: *Demands should be lower in negotiations among ingroup members than outgroup members,* 4) Hypothesis 4A: *Demands should converge to a greater extent for negotiations with outgroup members than ingroup members,* 5) Hypothesis 5A: *Estimates of the other party's limit should be lower for negotiations involving ingroup than outgroup members,* and 6) Hypothesis 6B: *Judgment errors should be lower when negotiation concerns ingroup*

than outgroup members.

Also, it is reasonable to predict that differences between individualists and collectivists should be moderated by the relationship of the negotiators. Whether negotiation occurs among ingroup or outgroup members should have greater impact for collectivists than individualists. Thus, it is possible to modify the above Hypotheses to reflect an enhanced ingroup-outgroup differentiation effect for collectivists. Thus, it is possible to state the following Hypotheses: 1) Hypothesis 1B: *Concern for other parties' outcomes should be higher in negotiations involving ingroup members than outgroup members, especially for collectivists,* 2) Hypothesis 2B: *Beliefs that the other party has concern for one's own outcomes should be greater for negotiations involving ingroup members than outgroup members, especially for collectivists,* 3) Hypothesis 3B: *Demands should be lower in negotiations among ingroup members than outgroup members, especially for collectivists,* 4) Hypothesis 4B: *Demands should converge to a greater extent for negotiations with outgroup members than ingroup members, especially for collectivists,* 5) Hypothesis 5B: *Estimates of the other party's limit should be affected by whether the negotiation concerns ingroup or outgroup members to a greater extent for collectivists than individualists,* and 6) Hypothesis 6B: *Judgment errors should be affected by whether the negotiation concerns ingroup or outgroup members to a greater extent for collectivists than individualists.*

Test of Hypotheses

The above hypotheses were tested in a laboratory experiment conducted with students in Champaign, Hong Kong and Seoul. Champaign was chosen because previous research has shown that the culture in Illinois tends to be individualistic. Hong Kong and Seoul were chosen because previous research has demonstrated that the culture there tends to be collectivistic (Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1990)

CHAPTER 7. METHOD

Subjects and Design

Subjects were undergraduate students from Illinois, South Korea and Hong Kong. The experiment involved a within subjects' manipulation of relationship, whereby subjects negotiated with either a close friend or another student whom they had never met.

Illinois. Seventy male students from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign participated in the experiment. Thirty-five were enrolled in an Introductory Psychology course and participated to fulfill a course requirement. Each of them brought a male friend to the experiment who received $5 for his participation.

Korea. Sixty male undergraduate students from Seoul National University participated in the experiment. Similar to the Illinois sample, half of the subjects were enrolled in an Introductory Psychology course and received course credit for their participation. The other half were their respective friends, and they received the equivalent of $5 to participate[2].

Hong Kong. Forty-eight male undergraduate students from the Chinese University of Hong Kong participated in the experiment. Twenty-four were enrolled in an Introductory Marketing course and received course credit for their participation. They each brought a male friend to the experiment who participated for $5.

Friend selection. In order to standardize the manipulation of relationship as much as possible across locations, students

enrolled in the respective courses were given specific instructions about what kind of friend they should bring to the experiment. They were told to bring a friend "who they have know for a long time," rather than a new friend or mere acquaintance. They were further instructed that the friend should be a male student at their university, who is not a family member and who is "about the same age as them." They were also told the amount of money their friend would receive for participating in the experiment. Finally, they were told that all participants, themselves included, had a chance to win cash prizes in a lottery based on performance in the experiment.

Apparatus

Subjects were brought into a large room immediately upon arrival. They were seated at individual cubicles which did not allow visual access to the other participants. Four to 8 subjects participated in each experimental session.

Pre-Experimental Questionnaire

Subjects completed a pre-experimental questionnaire before undertaking the negotiations. Responses to the pre-experimental questionnaire were used to predict negotiation behavior. To minimize social desirability effects, the cover page of the pre-experimental questionnaire contained the following:

> Today you will participate in two short experiments. The first experiment concerns measuring attitudes.
>
> Experiment 1
> We are trying to develop a reliable attitude scale. To accomplish this, we need as many people as possible to fill out our questionnaire. Then we can use statistical analysis to choose the best items. On the pages that follow, please

> fill out the questions as accurately as possible. Your participation is highly appreciated and very beneficial to research on attitudes.

After reading the cover page, all subjects completed the questionnaire which took 10 to 15 minutes.

Friendship closeness. The pre-experimental questionnaire first assessed the closeness of their relationship with their friends. The purpose of this measure was to provide statistical control for individual and cultural differences in the type of friend brought to the experiment. The first half consisted of objective measures of friendship closeness. Subjects were asked to report facts about their friends. Each subject estimated how long he had known his friend, how many siblings he had, as well as his name, birthdate, and place of birth. The second half was a subjective measure of friendship closeness. This measure contained a list of 10 statements about friendship. Subjects were asked to check those that applied to their relationship with the person with whom they arrived.

Individualism and Collectivism. Two measures of individualism and collectivism were used. The first was the "20 statements test," a measure of self-concepts (Kuhn & McPartland, 1955). This measure asks subjects to complete 20 statements that begin with "I am..." 2 experienced raters coded responses to produce a collective self-concept score for each subject. This score was computed by summing the number of statements that referred to social entities (for example, "I am the son of X", "I am the boyfriend of X", or "I am the good friend of X").

Previous research demonstrates that this procedure is highly reliable (Triandis et al., 1990).

The second measure of individualism and collectivism consisted of 22 self-attitude items (Triandis, et al., 1994). Items asked subjects to decide whether they "are the kind of person" who behaves in certain ways, where each item varied in the extent to which it is typical of individualists and collectivists. Subjects responded using 11-point Likert scales ranging from 1=False to 11=True.

Experimental Procedure

Upon completion of the pre-experimental questionnaire, subjects were given a packet of materials entitled "Experiment 2." The materials contained instructions for the first negotiation, pre- and post-negotiation questionnaires, and experimental materials.

Each subject completed two negotiations with identical instructions in every respect. The only difference was that one involved a friend and the other a stranger.

The cover page of the packet told subjects that the experiment was designed to better understand what occurs during negotiation. They were thanked for their participation and immediately told that the experiment involved negotiations over lottery tickets that could be used to win $25 prizes. The instructions explicitly told subjects "The more lottery tickets you get, the more chances you will have to win...," and "...during the negotiations, you should try to get as many

lottery tickets as possible."

Other Negotiator. At this point, the manipulation of relationship took place. Subjects were told that they would do a "series of negotiations" and that each negotiation involved a different person. They were instructed to read the index card that accompanied their packet to see whom they would negotiate with first. In the "friend condition" the card read, "In the upcoming negotiation, you will negotiate with the person you came to the experiment with[3]." For the "stranger condition" the card read, "In the upcoming negotiation, you will negotiate with someone in this room, but it will NOT be the person you came to the experiment with." All friend-friend and stranger-stranger dyads consisted of someone who was participating in the course for credit and someone who was participating for cash. The order of friend-friend and stranger-stranger negotiations was counterbalanced across experimental sessions.

Negotiation Task. After their relationship to other negotiator was identified, subjects were given more detailed instructions about the negotiation task. The current negotiation task has been used in earlier work on distributive negotiation (Kelley, Beckman & Fischer, 1967; Smith, Pruitt, & Carnevale, 1982).

The task involved the division of 19 points between two parties[4]. On each round, both negotiators decided how many of the 19 points they wanted, in other words, their level of demand. Each point was worth 10 lottery tickets. When both negotiators

had determined their demand for a given round, they wrote it on a sheet of paper and the experimenter delivered it the other party.

The negotiation ended when the sum of both parties' demands was to equal 19 or less or after 8 rounds. Each party received 10 lottery tickets for each point demanded on the final round.

Subjects were not told how many rounds the negotiation would involve. They were told to continue making demands until the sum was equal to 19 or less or until "time runs out." They were told that if they failed to successfully divide the points in time, they would be given 1 lottery ticket each. The value of 1 lottery ticket became the subject's "Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement" or BATNA (Fisher & Ury, 1981).

Lottery. To lessen the temptation to collude to win the lottery, subjects were informed that separate lotteries would be conducted for themselves and their opponent[5]. To make this salient, red and blue materials were used. The lotteries would be based on the color of the subject's materials, and the other party always used a different color. So, in essence, subjects were competing in the lottery against the other people in the room who had the same colored materials as they did. Subjects who were participating for course credit were given different colored materials than those participating for cash, and this was counterbalanced across sessions.

Concern measures. Immediately after subjects read the instructions, they were asked to complete measures of concern. Five types of concern were assessed: concern for personal

outcomes, concern for other's outcomes, concern with getting higher outcomes than the other, perception of other's concern for personal outcomes, and perception of other's concern for other's outcomes. They responded using 4-point scales ranging from 1=extremely concerned to 4=not at all concerned.

Own and other's limit. Next subjects were instructed to set a limit. Their limit was defined as the lowest number of points that they would accept in the negotiation. They were told to choose a limit between 0 and 9 points[6]. They were further instructed that the other negotiator was also setting a limit. The instructions emphasized that once a limit was chosen, it was forbidden to make demands below it. No subjects made demands below their limit during the experiment. Subjects were told that making a demand below their limit automatically resulted in 0 lottery tickets for them. After subjects recorded their limit on the page, an open-ended question asked them to describe the reasons for their choice.

After subjects set a limit for themselves, they were asked to estimate what the other negotiator's limit was between 0 and 9 and to describe the reasons for their guess.

Pre-negotiation questionnaire. Following the concern measure, subjects completed a pre-negotiation questionnaire. The first part of the questionnaire was a quiz about the experimental procedures. Subjects were asked, "What is the most you can demand on each round?", "What is the least you can demand on each round?", "What is your limit?", "Can you demand a value below

your limit?", "How many lottery tickets do you get if you make a demand below your limit?", and "What is your guess about the other person's limit?" The experimenters then checked the responses to this part of the questionnaire and answered any questions.

The second part of the pre-negotiation questionnaire contained a measure of aspiration ("How many points do you want to get in the upcoming negotiation?), tracking ("What do you think is the lowest number of points the other negotiator will demand in the negotiation?), and optimism ("How optimistic are you that you can get what you want?), measured on a 4-point scale ranging from 1=extremely optimistic to 4=not at all optimistic.

The last part of the pre-negotiation questionnaire contained open-ended questions that asked subjects to consider the upcoming negotiation and describe their strategy and the kind of impression that they hoped to make on the other negotiator. Finally, subjects were asked to describe what they thought the other negotiator's strategy would be.

Subjects then were given demand sheets, a summary instruction sheet and a summary sheet to keep track of the sum of the demands.

Demand sheets. The demand sheets informed subjects to make a demand and write it in the space provided. They were then told to fold the sheet in half and raise their hand so that the experimenter could deliver it to the other party.

Post-negotiation questionnaire. Following each negotiation,

subjects completed a series of questions about the negotiation, their outcome and the other party. They were asked about their own and the other's happiness with the outcome, how important it was for them and the other to receive a good outcome, how difficult it was to understand the instructions, and how important it was that the other party respected them, thought they were strong, and thought they were honest.

CHAPTER 8. RESULTS

Relationship Manipulation

The relationship manipulation was created by asking students enrolled in courses in each culture to bring a friend to the experiment with them. Relationship closeness was assessed in each culture to provide for statistical control.

For the first measure of relationship closeness, subjects reported how long they had known the person they came to the experiment with (in months). As seen in Table 2, a 1-way ANOVA revealed significant cultural differences for the mean number of months, $F(2,171) = 40.1$, $p < .001$. Bonferroni t-tests revealed that the Chinese reported having relationships of longest duration, followed by the Illinois and Korean samples, respectively.

The second measure of relationship closeness consisted of several quiz questions. Subjects were asked to report their friend's birthdate, place of birth and number of siblings. Correct responses were coded as 1; incorrect as 0. The mean proportion correct for each question and the total quiz score (sum of all three questions) is shown in Table 3. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant cultural differences in total quiz score, $F(2,161) = 11.4$, $p < .001$. Bonferroni t-tests revealed that the Illinois and Chinese samples did significantly better on the total quiz than the Korean sample did. The Chinese sample did better for the place of birth question. This probably reflects range restriction on that variable for people of Hong

Kong. In sum, the Illinois sample possessed more knowledge of their friends as measured by these three items, however, responses to the place of birth item are probably spurious.

The final measure of relationship closeness consisted of a relationship checklist, 10 statements that subjects checked if they held true for their relationship. Checks were coded as 1; blanks as 0. Table 4 shows the mean responses and standard deviations for each item and the total sum by culture. Table 4 also displays the results from a 1-way ANOVA conducted to assess cultural differences on the total relationship closeness checklist score (from 1 to 10). Bonferroni *t*-tests were also done are the results are shown. In sum, results consistently show the Illinois sample endorsed items to a greater extent than the Chinese and Korean samples. As measured by this scale, it would appear friendship closeness was highest in Illinois.

Measurement of Individualism and Collectivism

Individualism and collectivism were measured in 2 ways. The first measure was the Kuhn and McPartland (1954) 20 statements test. Responses to this measure reflecting a sampling of the collective self were tallied by two experienced raters. Interrater reliability of this procedure has been shown to be in the upper .90s (e.g., Triandis, et al., 1990). The raters' codes were averaged to produce one collective self score for each subject. Consistent with expectations, the results indicated that the Chinese and Koreans sampled the collective self to a much greater extent than did the Illini, $F(2,163) = 27.2$, $p <$

.001. Table 5 displays the results of collective self sampling in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong.

The second way individualism and collectivism was measured was through responses to a 22 item self-behaviors attitude questionnaire developed by Triandis, et al., (1994). Item means and standard deviations are displayed in Table 6.

A "Family Integrity with Responsiveness" subscale was created by examining item content and including only items that referred to family integrity or responsiveness to the needs of an ingroup member. This content analysis resulted in 10 items: 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, 11, 14, 18, 20, and 21. Items 1, 6, 8, 11 and 21 were reversed scored. Item analysis led to the deletion of items 8 and 11 due to low item-total correlations. Cronbach's alpha was computed on the remaining 8 items and a reliability coefficient of .60 was obtained.

Table 7 displays the mean scale scores and standard deviations for the Illinois, Korean and Chinese samples. A one-way ANOVA was done by culture, and, as Table 7 displays, all three samples differed significantly in mean individualism-collectivism, $F(2,150) = 101.0$, $p < .0001$.

Table 8 displays the correlations between the Family Integrity with Responsiveness scale scores and the amount of collective self sampling in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong. Results of the correlational analyses indicate that the measurements of individualism-collectivism are tapping into different elements of subjective culture. In other words, the

low significant correlations among the measures indicates that they seem to be tapping into different aspects of the same syndrome. To create an overall individualism-collectivism index for dyads, a procedure was used similar to the one developed by Chan (1991). First, within each dyad scores for the collective self and Family Integrity were summed, respectively. Then the distribution of COLINDEX was constructed based on those scores.

This was done in the following way: First, for the combined sample, the distribution of each measure was trichotomized. Then, for each measure dyads were assigned a 1, 2 or 3 based on where their score fell in the overall distribution of that measure. In each case, 3 was assigned to scores falling in the most collectivistic category, 2 to the middle category, and 1 to the most individualistic. This created a score, COLINDEX, with a possible range of 2 to 6, with higher scores indicating greater collectivism. Table 9 contains the frequency distributions and mean scores of COLINDEX for the overall sample and in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong. Again, the distribution makes evident that the Korean sample was the most collectivistic, followed by Hong Kong and then Illinois.

Dyads were classified as individualistic if their COLINDEX scores were 2 or 3, and they were classified as collectivistic if their COLINDEX scores were 5 or 6. To test Hypotheses, the location of the samples (Illinois, U.S.A., Seoul, Korea, or Hong Kong) was not used as a proxy for individualism-collectivism, but rather scores based on COLINDEX provided the classification.

However, COLINDEX was created in part from Family Integrity scale scores, and this scale exhibited very low reliability. Thus, it is useful to also include summary statistics for critical dependent variables by the location of the sample. Statistical analyses were not conducted in this way, but the reader can refer to means and standard deviations for critical dependent variables by location in APPENDIX A.

Individualism-Collectivism and Relationships

To assess the relation between relationship closeness and individualism-collectivism, correlations between COLINDEX and the measures of relationship closeness were computed for each sample. Measures of relationship closeness included the total quiz score (sum of sibling, birthday and place of birth questions), the total friend score (sum of relationship checklist items) and the number of months the parties had known each other. The results are displayed in Table 10. Results indicate for the Illinois sample, higher levels of collectivism were associated with a higher score on the quiz items. Contrary to expectations, a negative relation was found between collectivism and the number of months subjects had known each other for the Hong Kong sample. Thus, in general, the measures do not appear to be very useful in providing control for cultural differences in friendship closeness.

Tests of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1 states that concern for other's outcomes should be higher for collectivistic than individualistic dyads. Dyads

were classified as individualistic or collectivistic based on the distribution of COLINDEX. Hypothesis 1 was tested through responses to measures of concern on the pre-negotiation questionnaire. Two concern items are relevant for Hypothesis 1. The first was an item that stated, "How concerned will you be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for the other negotiator?" Subjects responded using a 4 point scale that ranged from 1 = extremely, to 4 = not at all concerned. Responses were summed for each dyad and a Culture X Relationship X Negotiation (2 X 2 X 2) ANOVA was done on the mean. As predicted by Hypothesis 1, a main effect for Culture was obtained, $\underline{F}(1, 135) = 17.3$, $\underline{p} < .0001$. Individualistic dyads reported less concern for the other outcomes than did collectivistic dyads ($\underline{M}_{ind} = 6.2$ versus $\underline{M}_{coll} = 5.3$). Also, a main effect for Relationship was obtained, $\underline{F}(1, 135) = 13.5$, $\underline{p} = .0001$. Consistent with what one might expect from Hypothesis 1A, concern was greater for friends than strangers, ($\underline{M}_{frnd} = 5.3$ versus $\underline{M}_{str} = 6.2$). No other effects were obtained, and, thus, Hypothesis 1B was not supported.

Another concern item was included, using the same 4 point scale, that stated, "How concerned will you be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for yourself?" Again, responses were summed for each dyad and a Culture X Relationship X Negotiation (2 X 2 X 2) ANOVA was done on the mean. Again, as predicted by Hypothesis 1, a main effect for Culture was obtained, $\underline{F}(1, 135) = 14.6$, $\underline{p} < .0001$. Individualistic dyads reported more concern for the own outcomes than did collectivistic dyads ($\underline{M}_{ind} = 4.6$ versus $\underline{M}_{coll} =$

5.4). Also, a main effect for Negotiation was obtained, $F(1, 135) = 6.0$, $p < .05$. Concern for own outcomes was greater in the first than second negotiation, ($M_1 = 4.8$ versus $M_2 = 5.2$). No other effects were obtained, and, thus, Hypothesis 1A and 1B were not supported.

Hypothesis 2 states that other's concern for one's own outcomes should be greater for collectivistic than individualistic dyads. Two concern items were included in the pre-negotiation questionnaire to test this Hypothesis. The items used the same format as previous concern items (1 = extremely concerned, to 4 = not at all concerned). The first was, "How concerned will the other negotiator be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for you?" Responses were summed for each dyad and a Culture X Relationship X Negotiation (2 X 2 X 2) ANOVA was done on the mean. As predicted by Hypothesis 2, a main effect for Culture was obtained, $F(1, 135) = 15.4$, $p < .0001$. Perceptions that the other would be concerned with one's own outcomes were greater among collectivistic than individualistic dyads ($M_{ind} = 6.2$ versus $M_{coll} = 5.4$). There was also a main effect for Relationship, $F(1, 135) = 22.4$, $p = .0001$. As predicted by Hypothesis 1A, friend-friend dyads perceived the other would be concerned with one's own outcomes to a greater extent than stranger-stranger dyads ($M_{frnd} = 5.3$ versus $M_{str} = 6.3$). No other effects were obtained, so Hypothesis 2B was not supported.

The second item of importance for Hypothesis 2 stated, "How

concerned will the other negotiator be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for himself?" Again, responses were summed for dyads and a Culture X Relationship X Negotiation (2 X 2 X 2) ANOVA was done on the mean. Again, as predicted by Hypothesis 2, a main effect for Culture was obtained, $\underline{F}(1, 135) = 21.0$, $\underline{p} < .0001$. Perceptions that the other would be concerned with his own outcomes was greater for individualists than collectivists, ($\underline{M}_{ind} = 4.0$ versus $\underline{M}_{coll} = 5.0$). There was also a main effect for Negotiation, $\underline{F}(1, 135) = 4.7$, $\underline{p} < .05$, where the perception that other was concerned with his own outcomes was greater in the first than second negotiation, ($\underline{M}_1 = 4.3$ versus $\underline{M}_2 = 4.7$). Finally, a marginal main effect for Relationship was obtained, $\underline{F}(1, 135) = 3.5$, $\underline{p} = .064$. Friend-friend dyads felt that other was concerned with his outcomes more than did stranger-stranger dyads ($\underline{M}_{frnd} = 4.7$ versus $\underline{M}_{str} = 4.3$). No other effects were obtained. Hypothesis 2B was not supported.

As described above, Hypothesis 1B and 2B predicted that the effects of culture on concern should be moderated by relationship. However, there were no significant Culture X Relationship interactions found, thus, Hypotheses 1B and 2B were not supported. Despite the lack of findings, because an interaction was predicted, the mean and standard deviations of concern items are shown by Culture and Relationship in Table 11.

Hypothesis 3 states that demands should be higher for individualists than collectivists. To test this Hypotheses, the total demand was computed for each dyad on each round of the

negotiation. The first test of this Hypothesis was with demand on round 1 as the dependent variable. A Culture (Individualist vs. Collectivist) X Relationship (Friend vs. Stranger) X Negotiation (1 vs. 2) ANOVA was done for mean demand on round 1. In support of Hypothesis 3, a significant main effect for Culture was found, $F(1, 135) = 7.41$, $p < .01$, with individualists, on average, demanding significantly greater amounts on round 1 than collectivists, (22.1 versus 19.8). No other significant effects were obtained for mean demand on Round 1. Thus, Hypotheses 3A and 3B were not supported.

Hypothesis 3 was also tested using the amount of demand at agreement, or final demand. A Culture (Individualist vs. Collectivist) X Relationship (Friend vs. Stranger) X Negotiation (1 vs. 2) ANOVA was done for mean final demand. Again, Hypothesis 3 was supported by a significant main effect for Culture, $F(1, 135) = 7.53$, $p < .01$, with individualistic dyads, on average, exhibiting significantly larger mean demands at the time an agreement was reached, or final demand, than collectivistic dyads, (18.4 versus 17.1). No other significant effects were obtained for mean final demand. Thus, Hypotheses 3A and 3B which predicted an effect for relationship, and that the effects of culture on demand should be moderated by relationship was not supported.

However, since the effects were predicted, Table 12 displays the means and standard deviations for final demands of dyads by Culture and Relationship for Negotiation 1, and Table 13 displays

the means and standard deviations for final demands of dyads by Culture and Relationship for Negotiation 2. Table 14 displays the mean value of demands for dyads over Rounds 1 through 4 by Culture and Relationship for Negotiation 1, and, Table 15 for Negotiation 2.

Hypothesis 4 states that demands should converge over time to a greater extent for individualists than collectivists. To test this Hypothesis a variable, High-Low difference was created. This variable was the algebraic difference in demands between members in each dyad for Round 1 and Round 2. In other words, for each dyad the amount of the low demand was subtracted from the amount of the high demand. Only Rounds 1 and 2 were included in this analysis because few dyads went past two rounds. Cases in which the dyads demanded the same amount on Round 1 were not included in this analysis, and, cases in which agreement was reached on Round 1 were not included.

Mean high-low difference was then submitted to a Culture (Individualist vs. Collectivist) X Relationship (Friend vs. Stranger) X Negotiation (1 vs. 2) X Round (1 or 2) repeated measures ANOVA, with Round as a within-subjects factor. As predicted by Hypothesis 4, a significant Culture X Round interaction was obtained, $\underline{F}(1, 66) = 7.1$, $\underline{p} < .01$. Individualistic dyads showed an increased tendency for mean differences between demands to converge over rounds ($\underline{M} = 4.7$ on Round 1 and $\underline{M} = 1.6$ on Round 2) than did collectivistic dyads ($\underline{M} = 5.2$ on Round 1 and $\underline{M} = 4.2$ on Round 2). There was also a

significant effect for Round, $F(1, 66) = 22.9$, $p < .0001$, (M = 5.0 on Round 1 and $M = 2.9$ on Round 2). No other effects were obtained for mean high-low difference. Again, Hypothesis 4A and 4B, which predicted a Relationship main effect, and that the effects of culture on demand should interact with relationship, were not supported.

Further analyses were done to examine changes in the high and low demands over Rounds. First, only those people who made a higher demand than the other party on Round 1 were analyzed. For these folks, mean amount of demand on Round 1 and 2 was submitted to a Culture (Individualist vs. Collectivist) X Relationship (Friend vs. Stranger) X Negotiation (1 vs. 2) X Round (1 or 2) repeated measures ANOVA, with Round as a within-subjects factor. A marginally significant Culture by Round interaction was obtained, $F(1, 62) = 3.6$, $p = .06$. As shown in Table 16, on average, individualists who had demanded a higher amount than the other party tended to lower their demands to a greater extent than did collectivists who had demanded a higher amount.

Similar analyses were done for only those people who demanded less than the other party on Round 1. For only those who demanded less on Round 1, mean demand on Round 1 and 2 was submitted to a Culture (Individualist vs. Collectivist) X Relationship (Friend vs. Stranger) X Negotiation (1 vs. 2) X Round (1 or 2) repeated measures ANOVA, with Round as a within-subjects factor. A marginally significant Culture by Round interaction was obtained, $F(1, 62) = 2.8$, $p = .10$. As shown in

Table 16, on average, collectivists who had demanded a lower amount than the other party tended to lower their demands to a greater extent than did individualists who had demanded a lower amount.

Hypothesis 5 states that estimates of the other limits should increase over rounds to a greater extent for individualistic than collectivistic dyads. To test this Hypothesis the estimates of the other limits were computed for each dyad based on judgments made prior to and after the negotiation. Mean estimate of limits for dyads was submitted to a Culture (Individualist vs. Collectivist) X Relationship (Friend vs. Stranger) X Negotiation (1 vs. 2) X Time (pre- or post-negotiation) repeated measures ANOVA, with Time as a within-subjects factor. A significant Time main effect was found, $\underline{F}(1, 123) = 13.2$, $\underline{p} < .001$, indicating estimates of limits increased over time ($\underline{M} = 12.5$ pre-negotiation and $\underline{M} = 13.7$ post-negotiation). Also, in modest support of Hypothesis 5, a <u>marginally</u> significant Culture X Time interaction was obtained, $\underline{F}(1, 123) = 3.9$, $\underline{p} = .051$. A greater increase in estimates of limits was observed for individualistic dyads ($\underline{M}_{pre} = 13.1$ versus $\underline{M}_{post} = 15.0$) than collectivistic dyads ($\underline{M}_{pre} = 12.0$ versus $\underline{M}_{post} = 12.7$). No other effects over time were found for estimates of other limits. Hypothesis 5A and 5B which predicted a Relationship main effect and a Culture X Relationship X Time interaction, respectively, were not supported.

However, Table 17 displays the mean and standard deviations

of pre- and post-negotiation estimates of other limits by Culture and Relationship for Negotiation 1, and, similarly, Table 18 displays the summary statistics for Negotiation 2.

Hypothesis 6 states that judgment errors should be greater for individualists than collectivists. To test this Hypothesis, judgment error was computed based on estimates of other limits pre- and post-negotiation and actual levels of limits. For each dyad, judgment error was equal to the sum of the differences between estimated and actual limits. Mean judgment error for dyads was then submitted to a Culture (Individualist vs. Collectivist) X Relationship (Friend vs. Stranger) X Negotiation (1 vs. 2) X Time (pre- or post-negotiation) repeated measures ANOVA, with Time as a within-subjects factor. A significant Time main effect was found, $\underline{F}(1, 123) = 13.2$, $\underline{p} < .001$, indicating judgment errors tended to increase over time ($\underline{M} = 1.2$ pre-negotiation and $\underline{M} = 2.4$ post-negotiation). Also, in weak support of Hypothesis 6, a marginally significant Culture X Time interaction was obtained, $\underline{F}(1, 123) = 3.9$, $\underline{p} = .051$. Over time, greater judgment errors were observed for individualistic dyads ($\underline{M}_{pre} = 1.9$ versus $\underline{M}_{post} = 3.9$) than collectivistic dyads ($\underline{M}_{pre} = 0.7$ versus $\underline{M}_{post} = 1.4$). No other effects over time were found for estimates of other limits, and, thus, Hypothesis 6A and 6B, which predicted a Relationship main effect and a Relationship X Culture interaction were not supported.

Yet, Tables 19 and 20 display the summary statistics for judgment error by Culture and Relationship for negotiations 1 and

2, respectively.

Finally, it is important to note that since numerous statistical tests were done, it is possible that some results may be spurious due to an experimentwise error rate.

CHAPTER 9. DISCUSSION

This Chapter first contains a discussion of the empirical results from the experiment. This is followed by a discussion of the implications of the results for negotiation theory. Highlighted in this discussion are implications for the dominant paradigm in research on distributive negotiation. Next, implications for theoretical developments of individualism-collectivism theory are discussed. This discussion reveals some empirical inconsistencies between the current and prior research and offers some suggestions for theoretical integration. This is followed by a discussion of the limitations of the current study and some suggestions for future research.

Experiment Summary

Experimental analyses generally supported the prediction that in distributive negotiation self-interest is a more probable assumption for individualists than collectivists: the values of initial demands and final agreements were lower for collectivists than individualists. This finding is consistent with the notion that collectivists have a greater tendency to define themselves in group terms (Triandis, 1989), and, thus, service to the collective takes precedence over self-interest.

Support was also found for the prediction that collectivism and individualism can be linked to the use of communal and exchange relationship rules, respectively (Triandis, 1990). Communal relationship rules promote interdependence and are based on concern for the needs of others, while exchange relationship

rules emphasize interdependence and are characterized by immediate reciprocity of comparable benefits (Clark & Mills, 1979). Consistent with predictions, results indicated that prior to negotiation collectivists had greater concern for others' outcomes and less concern for personal outcomes than did individualists. Also, prior to negotiation collectivists perceived the other negotiators to be more concerned with other outcomes and less concerned with personal outcomes than did individualists.

It was further argued that when a difference between the levels of demands of members of negotiation dyads existed, communal versus exchange rules have different implications. Communal rules imply that parties making higher demands have greater needs, and social responsiveness is required from parties making lower demands. In contrast, exchange rules imply that parties making higher demands are applying a tougher strategy than parties making lower demands. Consistent with this prediction, demands converged, or differences were reduced, to a greater extent for individualistic than collectivistic dyads. There was marginal evidence that collectivistic parties who made lower demands on the first round actually reduced their demand levels on the second. Unlike the collectivists, individualists who demanded less than the other party tended not make further concessions. Moreover, individualists who made higher demands on round 1 subsequently conceded more than did the collectivists who made higher demands on round 1.

It was also argued that collectivists and individualists, through their respective preferences for communal versus exchange rules, should make different attributions about the tough behavior of others. It was argued that collectivists should interpret demands from the other as an indication of need, while individualists should interpret demands as an indication of dispositional toughness-softness. Thus, consistent with Newman (1992), it was predicted that in response to others' toughness, individualists should be more inclined than collectivists to infer that the other had set a higher limit for himself. Support was found for this Hypothesis as individualists, more than collectivists, adjusted their estimates of opponents' limits during the negotiation.

Finally, judgment error was measured by asking subjects to estimate the value of the other's limit, which was set individually prior to the negotiation. Based on the fundamental attribution error, the tendency to overestimate the causes of another's behavior to dispositional factors, it was predicted that judgment error should be greater for individualists than collectivists. Support was found for this prediction.

Ingroup-Outgroup Differentiation. It was predicted also that collectivists should make sharper ingroup-outgroup distinctions than individualists. Collectivists, who possess stronger group identities than individualists, should be more likely to use the group as the fundamental unit of analysis in social interaction (Triandis, 1972). This should lead to

ingroup-outgroup differentiation, and enhanced intergroup competition should result (Tajfel & Turner, 1982). Individualists also make ingroup-outgroup distinctions and therefore should show a similar pattern of results, albeit not as dramatic (Triandis, et al., 1990). To test these predictions, negotiations among friend-friend and stranger-stranger dyads were compared.

No support for the predictions was found. This is in contrast to previous findings comparing U.S. and Chinese subjects (Chan, 1991; Leung & Bond, 1984; Triandis, et al., 1990). More surprising, collapsing across cultures, there were no consistent differences between friend-friend and stranger-stranger dyads. This is in stark contrast to previous research done on negotiation (Fry, et al., 1983; Shoeninger & Wood, 1969) and relationships (Clark, et al., 1989) in the United States.

This is a surprising result. Information for this lack of finding was sought from some exploratory probing of the data. Prior to the negotiation, subjects were asked a question in the pre-negotiation questionnaire that stated, "How concerned will you be with getting more lottery tickets than the other negotiator?" For each dyad, responses to this question (which ranged from 1 = extremely concerned, to 4 = not at all concerned) were summed. The mean was submitted to a Culture X Relationship X Negotiation (2 X 2 X 2) ANOVA. The only effect found was a main effect for relationship, $F(1,140) = 5.8$, $p < .05$. Apparently, friend-friend dyads were less concerned about getting

more lottery tickets than stranger-stranger dyads, (M_{frnd} = 6.0 versus M_{str} = 5.5). Further evidence of this effect was found by examining the number of agreements that consisted of equal levels of demand for both parties (for example, both parties end up with 9 lottery tickets). The percentage of times parties in the dyad ended up with equal levels of demands at agreement was submitted to a Culture X Relationship X Negotiation (2 X 2 X 2) ANOVA. Again, the only effect to emerge was a main effect for Relationship, $F(1,141) = 6.1$, $p < .05$. Friend-friend dyads agreed to equal levels of demand a greater percentage of the time than stranger-stranger dyads, (M_{frnd} = .15 versus M_{str} = .03). Thus, it appears that the tendency toward competition underlaid differences between friend-friend and stranger-stranger interactions in the experiment.

This tendency may arise from differences in social motives (Messick & McClintock, 1968; Pruitt, 1967; 1970). Social motives refer to preferences for particular patterns of self-other outcome distributions. An infinite number of social motives can be distinguished (Knight & Dubro, 1984; MacCrimmon & Messick, 1976; McClintock, 1976), but there is consistent empirical support for the three-category that Deutsch referred to as cooperation, individualism, and competition (Deutsch, 1960). Cooperative motives are preferences for maximizing collective outcomes, individualistic motives are preferences for maximizing personal outcomes, and competitive motives are preferences for maximizing one's relative advantage over others. Social motives

have been shown to be important predictors of cooperation in experimental games (Liebrand, Jansen, Rijke, & Shure, 1986; De Dreu & McCusker, 1994; Sattler & Kerr, 1991; Van Lange, 1992; Van Lange & Liebrand, 1991) such as the Prisoner's Dilemma (Rapaport, 1966), demands and information exchange in integrative negotiation (Carnevale & De Dreu, 1992; Carnevale & Lawler, 1986; De Dreu & Van Lange, 1993; Schulz & Pruitt, 1978), and helping behavior in psychological experiments (McClintock & Allison, 1989).

Finally, previous research has found more dramatic effects for relationships than what was found in the current study. An important difference is methodology is that previous research on relationships in negotiation (e.g., Fry, et al., 1983) has examined negotiations between married versus unmarried couples. Perhaps the differences lie in the extent to which competition occurs to a greater extent in friend-friend dyads than among married dyads.

Interestingly, there was no evidence that individualism-collectivism related to the tendency to compete with strangers more than friends. Thus, the results might be best summarized as follows: differences in negotiations among individualists and collectivists are mediated by preferences for exchange versus communal relationships, while differences in negotiation among friends and strangers are mediated by competitive motives.

Implications for Negotiation Research

Two important implications of the current experiment for

negotiation research are discussed below. First, an assessment of the dominant paradigm vis-a-vis the current findings is presented. This is followed by a discussion of judgmental processes in negotiation.

The Dominant Paradigm. Research on distributive negotiation has been consistent with the dominant paradigm described by Pruitt and Carnevale (1993). This paradigm has relied on assumptions of self-interest and cost-benefit calculations, and distributive negotiation can be described as the process of resource division. Collectivists do not appear to be motivated solely by the desire to get as much as possible for themselves from the negotiation. Collectivistic dyads are also willing to accept larger differences in their demands. Presumably this occurs because high demands reflect greater need, and a moral obligation exists to fulfill others' needs for collectivists (e.g., Markus & Kitiyama, 1991; Miller et al., 1992). In sum, the extent to which results of this study are explainable by cultural differences in individualism-collectivism, they are not easily accounted for by the dominant paradigm.

Although this is only one limited study (see discussion below), that there are cultural differences, consistent with implications of individualism and collectivism for communal versus exchange relationships, might suggest a need for a fundamental modification of the paradigm. Suggested here is the idea that such a modification might describe negotiation as a process by which individuals define the degree of independence or

interdependence in their relationship by giving and receiving of benefits. The manner in which interdependent parties give and receive benefits is the essence of negotiation. From the point of view of a relationship paradigm, most prior research on negotiation can be criticized as creating conditions that promote only one set of rules (exchange) for giving and receiving benefits. In sum, adopting a relationship perspective on negotiation would address some of the criticism levied against the dominant paradigm by Pruitt and Carnevale (1993), and would provide a theoretical paradigm that can be integrated with individualism and collectivism theory to develop hypotheses to test whether the assumptions underlying the dominant paradigm are cultural universals.

Judgment. Much recent research on negotiation has concerned the effects of human judgment on the negotiation process (e.g., Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Central to this research is the notion that humans are cognitive misers suffering from information overload (Fisk & Taylor, 1994). Negotiation typically does not entail full information. Thus, research on judgment under conditions of uncertainty (Kahneman, Slovic & Tversky, 1982; Markus & Zajonc, 1985) is relevant (e.g., Bazerman, et al., 1985). Judgment errors become important because they are often a source of error and inefficiency in negotiation (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). Cultural differences should not appear in effects that stem from human information processing limitations that can be linked to a common biology (Pepitone & Triandis, 1987). Thus,

many previous findings on judgment in negotiation are unlikely to be altered by cross-cultural comparisons.

However, the current research does show that culture can be important in predicting judgment error in negotiation. Some judgments in negotiation are not affected by human limitations, but rather are rooted in attributions. One such judgment occurs when negotiators estimate the value of opponents' limits. In the current experiment, limits were set individually prior to the negotiation. Then, negotiators were asked to make an estimate of their opponents' limits prior to and following the negotiation. Because individualists should be more apt to assume others high demands reflect dispositional tendencies toward toughness, it was predicted that they would adjust their estimates of limits accordingly. However, given the tendency to overestimate the dispositional causes of another's behavior, this resulted in greater judgment errors for individualists than collectivists. Thus, one important contribution of this study to research on judgment in negotiation is a demonstration of judgment errors that stem from social cognition, rather than human limitations. Moreover, this study paves the way for further analysis of the role of culture and judgment in negotiation by emphasizing the importance of cultural differences in attribution.

Implications for Individualism-Collectivism

This study also offers some interesting findings for cross-cultural analysis of individualism and collectivism. In the current research, individualists and collectivists were

distinguished by two defining attributes. The first was the tendency to define oneself in private versus collective terms. The second was the relative emphasis on independence versus interdependence as reflected in a scale assessing Family Integrity. Two implications of individualism and collectivism for social behavior were also described. Individualists were characterized as emphasizing cost-benefit analyses and making mild ingroup-outgroup distinctions. Collectivists were characterized as emphasizing social norms and making sharp ingroup-outgroup distinctions. An additional implication was proposed as well. Individualism and collectivism were linked to research on romantic relationships that has identified communal versus exchange rules as fundamental approaches for giving and receiving benefits in relationships (Clark & Mills, 1979).

Results of the current experiment generally supported this formulation of individualism and collectivism. However, one critical aspect of the theory, as described here, did not receive support. No evidence was found to support the idea that collectivists make sharper ingroup-outgroup distinctions than individualists. Described below are both theoretical and methodological explanations for this "riddle, wrapped in a puzzle, inside an enigma."

Theoretically, one can make the argument for greater ingroup-outgroup differentiation among collectivists quite directly. A critical defining attribute of collectivism is a stronger identity to the ingroup (Triandis, 1989). Thus, it is

not a difficult or new prediction to argue that greater identification with groups can lead to greater ingroup loyalty and outgroup competition (e.g., Sherif, et al., 1961). In fact, there is empirical support for this idea when individualists and collectivists have been compared (Chan, 1991; Leung & Bond, 1984; Triandis, et al., 1990).

There are also empirical findings that do not support this view. As mentioned previously, Hui (1988) found that collectivists had a greater sense of obligation than individualists. However, a careful review of his method reveals that this was found for newly met acquaintances. Similarly, Miller et al., (1990) found that Indian adults, who are presumably more collectivistic than American adults, felt that a moral obligation existed to fulfill the needs of others. Interestingly, in the Miller, et al. (1990) study, greater role-dependence in addressing other's needs was found in American than the Indian samples. That is, they found that the relationship among the parties in the need situation (parent-child versus acquaintances) had more impact in the American than Indian samples. Finally, many descriptions of collectivistic values have noted an emphasis on obligation, social order, and responsiveness to the needs of others (e.g., *simpatico* for Hispanics; Triandis, et al., 1984; for other examples, see Markus & Kitiyama, 1991, p. 229). It seems that such sentiments are ideals that are promoted within collectivistic cultures, but what is not clear is whether such cultural ideals prescribe that

ingroup-outgroup distinctions should be made. Thus, from a theoretical point of view, one explanation that emerges concerns expectations and monitoring.

Collectivists reside in a social environment that prescribes responsiveness to the needs of others--regardless of the size of the need or one's relationship to the needy (Miller, et al., 1992). An argument that can be made is based on a dialectic view of culture (Janosik, 1990). According to this view, individualism and collectivism can be viewed as systems of cultural values that create a different set of tensions to be resolved in social activities. Collectivists must resolve the tension between living up to cultural ideals that prescribe responding, emotionally and otherwise, to the needs of others and the desire for affiliation to others. Implicit in this argument is the idea that it is humanly impossible to respond to the needs of everyone one encounters. So, it becomes critical to pay careful attention and identify situations that offer relief from the burdens of their cultural ideals, yet to do so without threatening one's membership in the collective. On the other hand, as argued by Miller, et al., (1992), individualists face a tension between values of personal liberty and moral obligations to assist others. So, issues of fairness and justice become important concepts for individualists, and social institutions (such as laws) serve a purpose in that they defend inequitable distributions of resources. For example, if one obeys laws, pays one's taxes, and plays by the rules, one has fulfilled one's

obligation to society.

The important issue here is to understand how this proposed tension among collectivists might account for the apparent discrepancy between the current study and previous research. As mentioned previously, collectivists face an impossible burden of being responsive to the needs of others--regardless of the size of the need or their relationship to the needy. The issue, then, is under what conditions can collectivists escape social norms. For the sake of argument, we can adopt the Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) notion that normative influence consists of beliefs about what normative referents think one should do and motivation to comply to those normative referents. Collectivistic values are maintained and enforced through social norms. If collectivists share beliefs, in one form or another, of responding to the needs of others, the critical issue becomes the motivations to comply to normative referents. Two processes might underlie motivation to comply. The first might be whether the others are part of one's ingroup. The second process might be the extent to which the social situation is clearly defined. The reason that more clearly defined the social situations increase the motivation to comply to normative referents concerns the relative ease with which others can monitor one's behavior. Thus, in situations where monitoring of behavior is not possible, we should expect collectivists to exhibit ingroup-outgroup differentiation to a greater extent than in situations where monitoring is possible.

An implication of this argument for the theory is that

outgroup competition is not consistent with any social norms, but rather is an escape from social norms. Also, this analysis suggests that in intercultural negotiations, ingroup-outgroup differentiation for collectivists might arise because the others do not share the same beliefs, thus social norms do not exist.

Applying this logic to previous research helps explain inconsistent findings. Interestingly, when one considers psychological experiments, monitoring can stem from the experimenter as well as the participants. In Leung and Bond (1984) and Triandis, et al., (1990) the ingroup-outgroup findings were not for actual behavior but for responses to a scenario (Leung and Bond) and perceptions of social stimuli (Triandis et al.). It is not clear from the Leung and Bond study whether it was possible for the experimenter to identify the individuals after their responses were recorded, but subjects may actually describe their desires, which reflect the tension inherent in collectivistic societies, rather than how they would actually behave. In the Triandis, et al. (1990) study, given the complexity of the task and the elaborate method used to demonstrate the effect, it is unlikely that subjects felt their responses could be monitored by the experimenter in any meaningful way. Thus, the Triandis, et al. (1990) method may provide a useful technique because experimenter effects are minimized.

The Chan (1991) study is also consistent with this notion. He had collectivists and individualists negotiate against a

simulated other via computer. The critical difference between the current experiment and the Chan experiment concerns information. The current experiment is a situation with full information with one issue, while the Chan experiment was an integrative negotiation with incomplete information (subjects only had their issue chart) and multiple issues. Thus, given the differences in the amount of information available about the task facing each negotiator and the complexity of the situation, it can be argued that the current experiment creates a situation that is more clearly defined than the situation in the Chan (1991) experiment. Thus, following the logic described above, ingroup-outgroup differences were more evident in the Chan (1991) experiment because monitoring was less possible.

This argument has an interesting implication for negotiation among collectivists. Namely, for collectivists, creating ambiguity represents an effective negotiation tactic because it allows them to escape cultural prescriptions which would require responsiveness to the needs of the other party. Thus, the escape from social norms, through the creation of situational ambiguity, may be a desirable tactic for collectivists negotiating with outgroup members.

But what of the lack of ingroup-outgroup effect in the current experiment when samples are collapsed across cultures? In other words, why was it that no differences were observed for friend-friend and stranger-stranger dyads? Some evidence was obtained that the tendency to compete distinguished friend-friend

and stranger-stranger dyads.

One explanation, related to the above arguments, could be the following. There are collectivistic and individualistic tendencies among people, and the same can be said for situations. Consistent with previous arguments from above, a structured, or tight situation is one that is clearly defined and behavior is aptly monitored, while an unstructured, or loose situation is loosely defined and behavior is difficult to monitor.

The current experiment may well have created a tight situation. Subjects were asked to divide a known amount of lottery tickets. Thus, both sides had complete information. Moreover, the other party in the negotiation, the experimenter, and one's friend were all potential sources of monitoring, because they too possessed complete information. Previous experiments, such as Chan (1991), might have created more loose situations. Behavior was less monitorable, and, subjects faced less clarity with respect to what effect one was having on others when making demands. So, it may be that situational constraints limit the extent to which ingroup-outgroup differences are observable. In a highly controlled, highly monitored tight situation, one is less likely to have the effrontery to openly compete. This assumes that there is no socially acceptable basis for open competition[7]. Thus, it may be that public versus private competition is an important process mediating ingroup-outgroup effects for both individualists and collectivists. In sum, because social norms proscribe competition in most

situations, it must be done furtively, and, thus, only in loose situations do we find such intergroup competition, or ingroup-outgroup, effects.

This has important methodological implications. Typically, experiments create tight situations, and questionnaires create loose one. If ingroup-outgroup differentiation effects are more likely in loose situations, the methodology used to test hypotheses can be limiting. An interesting question is whether paper-and-pencil ingroup-outgroup effects (e.g., Rothbart & Hallmark, 1987) can be generalized to tighter situations such as the experimental laboratory.

Limitations of the Current Experiment

The results of the current experiment should be considered with a considerable amount of caution. The methodological difficulties of doing cross-cultural research are enormous, and several threats to valid inference were not controlled in the current study.

First, it is not clear that the experimental manipulation was a cultural etic. That is, it may be that when given instructions to bring a friend to the experiment with them, subjects in Illinois, Korea, and Hong Kong brought people who differed from one another, in other words, the manipulation could have been an emic treatment. This is problematic if the differences are related to individualism and collectivism. An attempt was made to control for possible differences in the nature of friendship, but the results were wildly different from

expectations--the individualists appeared to have more intimate friends than the collectivists. Thus, this possibility remains. Moreover, it could be that the lack of ingroup-outgroup effects among collectivists stemmed from collectivists bringing friends who were not ingroup members. Another possibility is that the strangers were part of the ingroup for collectivists--since this was not controlled for this might also explain the lack of ingroup-outgroup effects among collectivistic dyads.

The emic nature of the friend-friend manipulation also highlights another topic for future research. More research is needed on the nature of friendship across cultures (e.g., Wheeler, et al. 1989). Also, further conceptualizations of ingroups versus outgroups are needed. Such research might address issues such as how ingroups form and why they endure among individualists and collectivists.

Another threat to valid inferences concerns the language translation fidelity of the Family Integrity scale. Given the small sample sizes and small item pool, Item Response Theory analyses were deemed untenable. However, collectivism was measured in two ways, with the twenty-statements test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954) and the Family Integrity scale, which lessens the likelihood of any emic items producing spurious results.

Also, response sets on the Family Integrity scale are another potential threat to valid inference in the current experiment. However, the similarities among the samples for item standard deviations (see Table 7) do not support the claim that

there is a response set among Koreans and Chinese to use the middle of the scale.

Finally, the Family Integrity scale suffered from low reliability. Thus, comparisons between individualists and collectivists in this experiment may be suspect. It is also possible to treat the location of the samples (Korea, Hong Kong, or Illinois) as an experimental treatment for analysis. This was not done here because such effects are not as psychologically interesting as effects that can be directly linked to constructs such as individualism and collectivism. However, APPENDIX A contains the means and standard deviations for critical dependent variables for readers interested in location trends. For example, it might be useful for some to know that in Negotiation 2 there does appear to be some consistencies with Chan's (1991) study for the likelihood of agreement variable.

Another methodological concern is that the experiment occurred in different laboratories with different experimenters present. This is not a trivial concern as much of the above arguments have suggested that expectations of others are more important for collectivists than individualists.

Suggestions for Future Research

Finally, the results reported in the current experiment suggest several directions for future research. First, it appears that the distinction between communal and exchange relationships (Clark & Mills, 1979) holds much promise for negotiation researchers. The current research found that

individualism-collectivism predicted the rules negotiators preferred. There may be other dispositional factors. For example, motivational orientations of cooperation, competition, or individualism (Messick & McClintock, 1968) might be integrated with preferences for communal versus exchange rules. One might argue that prior research on motivational orientations is limited to situations where people have full information and can reciprocate benefits immediately. Incorporating the communal versus exchange rules into an analysis of motivational orientations would add time as a dimension and might have some interesting implications for differences in expectations based on cooperative or competitive motives (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; Liebert, et al., 1968).

Future research should also be done to determine the moderating effects of intergroup competition. Suggested here was the idea that intergroup competition is moderated by whether the interdependent <u>situation</u> is collectivistic or individualistic. Only in individualistic situations, which are not clearly defined and monitoring is difficult, should ingroup-outgroup effects be observed. A practical application of such a conclusion would be that in anonymous interdependent situations, such as control of pollution, collectivists should exhibit less cooperation than individualists. Finally, this logic implies that collectivists should use ambiguity as a negotiation tactic to a greater extent than individualists.

AUTHOR NOTES

1. Proactive is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as "of a person, policy, etc.: that creates or constructs a situation by taking the initiative or by anticipating events."

2. In each location, U.S. dollars were equated with local currency, not through exchange rates, but through consideration of how valuable the amount of money is for a typical day-to-day purchase of a typical student. After deliberation, we decided to use the "lunch criterion." In Champaign, Illinois, $5 is enough to purchase a typical lunch for a typical student. Based on this analysis, the amount given to subjects for participation was enough for a typical student to buy a modest lunch.

3. To minimize demand characteristics, the term "friend" was never used in any experimental instructions or materials. Instead, the "friend" was always referred to as "the person you came to the experiment with."

4. Previous research has used a "game of 9s" task, whereby subjects negotiated the division of 9 points. Pilot data revealed that increasing the amount of points to be divided to 19 provided more variance with respect to concession making. In other respects, the current task duplicates the earlier ones as much as possible.

5. For example, to increase the chances of a dyad winning it would be possible for one person to demand 0 and the other 19. To minimize the likelihood that subjects negotiated with the other negotiator by demanding little and then sharing the prize, member of dyads were involved in separate lotteries.

6. The highest limit allowed was 9 to ensure a positive bargaining zone existed between the parties.

7. Some situations, such as poker, allow, promote, and exist so that people can compete. However, such situations are called "games," and, that they exist as separate class of social activities supports the notion that open, direct competition is generally unacceptable in social situations of interdependence.

TABLES

Table 1

Key defining attributes of individualism-collectivism and their implications for social

behavior

General Defining Attributes	General Implications
Individualism	
A. personal identity	1. behavior predictable from personal cost-benefit analysis
B. independence from ingroups	2. small ingroup-outgroup distinctions
Collectivism	
A. collective identity	1. behavior predictable from social norms
B. interdependence with ingroups	2. large ingroup-outgroup distinctions

Table 2

Number of months subject pairs had known each other in Illinois, Korea, and Hong Kong

Culture	Mean	SD
Illinois	34.6	52.5
Korea	10.7	17.7
Hong Kong	96.5	69.9

Note: All means differ significantly at $p < .05$.

Table 3

Mean proportion correct responses of quiz items in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong

Item	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
No. of siblings	.78	.21	.20
Birthday	.42	.19	.20
Place of Birth	.25	.33	.76
Total	1.5_a	$.7_b$	1.2_a

Note: Row means with different subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$.

Table 4

Proportion of relationship closeness items checked in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong

Item	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
1.	.90	.56	.49
2.	.07	.07	.21
3.	.81	.56	.78
4.	.59	.19	.33
5.	.06	.05	.06
6.	.84	.39	.48
7.	.59	.67	.65
8.	.96	.59	.10
9.	.27	.36	.29
10.	.23	.07	.06
Total	5.3_a	3.5_b	3.4_b

Note: Row means with different subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$.

Item Key:
1. We like to do things together.
2. This person is sort of my advisor, he takes me "under his wing."
3. We help each other out. We do errands for one another.
4. We talk for hours about everything.
5. We are related by blood.
6. We enjoy just being around each other.
7. We are friends, because we work together (or share some other life situations).
8. We see each other almost every day.
9. This person is sort of a "side kick" who supports me at work, or in the fraternity, or on the team, etc.
10. We've been neighbors for a long time.

Subjects checked those items that described their relationship with the person they came to the experiment with. Total scores were computed by summing the number of checked statements.

Table 5

Mean (percent) collective self sampling in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Mean	1.7_a (8.5%)	4.9_b (24.5%)	4.8_b (24%)
Median	1.5 (7.5%)	4.0 (20%)	4.0 (20%)
Mode	0.0	4.0 (20%)	2.0, 6.0 (10%, 30%)
SD	1.6	2.6	3.8

Notes: Means with different subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$. Statements reflecting the collective self are those pertaining to social entities in response to the question, "Who am I?"

Table 6

Item and score means and standard deviations for self-behaviors items in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong

Item	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
1.	4.4_a (2.6)	7.1_b (2.0)	5.6_c (2.7)
2.	7.2_a (2.1)	7.0_a (2.7)	5.2_b (2.4)
3.	3.0_a (2.4)	1.4_b (1.3)	$2.2_{a,b}$ (1.8)
4.	5.0_a (2.7)	6.4_b (2.5)	$5.6_{a,b}$ (2.6)
5.	5.9_a (2.6)	3.0_b (2.2)	3.9_b (2.5)
6.	5.6_a (2.4)	$6.5_{a,b}$ (2.5)	7.4_b (1.8)
7.	7.4_a (1.5)	5.6_b (2.2)	5.3_b (2.5)
8.	4.9_a (2.6)	$5.3_{a,b}$ (2.6)	6.3_b (2.5)
9.	2.9 (2.1)	2.2 (2.1)	2.2 (1.6)
10.	2.8_a (2.0)	1.8_b (1.6)	3.1_a (2.1)
11.	5.3_a (2.2)	4.6_a (3.0)	6.9_b (2.0)
12.	6.8 (2.0)	6.6 (2.2)	7.4 (1.5)
13.	5.8_a (2.7)	7.6_b (1.7)	$6.6_{a,b}$ (2.5)
14.	4.6_a (2.7)	3.4_b (2.5)	$3.9_{a,b}$ (2.8)
15.	7.4_a (1.8)	6.2_b (2.5)	6.1_b (2.0)
16.	$5.0_{a,b}$ (2.4)	4.1_a (2.6)	5.8_b (2.1)
17.	4.9 $(2.5)_{a,b}$	5.5_a (2.5)	4.0_b (2.1)
18.	5.1_a (2.3)	2.4_b (2.0)	3.3_b (2.4)
19.	6.0_a (2.3)	3.6_b (2.7)	6.5_a (2.4)
20.	3.9_a (2.2)	2.6_b (2.0)	5.1_c (2.2)
21.	5.4_a (2.7)	7.5_b (1.9)	5.3_a (2.5)
22.	3.3 (2.7)	4.3 (3.0)	3.6 (2.4)

Note: Row means with different subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$. Scales ranged from 1 = False to 9 = True.

Item Key:
ARE YOU THE KIND OF PERSON WHO IS LIKELY TO:

1. ask your parents to live with you
2. stay with friends, rather than in a hotel, when you go to another town
3. place your parents in an old peoples' home or nursing home
4. prefer to stay in a hotel rather than with distant friends when visiting another town
5. call on a friend, socially, without giving prior warning
6. call your friends every time before visiting them
7. to take time off from work to visit an ailing friend
8. consult with your friends before buying an expensive item

Table 5 Continued

9. prefer to go to a cocktail party, rather than going to dinner with four of your close friends
10. spend money (e.g. send flowers) rather than take the time to visit an ailing friend.
11. carry references to relatives or friends when visiting a new place
12. have frank talks with others, so as to clear the air
13. decide to get married and then announce it to your parents and friends
14. ask close relatives for a loan
15. entertain visitors even when they drop in at odd hours
16. get to know people easily, but it is also very difficult for you to know them intimately
17. entertain even unwelcome guests
18. live far from your parents
19. ask a bank for a loan when you need money
20. show resentment toward visitors who interrupt your work
21. have parents who make enormous (outsiders would say unreasonable) sacrifices for you
22. have parents who consult your fiances parens extensively, before they decide whether you two should get married

Table 7

"Family Integrity with Responsiveness" scale scores in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Mean	16.3_a	48.3_b	29.7_c
SD	11.4	10.6	13.4

Notes: Higher scores indicate higher collectivism; Means with different subscripts differ significantly at $p < .05$.

Table 8

Pearson product-moment correlations between Family Integrity (X) scale scores and amount of Collective Self Sampling (Y) in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong	Overall
r_{xy}	$.30_a$	.10	$.44_b$	$.53_c$
N	43	53	42	138

Notes: Higher scores on X indicate greater collectivism; Higher scores on Y indicate greater collectivism;
$_a$ indicates $p < .05$, $_b$ indicates $p < .01$, $_c$ indicates $p < .001$

Table 9

Frequency distribution of COLINDEX in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong	Overall
2	30 (54.5)	0 (0.0)	5 (10.9)	35 (21.9)
3	20 (36.4)	1 (1.7)	11 (23.9)	32 (20.0)
4	4 (7.3)	5 (8.5)	8 (17.4)	17 (10.6)
5	1 (1.8)	27 (45.8)	15 (32.6)	43 (26.9)
6	0 (0.0)	26 (44.1)	7 (15.2)	33 (20.6)

Note: Percentages shown in parentheses

Table 10

Pearson product-moment correlations between COLINDEX and relationship measures in Illinois, Korea and Hong Kong

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Months	.11	.01	$-.59_b$
Quiz Score	$.40_a$	.18	.13
Checklist Score	.09	.23	-.14

Notes: $_a$ indicates $p < .05$, $_b$ indicates $p < .01$

Table 11

Mean Concern Among Individualistic and Collectivistic Dyads

	Individualists	Collectivists
Friends		
1.	4.7 (1.1)	5.4 (1.5)
2.	4.3 (1.4)	5.1 (1.3)
3.	5.8 (1.2)	4.8 (1.4)
4.	5.9 (1.3)	4.9 (1.5)
5.	5.9 (1.5)	6.2 (1.4)
Strangers		
1.	4.4 (1.1)	5.4 (1.3)
2.	3.8 (1.0)	4.8 (1.1)
3.	6.6 (1.3)	5.9 (1.2)
4.	6.6 (1.4)	5.8 (1.4)
5.	5.4 (1.3)	5.5 (1.5)

Note: Means were computed after responses within each dyad were summed. Thus, scores could range from 2 to 8.

Item Key:

1. How concerned will you be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for youself?
2. How concerned will the other negotiator be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for himself?
3. How concerned will the other negotiator be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for you?
4. How concerned will you be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for the other negotiator?
5. How concerned will you be with getting more lottery tickets than the other negotiator?

Response Key:

1 = extremely concerned
2 = moderately concerned
3 = slightly concerned
4 = not at all concerned

Table 12

Means and standard deviations of final demand outcomes for dyads by culture and relationship for negotiation 1

	Individualists	Collectivists
Friends		
Final Demand	18.0 (2.8)	17.2 (2.6)
Strangers		
Final Demand	19.0 (0.0)	17.7 (2.5)

Note: Final demands were computed by summing the demand levels within each dyad at the time agreement was reached. Individual demands ranged from 0 to 19, but agreement was not reached until the total amount demanded by the two parties was 19 or less.

Table 13

Means and standard deviations of final demand outcomes for dyads by culture and relationship for negotiation 2

	Individualists	Collectivists
Friends		
Final Demand	18.8 (0.6)	16.9 (4.8)
Strangers		
Final Demand	18.3 (1.8)	16.5 (2.9)

Note: Final demands were computed by summing the demand levels within each dyad at the time agreement was reached. Individual demands ranged from 0 to 19, but agreement was not reached until the total amount demanded by the two parties was 19 or less.

Table 14

Means and standard deviations of total demand for dyads by round, culture and relationship for negotiation 1

	Individualists	Collectivists
Friends		
Demand on Round 1	21.4 (4.9)	19.3 (4.7)
Demand on Round 2	19.7 (3.0)	20.1 (3.6)
Demand on Round 3	19.2 (0.8)	19.0 (0.8)
Demand on Round 4	19.0 (0.0)	19.0 (---)
Strangers		
Demand on Round 1	24.9 (4.3)	21.0 (4.1)
Demand on Round 2	23.8 (4.9)	20.5 (2.5)
Demand on Round 3	21.7 (3.3)	20.0 (2.4)
Demand on Round 4	20.8 (3.0)	19.0 (2.0)

Note: Demands were computed by summing the demand levels within each dyad for each round.

Table 15

Means and standard deviations of total demand for dyads by round, culture and relationship for negotiation 2

	Individualists	Collectivists
Friends		
Demand on Round 1	23.7 (5.3)	20.8 (6.2)
Demand on Round 2	21.0 (2.7)	22.4 (3.8)
Demand on Round 3	19.7 (1.3)	21.4 (3.1)
Demand on Round 4	19.5 (0.6)	20.5 (2.1)
Strangers		
Demand on Round 1	20.8 (4.9)	17.9 (3.9)
Demand on Round 2	19.2 (1.0)	20.7 (2.4)
Demand on Round 3	19.3 (0.6)	20.7 (3.1)
Demand on Round 4	29.0 (---)	19.5 (0.7)

Note: Demands were computed by summing the demand levels within each dyad for each round.

Table 16

Means and standard deviations of high and low demands by culture and round

	Round 1	Round 2
High Demand		
Individualists	14.3 (3.0)	11.1 (2.4)
Agreed on Round 1	9.0 (1.4)	
Collectivists	14.8 (3.0)	13.0 (3.5)
Agreed on Round 1	8.6 (3.1)	
Low Demand		
Individualists	9.5 (1.2)	9.4 (1.9)
Agreed on Round 1	8.6 (2.3)	
Collectivists	8.9 (2.3)	8.2 (2.3)
Agreed on Round 1	7.7 (2.4)	

Notes: Dyads who reached agreement on Round 1 were not included in this analysis. There were no significant ($p < .05$) effects for individualism-collectivism on likelihood of agreement on Round 1, however, the trend was that more collectivistic than individualistic dyads reached agreement (50% versus 35%). The means and standard deviations for those dyads are shown.

Table 17

Means and standard deviations of perceptions of the other party's limit for dyads by culture and relationship for negotiation 1

	Individualists	Collectivists
Friends		
Perceived Limit of Other (pre-negotiation)	11.0 (4.9)	10.6 (4.0)
Perceived Limit of Other (post-negotiation)	13.4 (5.2)	11.4 (5.1)
Strangers		
Perceived Limit of Other (pre-negotiation)	15.6 (2.7)	12.6 (3.8)
Perceived Limit of Other (post-negotiation)	18.4 (3.9)	12.5 (4.2)

Note: Subjects were asked to estimate the value of the other's limit. Perceptions of other limits were computed by summing the estimates within each dyad.

Table 18

Means and standard deviations of perceptions of the other party's limit for dyads by culture and relationship for negotiation 2

	Individualists	Collectivists
Friends		
Perceived Limit of Other (pre-negotiation)	14.5 (4.3)	12.0 (4.0)
Perceived Limit of Other (post-negotiation)	17.0 (4.2)	13.2 (5.7)
Strangers		
Perceived Limits of Other (pre-negotiation)	14.3 (3.4)	13.0 (3.4)
Perceived Limit of Other (post-negotiation)	14.8 (3.3)	13.8 (3.2)

Note: Subjects were asked to estimate the value of the other's limit. Perceptions of other limits were computed by summing the estimates within each dyad.

Table 19

Means and standard deviations of dyadic judgment error by culture and relationship for negotiation 1

	Individualists	Collectivists
Friends		
Pre-negotiation Error	1.3 (3.4)	-0.4 (2.5)
Error after Round 1	3.8 (3.8)	0.6 (4.8)
Post-negotiation Error	3.8 (3.7)	0.4 (4.7)
Strangers		
Pre-negotiation Error	0.6 (1.6)	1.5 (3.3)
Error after Round 1	3.0 (3.1)	1.6 (4.4)
Post-negotiation Error	4.1 (4.3)	1.3 (4.1)

Notes: Subjects were asked to estimate the value of the other's limit. Individual error was computed by subtracting the actual value of the other's limit from the estimate. Dyadic judgment error was computed by summing individual errors within each dyad. In other words, DYADIC JUDGMENT ERROR = $(A_{estimate} - B_{actual}) + (B_{estimate} - A_{actual})$, where *A* is negotiator 1 and *B* is negotiator 2.

Table 20

Means and standard deviations of dyadic judgment error by culture and relationship for negotiation 2

	Individualists		Collectivists	
Friends				
Pre-negotiation Error	1.0	(2.1)	0.5	(3.9)
Error after Round 1	2.1	(2.7)	1.1	(4.5)
Post-negotiation Error	3.3	(2.6)	1.7	(4.8)
Strangers				
Pre-negotiation Error	3.6	(4.2)	1.4	(3.1)
Error after Round 1	4.3	(3.4)	2.4	(3.0)
Post-negotiation Error	4.1	(3.3)	2.1	(2.6)

Notes: Subjects were asked to estimate the value of the other's limit. Individual error was computed by subtracting the actual value of the other's limit from the estimate. Dyadic judgment error was computed by summing individual errors within each dyad. In other words, DYADIC JUDGMENT ERROR = $(A_{estimate} - B_{actual}) + (B_{estimate} - A_{actual})$, where *A* is negotiator 1 and *B* is negotiator 2.

REFERENCES

Adler, N.J. 1986. International Dimensions of Organizational Behavior. Boston: Kent.

Adler, N.J., Brahm, R., & Graham, J.L. 1992. Strategy implementation: A comparison of face-to-face negotiations in The People's Republic of China and The United States. Strategic Management Journal, 13, 449-466.

Alcock, J.E. 1974. Cooperation, competition, and the effects of time pressure in Canada and India. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 18, 171-197.

Alcock, J.E. 1975. Motivation in an asymmetric bargaining situation: A cross-cultural study. International Journal of Psychology, 10, 69-81.

Allerheiligen, R., Graham, J.L., & Lin, C. 1985. Honesty in interorganizational negotiations in the United States, Brazil, and the Republic of China. Journal of Macromarketing, Fall, 4-16.

Argyle, M., Henderson, M., Bond, M., Iizuka, Y., & Contarello, A. (1986). Cross-cultural variations in relationships rules. International Journal of Psychology, 21, 287-315.

Arkes, H.R., & Hammond, K.R. (Eds.). 1986. Judgment and Decision Making: An Interdisciplinary Reader. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Austin, W.G. Worchel, S., eds. 1979. The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Bartos, O.J. 1974. Process and Outcome in Negotiation New

York: Columbia University Press.

Bazerman, M.H. Magliozzi, T. Neale, M.A. 1985. Integrative bargaining in a competitive market. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 35, 294-313.

Bellah, R.N., Madsen, R., Sullivan, W.M., Swindler, A., & Tipton, S.M. (1985). Habits of the heart: Individualism and commitment in American life. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Benton, A.A. Druckman, D. 1973. Salient solutions and the bargaining behavior of representatives and nonrepresentatives. International Journal of Group Tensions, 3, 28-39.

Benton, A.A. Kelly, H.H. Liebling, B. 1972. Effects of extremity of others and concession rate on the outcomes of bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24, 73-83.

Ben-Yoav, O. Pruitt, D.G. 1984a. Accountability to constituents a two-edged sword. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 34, 293-95.

Ben-Yoav, O. Pruitt, D.G. 1984b. Resistance to yielding and the expectation of cooperative future interaction in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 20, 323-35.

Berry, J. W. (1979). A cultural ecology of social behavior. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 12, pp. 177-207). New York: Academic

Press.

Bodenhausen, G.V. 1991. Identity and cooperative social behavior: Pseudospeciation or human integration? World Futures, 30, 95-106.

Bontempo, R. 1993. Translation fidelity of psychological scales: An item response theory analysis of an individualism-collectivism scale. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 24, 149-166.

Bontempo, R., & Rivero, C. 1992. Paper Presented at the Academy of Management Meeting, Las Vegas, Nevada.

Bottom, W.P., and Paese, P.W. 1994. Lincoln's law and bargainer judgment. Paper presented at the 5th Annual Meeting of the International Association of Conflict Management, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Bottom, W.P., Studt, A. 1990. The nature of risk and risk preference in bargaining. Presented at the 3rd Annual Meeting of the International Association of Conflict Management, Vancouver, British Columbia.

Brislin, R.W. 1980. Translation and content analysis of oral and written materials. In H.C. Triandis & J.W. Berry (Eds.), Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology (Vol. 2). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

Carnevale, P.J., & De Dreu, C.K.W. 1992. Information and motivation in integrative negotiation. Unpublished manuscript.

Carnevale, P.J., Keenan, P.A. 1990. Decision frame and social

goals in integrative bargaining: the likelihood of agreement versus the quality. Presented at the 3rd Annual Meeting of the International Association of Conflict Management, Vancouver, British Columbia.

Carnevale, P.J. & Lawler, E.J. 1986. Time pressure and the development of integrative agreements in bilateral negotiation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 30, 636-659.

Carnevale, P.J., & Pruitt, D.G., 1992. Negotiation and mediation. Annual Review of Psychology, 43, 531-582.

Casagrande, J. 1954. The ends of translation. International Journal of American Linguistics, 20, 335-340.

Chan, D.K.S. 1991. Effects of concession patterns, relationships between negotiators, and culture on negotiation. MA thesis, University of Illinois, Urbana, 54pp.

Cherkoff, J.M., Conley, M. 1967. Opening offer and frequency of concessions as bargaining strategies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 181-85.

Church, T.A. 1987. Personality research in a non-Western culture: The Philippines. Psychological Bulletin, 102, 272-292.

Clark, M.S. 1981. Noncomparability of benefits given and received: a cue to the existence of friendship. Social Psychology Quarterly, 44, 375-381.

Clark, M.S. 1984. Record keeping in two types of relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 549-557.

Clark, M.S. 1987. Evidence for the effectiveness of manipulations of communal and exchange relationships. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 12, 414-425.

Clark, M.S., & Mills, J. 1979. Interpersonal attraction in exchange and communal relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 12-24.

Clark, M.S., Mills, J., & Corcoran, D.M. 1989. Keeping track of needs and inputs of friends and strangers. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 15, 533-542.

Clark, M.S., Mills, J., & Powell, M. 1986. Keeping track of needs in communal and exchange relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 51, 333-338.

Clark, M.S., Ouellette, R., Powell, M.C., and Milberg, S. 1987. Recipient's mood, relationship type, and helping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 94-103.

Clark, M.S., & Waddell, B. 1985. Perceptions of exploitation in communal and exchange relationships. Journal of Social and Personal Relationships, 2, 403-418.

Cohen, H. 1980. You Can Negotiate Anything. New York: Bantam Books.

Cook, T.D., & Campbell, D.T. 1979. Quasi-experimentation: Design and analysis issues for field settings. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Cooley, C.H. 1902/1964. Human Nature and the Social Order. New York: Schocken Books.

Crandall, J.E. 1980. Adler's concept of social interest:

Theory, measurement and implications for adjustment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39, 481-495.

Cronbach, L. 1951. Coefficient alpha and the internal structure of tests. Psychometrika, 6, 297-334.

Crowne, D.P., & Marlow, D. 1964. A new scale of social desirability, independent of psychopathology. Journal of Consulting Psychology, 24, 349-354.

D'Andrade, R. 1984. Cultural meaning systems. In R.A. Shweder & R.A. Levine (Eds.), Culture Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Davidson, A.R., Jaccard, J.J., Triandis, H.C., Morales, M.L., & Diaz-Guerrero, R. 1976. Cross-cultural model testing: Toward a solution to the etic-emic dilemma. International Journal of Psychology, 11, 1-13.

Dawes, R., 1988. Rational Choice in an Uncertain World. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

de Callieres, F. 1/16 (reissued in 1976). On the manner of negotiating with princes. Translation by A.F. Whyte. Notre Dame, IN. Notre Dame: University Press.

De Dreu, C.K.W., Lualhati, J., & McCusker, C. 1994. Effects of gain-loss frames on own-other outcome differences in social decision making. European Journal of Social Psychology, forthcoming.

De Dreu, C.K.W., & McCusker, C. 1994. A transformational analysis of frame effects in mixed-motive interdependence, submitted.

De Dreu, C.K.W., & Van Lange, P.A.M. 1993. Impact of social value orientation on negotiator cognition and behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, in press.

Deutsch, M. 1960. The effect of motivational orientation on trust and suspicion. Human Relations, 13, 123-139.

Deutsch, M. 1975. Equity, equality, and need. What determines which value will be used as the basis of distributive justice? Journal of Social Issues, 31, 137-50.

Deutsch, M. 1993. Keynote address. Presented at the 6th Annual Meeting of the International Association of Conflict Management, Leuven, Belgium.

Deutsch, M., Krauss, R.M. 1962. Studies of interpersonal bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 6, 52-76.

Dixit, A.K., & Nalebuff, B.J. 1991. Thinking Strategically. New York: Norton.

Drasgow, F. 1984. Scrutinizing psychological tests: Measurement equivalence and equivalent relations with external variables are the central issues. Psychological Bulletin, 95, 134-135.

Druckman, D., Benton, A.A., Ali, F., & Bagur, J.S. 1976. Cultural differences in bargaining behavior: India, Argentina, and the United States. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 20, 413-452.

Esser, J., Komorita, S.S. 1975. Reciprocity and concession making in bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 864-72.

Fiske, S.T., & Taylor, S.E. 1991. Social Cognition (2nd Ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill.

Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. 1975. Belief, Attitude, Intention and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.

Fisher, R., Brown, S. 1988. Getting Together: Holding a Relationship that Gets to YES, Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

Follett, M.P. 1940. Constructive conflict. In Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett, ed. H.C. Metcalf, L. Urwick, pp. 30-49. New York: Harper and Row.

Frager, C. 1970. Conformity and anti-conformity in Japan. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 15, 203-210.

Francis, J.N.P. 1991. When in Rome? The effects of cultural adaptation on intercultural business negotiations. Journal of International Business Studies, Third Quarter, 1991.

Freeman, R.B., & Medoff, J.L. 1984. What Do Unions Do? New York: Basic Books.

Fry, W.R., Firestone, I.J., Williams, D.L. 1983. Negotiation process and outcome of stranger dyads and dating couples: Do lovers lose? Basic Applied Social Psychology, 4, 1-16.

Graham, J.L. 1984. A comparison of Japanese and American business negotiations. International Journal of Marketing, 1, 51-68.

Graham, J.L. 1985a. The influence of culture on the process of business negotiations: an exploratory study. Journal of

International Business Studies, Spring, 81-96.

Graham, J.L. 1985b. Cross-cultural marketing negotiations: a laboratory experiment. Marketing Science, 4, 130-146.

Graham, J.L., Kim, D.K., Lin, C.L., & Robinson, M. 1988. Buyer-seller negotiations around the Pacific rim: Differences in the fundamental exchange processes. Journal of Consumer Research, 15, 48-54.

Greenhalgh, L. 1987. Relationships in negotiations. Negotiation Journal, 3, 235-243.

Greenwald, A.G., & Pratkanis, A.R. (1984). The self. In R.S. Wyer & T.K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (Vol. 3, pp. 129-178). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.

Gruder, C. 1971. Relationship with opponent and partner in mixed-motive bargaining. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 14, 403-16.

Gulliver, P.H. 1988. Anthropological contributions to the study of negotiations. Negotiation Journal, 4, 247-55.

Hamner, W.C. 1974. Effects of bargaining strategy and pressure in reach agreement in a stalemated negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 458-467.

Hammer, W.C., Harnett, D.L. 1975. The effects of information and aspiration level on bargaining behavior. Journal of experimental Social Psychology, 1, 329-423.

Harsanyi, J. 1956. Approaches to the bargaining problem before and after the theory or games: a critical discussion of Zeuthen's, Hick's and Nash's theories. Econometrica, 24:

144-57.

Heider, F. 1958. The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations. New York: Wiley.

Herskovitz, M.J. 1955. Cultural Anthropology. New York: Knopf.

Higgins, E.T. 1987. Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect. Psychological Review, 94, 319-340.

Higgins, E.T., & Bargh, J.A. 1987. Social cognition as social perception. Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 369-425.

Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's consequences. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Holmes, J.G., Throop, W.F., Strickland, L.H. 1971. The effect of prenegotiation expectations on the distributive bargaining process. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 7, 582-99.

Hsu, F.L.K. (1971). Kinship and culture. Chicago: Aldine.

Hsu, F.L.K. (1981). American and Chinese: Passages to differences (3rd ed.). Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

Huber, V.L., Neale, M.A., & Northcraft, G. 1987. Decision bias and personnel selection strategies. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 40, 136-147.

Hui, C.H. 1988. Measurement of individualism-collectivism. Journal of Research on Personality, 22, 17-36.

Hui, C.H., & Triandis, H.C. (1986). Individualism-collectivism: A study of cross-cultural researchers. Journal of Cross

Cultural Psychology, 17, 225-248.

Hulin, C.L. 1987. A psychometric theory of evaluations of item and scale translations: Fidelity across languages. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 18, 115-142.

Hulin, C.L., Drasgow, F., & Parsons, C.K. 1983. Item Response Theory: Application to Psychological Measurement. Homewood, IL: Irwin.

Hulin, C.L., & Mayer, L.J. 1986. Psychometric equivalence of a translation of the Job Descriptive Index into Hebrew. Journal of Applied Psychology, 71, 83-94.

Jackson, D.N., & Messick, S.J. 1962. Response styles and the assessment of psychopathology. In S.J. Messick and J. Ross (Eds.). Measurement in Personality and Cognition. New York: Wiley.

James, W. 1890. The Principles of Psychology. New York: Holt.

Janosik, R.J. 1987. Rethinking the culture-negotiation link. Negotiation Journal, October, 385-395.

Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. 1979. Prospect theory: an analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47, 263-91.

Kahneman, D., Slovic, P., & Tversky, A. (Eds.). 1982. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Kakar, S. 1978. The Inner World: A Psychoanalytic Study of Childhood and Society in India. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Kelley, H.H, Beckman, I.L., Fisher, C.S. 1967. Negotiating the

division of reward under incomplete information. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 3, 361-98.

Kelley, H.H., Stahelski, A.J. 1970. Social interaction basis of cooperators and competitors beliefs about others. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 16, 190-97.

Klein, S.B., & Loftus, J. 1988. The nature of self-referent encoding: The contributions of elaborative and organizational processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 5-11.

Kluckhohn, F., & Strodtbeck, F. 1961. Variations in Value Orientations. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson.

Knight, G.P., & Dubro, A.F. 1984. Cooperative, competitive, and individualistic social values: an individualized regression and clustering approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 98-105.

Komorita, S.S., Esser, J.K. 1975. Frequency of reciprocated concessions in bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 13, 245-52.

Kramer, R.M. 1993. Cooperation and organizational identification. In J.K. Murninghan (Ed.), Social Psychology in Organizations: Advances in Theory and Research. (pp. 244-268). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Kuhn, M.H., & McPartland, R. 1954. An empirical investigation of self attitudes. American Sociological Review, 19, 68-76.

Lamm, H., Rosch, E. 1972. Information and competitiveness of incentive structure as factors in two-person negotiation.

Journal of Social Psychology, 2, 459-62.

Lax, D.A. & Sebinius, J.K., 1986. The Manager as Negotiator. New York: Free Press.

Liebert, R.M., Smith, W.P., Hill, J.H., & Keiffer, M. 1968. The effects of information and magnitude of initial offer on interpersonal negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4, 431-441.

Liebrand, W., Jansen, R., Rijke, V., & Shure, C. 1986. Might over morality: Social values and the perception of other players in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 22, 203-215.

Leung, K. 1987. Some determinants of reactions to procedural models for conflict resolution: A cross national study. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 898-908.

Leung, K. (1988). Some determinants of conflict avoidance. Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology, 19, 125-136.

Leung, K., & Bond, M. (1984). The impact of cultural collectivism on reward allocation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 793-804.

Leung, K., & Bond, M. 1989. On the empirical identification of dimensions for cross-cultural comparison. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 20, 133-151.

Leung, K., & Iwawaki, S. (1988). Cultural collectivism and distributive behavior. Journal of Cross Cultural Psychology, 19, 35-49.

Lewicki, R.J. & Litterer, J. 1985. Negotiation. Homewood, IL:

Richard D. Irwin.

Lord, F.M. 1980. Application of Item Response Theory to Practical Testing Problems. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Luce, R.D., & Raiffa, H. 1957. Games and Decisions. New York: Wiley.

Luthans, F., McCaul, H.S., Dodd, N.G. 1985. Organizational commitment: A comparison of American, Japanese, and Korean employees. Academy of Management Journal, 28, 213-219.

MacCrimmon, K.R., & Messick, D.M. 1976. A framework for social motives. Behavioral Science, 21, 86-100.

Malinowski, B. 1927. The Father in Primitive Psychology. New York: Norton.

Markus, H., & Zajonc, R.B. 1985. The cognitive perspective in social psychology. In G. Lindzey and E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of Social Psychology. New York: Random House.

Markus, H., & Kitiyama, S. 1991. Culture and the self: Implications for cognition, emotion, and motivation. Psychological Review, 98, 224-253.

McClintock, C. 1976. Social motivations in settings of outcome interdependence. In D. Druckman (Ed.), Negotiations: Social Psychological Perspective (pp 49-77). Beverly Hills: Sage.

McClintock, C., & Allison, S. 1989. Social value orientation and helping behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 19, 353-362.

Messe, L.A. 1971. Equity in bilateral bargaining. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 17, 287-91.

Messick, D.M. & McClintock, C.G. 1968. Motivational bases of choice in experimental games. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 4, 1-25.

Miller, J.G., & Bersoff, D.M. 1992. Culture and moral judgment: How are conflicts between justice and interpersonal responsibilities resolved? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 62, 541-554.

Miller, J.G., Bersoff, D.M., & Harwood, R.L. 1990. Perceptions of social responsibilities in India and in the United States: Moral imperatives or personal decisions? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 58, 33-47.

Mills, J., & Clark, M.S. (1982). Exchange and communal relationships. In L. Wheeler (Ed.), Review of personality and social psychology, (Vol. 3). Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

Nakone, C. 1970. Japanese Society. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Nash, J.F. 1950. Equilibrium points in n-person games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 36, 48-49.

Northcraft, G.B., & Neale, M.A. 1990. Organizational Behavior: A Management Challenge. Chicago, IL: Dryden Press.

Park, O.S., Sims, H.P., & Motowidlo, S.J. 1986. Affect in organizations, in H.P. Sims, D.A., Gioia and Associates (Eds.), The Thinking Organization. San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Parsons, T., & Shils, E.A. 1951. Toward a General Theory of Action. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pepitone, A., & Triandis, H.C. 1987. On the universality of social psychology theories. Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, 18, 471-498.

Pike, K.L. 1966. Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior. The Hague: Mouton.

Pruitt, D.G. 1967. Reward structure and cooperation: The decomposed prisoner's dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 21-27.

Pruitt, D.G. 1970. Motivational processes in the decomposed prisoner's dilemma game. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 14, 227-238.

Pruitt, D.G. 1972. Methods for resolving differences of interest: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Social Issues, 28, 133-154.

Pruitt, D.G. 1981. Negotiation Behavior, New York: Academic Press.

Pruitt, D.G., Crocker, J., Hanes, D.L. 1987. Matching in social influence. In Enhancing Human Performance: Issues, Theories, and Techniques, ed. D. Druckman, J. Swets, Washington, DC: Natil. Academy Press.

Pruitt, D.G., & Carnevale, P.J. 1993. Negotiation in Social Conflict. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Pruitt, D.G., Kimmel, M.J. 1977. Twenty years of experimental gaming: critique, synthesis, and suggestions for the

future. Annual Review of Psychology, 28, 363-92.

Pruitt, D.G., Lewis, S.A. 1975. Development of integrative solutions in bilateral negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 621-33.

Pruitt, D.G., & Rubin, J.Z. 1986. Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement. New York: Random House.

Pruitt, D.G., & Syna, H. 1985. Mismatching the opponent's offers in negotiation. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 103-113.

Quattrone, G.A. (1986). On the perception of a group's variability. In S. Worchel & W.G. Austin (Eds.), The psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 25-48). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.

Raiffa, H. 1982. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Rapaport, A. 1966. Two-person Game Theory. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Riesman, D. 1966. Individualism reconsidered. (2nd ed.). New York: Free Press.

Rokeach, M. 1973. The Nature of Human Values. New York: Free Press.

Ross, L. 1977. The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology (Vol. 10, pp. 173-220). New York: Academic Press.

Roth, A.E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., & Zamir, S. 1991.

Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh, and Tokyo: An experimental study. American Economic Review,

Rothbart, M., & Hallmark, W. 1988. Ingroup-outgroup differences in the perceived efficacy of coercion and conciliation in resolving social conflict. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 248-57.

Rubin, J.Z., & Brown, B. 1975. The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiations. New York: Academic.

Runkel, P.J., & McGrath, J.E. 1972. Research on Human Behavior: A Systematic Guide to Method. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Sattler, N.D., & Kerr, N.L. 1991. Might versus morality: Motivational and cognitive bases for social motives. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 756-765.

Schelling, T. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Schoeninger, D.W., Wood, W.D. 1969. Comparison of married and ad hoc mixed-sex dyads negotiating the division of a reward. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 5, 483-99.

Schulz, J.W. & Pruitt, 1978. The effects of mutual concern on joint welfare. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 480-491.

Schwartz, B. (1986). The battle for human nature: Science, morality and modern life. New York: Norton.

Schwartz, S. 1990. Individualism-collectivism: Critique and

proposed refinements. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 21, 139-157.

Schwartz, S., & Bilsky, W. (1987). Toward a universal psychological structure of human values. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 550-562.

Sherif, M., Harvey, O.J., White, B.J., Hood, W.E., & Sherif, C.W. 1961. Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment. Norman, OK: Institute of Group Relations.

Smith, D.L., Pruitt, D.G., & Carnevale, P.J. 1982. Matching and mismatching: the effect of own limit, other's toughness, and time pressure on concession rate in negotiation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 876-883.

Siegel, S., & Fouraker, L.E. 1960. Bargaining and Group Decision Making: Experiments in Bilateral Monopoly. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Skinner, B.F. 1971. Beyond Freedom and Dignity. New York: Knopf.

Shapira, Z., & Bass, B.M. 1975. Settling strikes in real life and simulations in North America and different regions of Europe. Journal of Applied Psychology, 60, 466-471.

Spiro, M.E. 1982. Oedipus in the Trobriands. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Tajfel, H. 1982. Social identity and intergroup relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Thissen, D., & Steinberg, L. 1986. A taxonomy of item response

models. Psychometrika, 51, 567-577.

Thompson, L.L. 1990. Negotiation behavior and outcomes: empirical evidence and theoretical issues. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 515-532.

Thompson, L.L., Hastie, R. 1990. Social perception in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 47, 98-123.

Trafimow, D., Triandis, H.C., & Goto, S.G. 1991. Some tests of the distinction between the private self and the collective self. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 649-655.

Triandis, H.C. 1972. The analysis of subjective culture. New York: Wiley.

Triandis, H.C. 1979. Some universals of social behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 4, 1-16.

Triandis, H.C. 1979. Chapter 14. In W.G. Austin, and S. Worchel, (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.

Triandis, H.C. 1988. Collectivism v. individualism: A reconceptualization of a basic concept of cross-cultural psychology. In G.K. Verma & C. Bagley (Eds.), Cross-cultural studies of personality, attitudes and cognition (pp. 60-95). London: Macmillian.

Triandis, H.C. 1989. The self and social behavior in different cultural contexts. Psychological Review, 96, 506-20.

Triandis, H.C. 1990. Cross-cultural studies of individualism

and collectivism. In J. Berman (Ed.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, 1989. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

Triandis, H.C. 1995. Individualism and Collectivism. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, forthcoming.

Triandis, H.C., & Berry, J.W., (Eds.), 1980. Handbook of Cross-Cultural Psychology (Vol. 2). Boston, MA: Allyn & Bacon.

Triandis, H.C., Bontempo, R., Betancourt, H., Bond, M., Leung, K., Brenes, A., Georgas, J., Hui, C.H., Marin, G., Setiadi, B., Sinha, J.B.P., Verman, J., Spangenberg, J., Touzard, H., & de Montmollin, G. 1986. The measurement of the etic aspects of individualism and collectivism across cultures. Australian Journal of Psychology, 38, 257-267.

Triandis, H.C., Bontempo, R., Villareal, M., Asai, M., & Lucca, N. 1988. Individualism-collectivism: Cross-cultural perspectives on self-ingroup relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54, 323-338.

Triandis, H.C., & Brislin, R. 1984.

Triandis, H.C., Chan, D.K., Bhawuk, B., Iwao, S., & Sinha, J.B.P. 1994. Multimethod probes of allocentrism and idiocentrism, submitted.

Triandis, H.C., Leung, K., Villareal, M., & Clack, F.L. 1985. Allocentric vs. idiocentric tendencies: Convergent and discriminant validation. Journal of Research in Personality, 19, 395-415.

Triandis, H.C., McCusker, C., Betancourt, H., Iwao, S., Leung,

K., Salazar, J.M., Setiadi, B., Sinha, J.B.P., Touzard, H., Wang, D., & Zaleski, Z. 1993. An etic-emic analysis of individualism and collectivism. Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, 24, 366-383.

Triandis, H.C., McCusker, C., & Hui, C.H. 1990. Multimethod probes of individualism and collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 1006-1020.

Tung, R.L. 1982. U.S.-China trade negotiations: Practices, procedures and outcomes. Journal of International Business Studies, 13, 25-38.

Van Lange, P.A.M. 1992. Confidence in expectations: A test of the triangle hypothesis. European Journal of Personality, 6, 371-379.

Van Lange, P.A.M., & Liebrand, W.B.G. 1991. Social value orientation and intelligence: A test of the Goal-Prescribes-Rationality-Principle. European Journal of Social Psychology, 21, 273-292.

Wall, J.A. 1977. Operantly conditioning a bargainer's concession making. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13, 431-440.

Walton, R., McKersie, R. 1965. A behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations: An Analysis of a Social Interaction System. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Wheeler, L., Reis, H., & Bond, M. 1989. Collectivism-individualism in everyday social life: The Middle Kingdom and the melting pot. Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology, 57, 79-86.

White, S.B., & Neale, M.A. 1992. Reservation prices, resistance points, and BATNAs: Determining the parameters of acceptable negotiated outcomes. Negotiation Journal, October, 379-388.

Yukl, G.A. 1974a. The effects of situational concessions. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 29, 227-236.

Yukl, G.A. 1974b. Effects of opponents initial offer, concession magnitude, and concession frequency on bargaining behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 30, 332-335.

Zartman, I.W., Antrim, L., Bonham, M., Druckman, D., Jensen, L., Pruitt, D.G., & Young, H.R. 1990. The many faces of fairness in negotiated decisions. Unpublished manuscript.

Zartman, I.W. 1993. A skeptic's view. In G.O. Faure & J.Z Rubin (Eds.), Culture and Negotiation. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY STATISTICS OF NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR BY LOCATION

Means and standard deviations of final demand outcomes for dyads by culture and relationship for negotiation 1

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Final Demand	18.7 (0.5)	16.7 (3.0)	16.8 (4.0)
Strangers			
Final Demand	18.9 (0.3)	17.6 (2.4)	18.0 (2.4)

Means and standard deviations of final demand outcomes for dyads by culture and relationship for negotiation 2

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Final Demand	18.8 (0.6)	18.4 (0.9)	15.8 (6.1)
Strangers			
Final Demand	18.8 (0.6)	16.3 (3.0)	17.4 (2.7)

Means and standard deviations of total demand for dyads by round, culture and relationship for negotiation 1

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Demand on Round 1	21.8 (3.7)	18.3 (4.6)	20.4 (6.5)
Demand on Round 2	20.0 (2.9)	18.4 (2.1)	20.6 (4.1)
Demand on Round 3	19.0 (1.0)	19.0 (0.0)	19.3 (1.0)
Demand on Round 4	19.0 (---)	---- (--)	---- (--)
Strangers			
Demand on Round 1	24.4 (4.2)	20.7 (2.5)	22.3 (5.1)
Demand on Round 2	22.5 (5.0)	18.6 (1.9)	22.2 (3.3)
Demand on Round 3	20.4 (1.1)	18.0 (1.4)	21.6 (3.3)
Demand on Round 4	19.5 (1.0)	---- (---)	20.6 (3.4)

Means and standard deviations of total demand for dyads by round, culture and relationship for negotiation 2

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Demand on Round 1	24.6 (6.1)	21.1 (3.6)	21.8 (8.7)
Demand on Round 2	22.4 (4.9)	21.1 (3.2)	25.8 (5.6)
Demand on Round 3	20.9 (2.5)	20.6 (1.9)	24.5 (6.2)
Demand on Round 4	19.6 (0.5)	19.8 (1.5)	24.0 (3.4)
Strangers			
Demand on Round 1	20.4 (2.5)	17.5 (3.6)	20.5 (7.1)
Demand on Round 2	19.0 (0.9)	20.8 (2.9)	20.0 (1.4)
Demand on Round 3	19.5 (0.7)	22.0 (2.8)	18.5 (0.7)
Demand on Round 4	29.0 (---)	19.5 (0.7)	---- (---)

Mean and standard deviation of likelihood of agreement by round, culture and relationship for negotiation 1

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Agreement Round 1	.41 (.51)	.67 (.49)	.42 (.51)
Agreement Round 2	.82 (.39)	.87 (.35)	.67 (.49)
Agreement Round 3	.94 (.24)	1.0 (0.0)	.83 (.39)
Agreement Round 4	1.0 (0.0)	1.0 (0.0)	1.0 (0.0)
Strangers			
Agreement Round 1	.11 (.33)	.36 (.50)	.18 (.40)
Agreement Round 2	.44 (.53)	.86 (.36)	.36 (.50)
Agreement Round 3	.56 (.53)	1.0 (0.0)	.55 (.52)
Agreement Round 4	.88 (.33)	1.0 (0.0)	.73 (.48)

Mean and standard deviation of likelihood of agreement by round, culture and relationship for negotiation 2

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Agreement Round 1	.17 (.39)	.40 (.51)	.42 (.51)
Agreement Round 2	.42 (.51)	.67 (.49)	.50 (.52)
Agreement Round 3	.58 (.51)	.73 (.46)	.67 (.49)
Agreement Round 4	.75 (.45)	.93 (.26)	.75 (.45)
Strangers			
Agreement Round 1	.53 (.51)	.73 (.46)	.55 (.52)
Agreement Round 2	.89 (.33)	.87 (.35)	.82 (.40)
Agreement Round 3	.94 (.24)	.87 (.35)	1.0 (0.0)
Agreement Round 4	.94 (.24)	.93 (.26)	1.0 (0.0)

Means and standard deviations of aspirations and limits for dyads by culture and relationship for negotiation 1

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Aspirations	20.3 (4.8)	18.3 (5.3)	26.1 (7.3)
Own Limits	8.6 (4.4)	10.9 (3.4)	10.9 (3.7)
Strangers			
Aspirations	24.1 (4.8)	22.4 (4.6)	20.8 (6.0)
Own Limits	15.2 (2.8)	11.4 (3.2)	10.5 (3.5)

Means and standard deviations of aspirations and limits for dyads by culture and relationship for negotiation 2

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Aspirations	23.0 (6.0)	21.7 (5.5)	23.6 (4.9)
Own Limits	14.3 (4.4)	12.5 (3.1)	10.3 (6.0)
Strangers			
Aspirations	22.1 (4.1)	19.9 (5.1)	23.2 (4.7)
Own Limits	10.6 (3.6)	10.7 (3.9)	11.3 (4.3)

Means and standard deviations of perceptions of the other party's limit for dyads by culture and relationship for negotiation 1

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Perceived Other (pre-negotiation)	10.3 (5.3)	14.7 (4.4)	10.5 (3.6)
Perceived Other (post-negotiation)	13.3 (5.4)	11.3 (5.3)	12.7 (4.9)
Strangers			
Perceived Other (pre-negotiation)	15.7 (2.6)	12.0 (3.7)	12.5 (4.4)
Perceived Other (post-negotiation)	17.4 (2.6)	12.9 (3.4)	14.2 (6.0)

Means and standard deviations of perceptions of the other party's limit for dyads by culture and relationship for negotiation 2

	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Perceived Other (pre-negotiation)	14.7 (4.4)	12.9 (3.3)	10.8 (4.4)
Perceived Other (post-negotiation)	17.1 (4.3)	14.2 (4.0)	12.7 (6.6)
Strangers			
Perceived Other (pre-negotiation)	13.7 (3.0)	12.7 (3.3)	14.7 (4.4)
Perceived Other (post-negotiation)	14.9 (3.8)	12.7 (3.2)	15.2 (2.5)

Means and standard deviations of dyadic judgment error by culture and relationship for negotiation 1

Error	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Pre-negotiation	1.7 (3.1)	0.1 (2.4)	-0.3 (3.8)
After Round 1	4.2 (4.5)	0.5 (4.6)	2.4 (3.2)
Post-negotiation	4.4 (4.3)	0.4 (4.5)	1.8 (3.7)
Strangers			
Pre-negotiation	0.4 (1.7)	0.6 (2.5)	2.0 (3.3)
After Round 1	1.7 (3.0)	1.2 (2.6)	4.1 (5.4)
Post-negotiation	2.9 (3.1)	1.5 (3.4)	3.6 (5.3)

Note: DYADIC JUDGMENT ERROR = $(A_{estimate} - B_{actual}) + (B_{estimate} - A_{actual})$, where A is negotiator 1 and B is negotiator 2.

Means and standard deviations of dyadic judgment error by culture and relationship for negotiation 2

Error	Illinois	Korea	Hong Kong
Friends			
Pre-negotiation	0.4 (1.0)	0.4 (3.7)	0.5 (4.7)
After Round 1	1.3 (2.0)	0.6 (4.0)	1.7 (5.5)
Post-negotiation	2.3 (2.0)	1.7 (4.9)	2.4 (4.6)
Strangers			
Pre-negotiation	3.1 (4.2)	1.9 (3.0)	3.5 (3.7)
After Round 1	3.9 (4.0)	2.1 (2.4)	4.3 (3.2)
Post-negotiation	3.8 (3.9)	2.0 (2.4)	3.9 (2.6)

Note: DYADIC JUDGMENT ERROR = $(A_{estimate} - B_{actual}) + (B_{estimate} - A_{actual})$, where A is negotiator 1 and B is negotiator 2.

APPENDIX B

EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS

W E L C O M E !

Today you will participate in two short experiments. The first experiment concerns measuring attitudes.

EXPERIMENT 1

We are trying to develop a reliable attitude scale. To accomplish this, we need as many people as possible to fill out our questionnaire. Then we can use statistical analysis to choose the best items. On the pages that follow, please fill out the questions as accurately as possible. Your participation is highly appreciated and very beneficial to research on attitudes. Thank you.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE AND FILL OUT THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

IF YOU HAVE A QUESTION AT ANY TIME, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HAND AND AN EXPERIMENTER WILL ASSIST YOU.

In the spaces below, please complete the 20 sentences. Answer the question: "Who am I?" as if you were giving the answers to yourself, not to someone else. Write your answers in the order they occur to you. Do not worry about importance or logic. Go fairly fast.

1. I am _____
2. I am _____
3. I am _____
4. I am _____
5. I am _____
6. I am _____
7. I am _____
8. I am _____
9. I am _____
10. I am _____
11. I am _____
12. I am _____
13. I am _____
14. I am _____
15. I am _____
16. I am _____
17. I am _____
18. I am _____
19. I am _____
20. I am _____

Please turn the page and continue.

Now we want you to indicate if you are the kind of person who behaves in certain ways.

ARE YOU THE KIND OF PERSON WHO IS LIKELY TO

1. ask your parents to live with you?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

2. stay with friends, rather than in a hotel, when you go to another town?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

3. place your parents in an old peoples' home or nursing home?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

4. prefer to stay in a hotel rather than with distant friends when visiting another town?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

5. call on a friend, socially, without giving prior warning?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

6. call your friends every time before visiting them?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

7. to take time off from work to visit an ailing friend?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

8. consult with your friends before buying an expensive item?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

9. prefer going to a cocktail party, rather than going to dinner with four of your close friends?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

10. spend money (e.g. send flowers) rather than take the time to visit an ailing friend?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

11. carry references to relatives or friends when visiting a new place?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

12. have frank talks with others, so as to clear the air?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

13. decide to get married and then announce it to your parents and friends?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

14. ask close relatives for a loan?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

15. entertain visitors even when they drop in at odd hours?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

16. get to know people easily, but it is also very difficult for you to know them intimately?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

17. entertain even unwelcome guests?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

18. live far from your parents?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

19. ask a bank for a loan when you need money?
False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

20. show resentment toward visitors who interrupt your work?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

21. have parents who make enormous (outsiders would say "unreasonable) sacrifices for you?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

22. have parents who consult your fiancee parents extensively, before they decide whether you two should get married?

False 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 True

In the questionnaire below, you are to ask yourself: "What values are important to ME, as guiding principles in MY life, and what values are less important to me?"

Rate the values on a scale from 0 to 7. Where 0 is "not at all important" and 7 is "of supreme importance." Only one of the values should be given a 7. Use numbers from 0 to 6 to indicate the more and more important values. If you reject any of the values, then assign them a -1.

Read all the values. Then decide (a) if you want to reject one or two of them, and (b) to which value your are going to give a 7. Then, place the numbers that correspond to the importance of each value in the blanks next to the value.

1. ____ NATIONAL SECURITY (protection of my nation from enemies)

2. ____ FREEDOM (my own freedom of action and thought)

3. ____ FAMILY SECURITY (safely for loved ones)

4. ____ AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences)

5. ____ HONORING PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)

6. ____ A VARIED LIFE (enjoyment of variety)

7. ____ OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)

8. ____ CHOOSING OWN GOALS (self-direction)

9. ____ SELF-DISCIPLINED (self-restraint, resistance to temptation)

10. ____ INDEPENDENT (doing my own thing)

W E L C O M E

Today's experiment concerns negotiation.

Today you are participating in an experiment to better understand what occurs during negotiation. Your participation is very much appreciated. If you should have questions during the experiment, please raise your hand. Thank you.

Before we begin the actual negotiations, there is something that you should know: During this experiment you have a chance to win money!

PRIZE MONEY
For this experiment you will participate in a series of short negotiations. You have an opportunity to win money. Several prizes of $25 are available.

HOW TO GET THE MONEY
The prizes will be awarded by using a lottery. The lottery will be held on March 23, 1992 at 7:00 p.m. in room 536 of the psychology building. Winners will be notified the next day by telephone. You are welcome to attend the drawing in person if you wish.

LOTTERY TICKETS
During the negotiations you can get lottery tickets. The more lottery tickets you get, the more chances you will have to win the prize. So, during the negotiations, you should try to get as many lottery tickets as possible. The exact way to get lottery tickets during the negotiations will be described shortly.

THE OTHER NEGOTIATOR
You will do a series of negotiations. Each negotiation involves a different person.

PLEASE READ THE INDEX CARD IN FRONT OF YOU TO FIND OUT WHO YOU WILL NEGOTIATE WITH FIRST.

PLEASE TURN THE PAGE TO CONTINUE

Before we go any further, we would like to ask a few questions.

1. How concerned will you be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for yourself?

____ extremely concerned
____ moderately concerned
____ slightly concerned
____ not at all concerned

2. How concerned will the other negotiator be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for himself?

____ extremely concerned
____ moderately concerned
____ slightly concerned
____ not at all concerned

3. How concerned will the other negotiator be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for you?

____ extremely concerned
____ moderately concerned
____ slightly concerned
____ not at all concerned

4. How concerned will you be with getting a lot of lottery tickets for the other negotiator?

____ extremely concerned
____ moderately concerned
____ slightly concerned
____ not at all concerned

5. How concerned will you be with getting more lottery tickets than the other negotiator?

____ extremely concerned
____ moderately concerned
____ slightly concerned
____ not at all concerned

THE SITUATION

The negotiation consists of a series of rounds. On each round you and the other person make demands. Specifically, the negotiation involves dividing up 19 points between yourself and the other negotiator. So, on each round of the negotiation, you both demand points. Each point is worth 10 lottery tickets. The more tickets you get, the greater your chances of winning money.

You have been assigned to be a "red" or a "blue" negotiator based on the color of the materials used in the negotiation. The other negotiator has been assigned to be a different color.

LOTTERY TICKETS

There will be two prizes of $25 available for each negotiation. For each prize a lottery will be conducted. One lottery will be held for the negotiators who use "blue" materials and another lottery will be held for the negotiators who use "red" materials.

THE PROCEDURE

The negotiation takes place as follows. Both you and the other negotiator decide how many of the 19 points you want. This means that you will decide how many points you want from 0 to 19. You do this anonymously and in private. The number of points that you want is your demand. The number of points that other negotiator wants is his demand. When you both have decided on your demands you will write them on sheets of paper and the experimenter will deliver them. If the sum is equal to 19 or less, the negotiation ends. If the sum is greater than 19, both of you will be required make another demand. You will do this until the sum is equal to 19 or less or until time runs out. If time runs out and your demands do not sum to 19, you will be given 1 lottery ticket each.
If the sum of your demands reach 19 or less, the negotiation will end. Then based on your final point total you will get lottery tickets.

YOU WILL GET 10 LOTTERY TICKETS FOR EACH POINT.

YOUR LIMIT

Before we begin there is something that you and the other negotiator must do. You must decide upon a limit. Your limit will be the lowest number of points that you will accept in this negotiation. You can choose a limit between 0 and 9 points. When you choose your limit, you must stick to it. You can not make demands below it.

IF YOU MAKE A DEMAND BELOW YOUR LIMIT, YOU AUTOMATICALLY GET 0 LOTTERY TICKETS.

NOW YOU CAN SET YOUR LIMIT

You must choose a limit from 0 to 9. Please write it on this sheet.

I CHOSE MY LIMIT TO BE _____. This is the lowest number of points that I will demand in this negotiation.

In the space below, please describe the reasons for your choice.

THE OTHER NEGOTIATOR'S LIMIT

At this time, we would like you to guess what the other negotiator's limit is. This is the lowest number points he will demand in this negotiation. He had to chose a limit between 0 and 9.

I THINK THE OTHER NEGOTIATOR'S LIMIT IS _____.

In the space below, please describe the reasons for your guess.

QUESTIONS PLEASE!

We want you to be comfortable with the instructions and we like to answer your questions.

Please raise your hand if you have a question!

If you have no questions, please turn the page!

WE HAVE A FEW QUESTIONS BEFORE WE START NEGOTIATING!

1. What is the most you can demand on each round? ____

2. What is your limit? ____

3. What is the least you can demand on each round? ____

4. Can you demand a value below your limit? ____ yes ____ no

5. How many lottery tickets do you get if you make a demand below your limit? ____

6. What is your guess about the other person's limit? ____

7. How many points do you want to get in the upcoming negotiation?

   _____

8. What do you think is the lowest number of points the other negotiator will demand in the negotiation?

   _____

9. How optimistic are you that you can get what you want?

   ____ extremely optimistic
   ____ moderately optimistic
   ____ slightly optimistic
   ____ not at all optimistic

10. Describe what your strategy will be during the upcoming negotiation.

11. During the upcoming negotiation, what impression do you want to make on the other negotiator?

12. Describe what you think the other negotiator's strategy will be.

NEGOTIATION INSTRUCTION SHEET

THE NEGOTIATION WILL NOW TAKE PLACE.

TO SEND A DEMAND

1. TO MAKE A DEMAND YOU MUST USE A "DEMAND SHEET."

2. WRITE THE VALUE OF YOUR DEMAND IN THE BLANK. THE VALUE OF YOUR DEMAND CAN RANGE FROM YOUR LIMIT UP TO 19 POINTS.

3. YOU CAN ALSO WRITE ANY MESSAGE THAT YOU WANT TO SEND TO THE OTHER NEGOTIATOR.

4. RAISE YOUR HAND AND THE EXPERIMENTER WILL DELIVER YOUR DEMAND AND MESSAGE.

5. WRITE YOUR DEMAND ON YOUR OWN SUMMARY SHEET

RECEIVING AN OFFER

1. READ THE DEMAND AND ANY MESSAGE.

2. FILL OUT THE "OTHER'S DEMAND RATING SHEET."

3. WRITE THE OTHER'S DEMAND ON YOUR SUMMARY SHEET.

4. COMPUTE THE SUM OF YOUR AND THE OTHER'S DEMAND.

VITA

Christopher Robert McCusker

Work

Yale University
School of Management
Box 1A, New Haven, CT 06520
203-432-6055 (office)
203-432-9994 (fax)
E-mail: mccusker@som.yale.edu

Home

347 Pine Orchard Rd.
Branford, CT 06405
203-483-6524

Education

Ph.D. Industrial-Organizational Psychology, Oct., 1994
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

A.M. Industrial/Organizational Psychology, Oct., 1990
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

B.S. Psychology (with distinction), May, 1987
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Honors and Awards

American Psychological Association Dissertation Research Award, 1992

Named to List of University of Illinois Instructors Rated as "Excellent", Spring 1992

Professional Affiliations

American Psychological Association
Academy of Management
Society for Judgment and Decision Making
International Association of Conflict Management

Work Experience

Present	Assistant Professor, Organizational Behavior Yale University, School of Management
1993	Adjunct Assistant Professor, Managerial Negotiation Columbia University, Graduate School of Business
1992	Teaching Assistant, Social Psychology University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1990-91	Personnel Selection Intern International Business Machines Corporation U.S. Headquarters, Purchase, NY
1987-90	Research Assistant to Fritz Drasgow University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1989-90	Research Assistant to Peter J. Carnevale University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1990	Statistics Tutor, Office of Minority Student Affairs, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1989	Teaching Assistant, Research Methods in Field Settings University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
1987	Teaching Assistant, Industrial-Organizational Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Publications

Carnevale, P. J., O'Connor, K., & McCusker, C. (in press). Time pressure in negotiation and mediation. In O. Svenson and J. Maule (Eds.), Time pressure and stress in human judgment and decision making. New York: Plenum.

De Dreu, C. K. W., Lualhati, J. C., & McCusker, C. (in press). Effects of gain-loss frames on individual satisfaction with outcome differences in social decision making. European Journal of Social Psychology.

Triandis, H. C., McCusker, C., & Hui, C. H. (1990). Multimethod probes of individualism-collectivism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 1006-1020.

Triandis, H. C., McCusker, C., Betancourt, H., Iwao, S., Leung, K., Salazar, J. M., Setiadi, B., Sinha, J. B. P., Touzard, H., Wang, D., & Zaleski, Z. (in press). An etic-emic analysis of the individualism and collectivism constructs. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology.

Levine, M. V., Drasgow, F., Williams, B., McCusker, C., & Thomasson, G. (in press). Measuring the difference between two models. Applied Psychological Measurement.

McCusker, C. & Carnevale, P. J. (in press). Framing in resource dilemmas: Loss aversion and the moderating effects of sanctions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes.

Existing Manuscripts

Bottom, W. P. & McCusker, C. (1994). Effects of allocentrism-idiocentrism, group identity and task type on cooperation in a pubic goods problem.

Carnevale, P. J., O'Connor, K., & McCusker, C. (1994). Effects of prior experience, decision frame and issue presentation on cooperation in bilateral negotiation.

DeDreu, C. K. W. & McCusker, C. (1994). A transformational analysis of frame effects in mixed-motive interdependence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, UNDER EDITORIAL REVIEW.

Drasgow, F., Levine, M. V., Williams, B., Thomasson, G., McCusker, C., & Lim, R. G. (1994). Testing specific hypotheses with optimal appropriateness measurement.

Drasgow, F., Levine, M. V., Williams, B., Thomasson, G., McCusker, C., & Lim, R. G. (1994). Robustness of optimal appropriateness measurement to misspecification.

Lim, R. G., Williams, B., Drasgow, F., Levine, M. V., McCusker, C., & Thomasson, G. L. (1994). Maximum likelihood formula score theory: A nonparametric item response theory.

McCusker, C., Nam, K., and Chan, A.C.F. (1994). Individualism-collectivism and relationships in distributive negotiation: An experimental analysis in Hong Kong, Korea and the United States.

Current Research Projects (data collected; manuscript incomplete)

Carnevale, P. J. & McCusker, C. (1994). Negotiation in an experimental market: Effects of decision frame, information, and other's behavior on concession making.

McCusker, C., Gelfand, M., Goto, S., Trafimow, D., & Triandis, H. C. (1994). Culture, self, motives and rewards: A laboratory test of individualism-collectivism theory.

McCusker, C., Kuhn, K., & Carnevale, P. J. (1994). Effects of mood, aspiration and others' behavior on cooperation in bilateral negotiation.

McCusker, C., Ulaszek, W. R., Chen, Y., Nam, K. & De Dreu, C.K.W. (1994). Culture and social decision making: Effects of individualism-collectivism and social distance on satisfaction with outcomes.

Ad Hoc Reviewer

International Journal of Conflict Management
Journal of Conflict Resolution
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes

Conference Presentations

McCusker, C., Nam, K., and Chan, A.C.F. (1994). Individualism-collectivism and relationships in distributive negotiation: An experimental analysis in Hong Kong, Korea and the United States. To be presented at the 6th Conference of the International Association of Conflict Management, Portland, Oregon.

Bottom, W.P., & McCusker, C. (1994). Effects of allocentrism-idiocentrism, group identity and task type on cooperation in a pubic goods problem. To be presented at the 6th Conference of the International Association of Conflict Management, Portland, Oregon.

McCusker, C. (1993, June). Research on culture and negotiation: Conceptual, epistemological, and methodological dilemmas. Presented at the 5th Conference of the International Association of Conflict Management, Leuven, Belgium.

De Dreu, C.K.W. and McCusker, C. (1993, June). Effects of frames and social motives on cooperation in interdependent decision making: A transformational analysis. Presented at the 5th Conference of the International Association of Conflict Management, Leuven, Belgium.

De Dreu, C.K.W., Lualhati, J.C., & McCusker, C. (1992, November). Effects of gain-loss frames on own-outcome orientation and equity considerations in social decision making. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, St. Louis, Missouri.

McCusker, C. & Nam, K. (1992, June). Culture and rational expectations in negotiation. Presented at the 4th Conference of the International Association of Conflict Management, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

McCusker, C. & Carnevale, P. J. (1992, June). Frame, loss aversion and cooperation in social dilemmas: The moderating effects of sanctioning systems and others' behavior. Presented at the 4th Conference of the International Association of Conflict Management, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Midkiff, K.R., Dyer, P.J., Desmarais, L.B., Rogg, K.L., & McCusker, C. (1992, May). The Multimedia Test: Friend or Foe? Presented at the Seventh Annual Conference of the Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, Montreal, Canada.

McCusker, C. & Carnevale, P. J. (1990, November). Decision framing and others' behavior in social dilemmas. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Judgment and

Decision Making, New Orleans, Louisiana.

Carnevale, P. J., O'Connor, K., & McCusker, C. (1990, November). Effects of experience, decision frame, and issue presentation on cooperation in bilateral negotiation. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Judgment and Decision Making, New Orleans, Louisiana.

Carnevale, P. J. & McCusker, C. (1990, March). Framing of reward and penalty sanctioning systems in social dilemmas. Presented at the Fourth International Conference on Social Dilemmas, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan.

Drasgow, F., Levine, M. V., Williams, B., McCusker, C., & Lim, R. G. (1990, June). Polychotomous IRT models: Some surprising results. Paper presented at the Office of Naval Research Conference on Psychological Measurement, Norman, Oklahoma.

Lim, R. G., Williams, B., McCusker, C., Mead, A., Thomasson, G. G. L., Drasgow, F., & Levine, M. V. (1989, May). A nonparametric polychotomous item response model and estimation procedure. Paper presented at the Office of Naval Research Conference on Psychological Measurement, Norman, Oklahoma.

McCusker, C., Williams, B., Drasgow, F., & Levine, M. V. (1988, May). When are estimated parameters as good as population parameters? Paper presented at the Office of Naval Research Conference on Psychological Measurement, Iowa City, Iowa.

References

Peter J. Carnevale
Department of Psychology
University of Illinois
603 East Daniel St.
Champaign, IL 61820
217-333-4819

James H. Davis
Department of Psychology
University of Illinois
603 East Daniel St.
Champaign, IL 61820
217-333-0008

Fritz Drasgow
Department of Psychology
University of Illinois
603 East Daniel St.
Champaign, IL 61820
217-333-2739

Patricia J. Dyer
International Business Machines Corporation
United States Headquarters
Purchase, NY 10577
914-697-7444

Samuel S. Komorita
Department of Psychology
603 East Daniel St.
Champaign, IL 61820
217-333-0446

Michael V. Levine
Department of Educational Psychology
University of Illinois
210 S. Sixth Street
Champaign, IL 61820
217-333-0092

Harry C. Triandis
Department of Psychology
University of Illinois
603 East Daniel St.
Champaign, IL 61820
217-333-1894